2 total
Four-year mandatory minimum for discharging a firearm at a dwelling struck down as grossly disproportionate.
The appellant pleaded guilty to intentionally discharging a firearm into or at a place knowing or being reckless as to whether another person was present, contrary to s. 244.2(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence of four years' imprisonment under s. 244.2(3)(b) on the basis of a reasonable hypothetical involving a young person firing an air-powered pistol or rifle at a residence incapable of perforating its walls.
The majority held that the mandatory minimum is grossly disproportionate under s. 12 of the Charter because the offence captures a wide spectrum of conduct ranging from acts that present little danger to the public to those that pose a grave risk, and the fit sentence for the hypothetical youthful offender would be a suspended sentence of up to 12 months' probation — rendering a four-year custodial term totally out of sync with sentencing norms and incompatible with human dignity.
The declaration of invalidity was applied retroactively and the three-and-a-half-year sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was reinstated.
Côté J. dissented, finding that the hypothetical was not a reasonably foreseeable application of the offence and that the mandatory minimum did not meet the high threshold for cruel and unusual punishment.
The 18-month presumptive ceiling for trial delay established in Jordan applies to youth justice court proceedings.
A young person charged under the Youth Criminal Justice Act appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, arguing that the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan should be lowered for youth justice court proceedings and that the delay of nearly 19 months in his case was unreasonable.
The majority held that the existing Jordan framework applies to youth proceedings without modification to the presumptive ceilings, but that the enhanced need for timeliness in youth matters must be considered within the below-ceiling test when assessing whether delay was markedly longer than it reasonably should have been.
After deducting two to three months of defence delay and approximately one month of delay from a discrete exceptional administrative event, the net delay fell below the 18-month ceiling and did not meet the test for a stay below the ceiling in this transitional case.
Four justices dissented, with three finding a separate 15-month ceiling should apply and one finding the full delay breached the 18-month ceiling without any deductions.
