SCC 2006

The respondent requested access to government documents relating to his prosecution for regulatory offences, which had been quashed or stayed.

The government denied access to many documents, claiming solicitor-client privilege under s. 23 of the Access to Information Act, which was interpreted to include litigation privilege.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that litigation privilege, unlike legal advice privilege, expires with the litigation that gave rise to it, absent closely related proceedings.

Since the penal proceedings had terminated and the respondent's civil action for abuse of process was not closely related, the litigation privilege had expired and the documents were not exempt from disclosure.

The applicants sought a stay of an Alberta Court of Appeal judgment that upheld legislation disqualifying school board employees from serving as school trustees.

The applicants, who were sitting trustees, applied for a stay pending their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

A single judge of the Supreme Court granted the stay on an exemption basis, allowing the currently sitting trustees to complete their terms or remain in office until the appeal is decided, finding that the RJR-MacDonald test was met and the government consented to the stay to preserve electoral integrity.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered four appeals regarding retroactive child support.

The Court held that parents have a free-standing obligation to support their children commensurate with their income, and courts have the jurisdiction to order retroactive child support under both the Divorce Act and provincial legislation.

In determining whether to make a retroactive award, courts must balance the payor parent's interest in certainty with fairness to the child by considering the reason for the recipient parent's delay, the payor parent's conduct, the child's past and present circumstances, and potential hardship.

The Court allowed the appeals in D.B.S. and T.A.R., restoring the chambers judges' decisions to deny retroactive support, and dismissed the appeals in Henry and Hiemstra, affirming the retroactive support awards.

The appellants' premises were searched pursuant to an Anton Piller order obtained by the respondents.

During the search, the respondents' solicitors seized electronic documents, some of which were subject to solicitor-client privilege.

The respondents' solicitors subsequently accessed and reviewed these privileged documents without the appellants' consent.

The appellants brought a motion to remove the respondents' solicitors of record.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that where lawyers obtain access to relevant solicitor-client confidences during an Anton Piller search, they bear the onus of rebutting the presumption of a resulting risk of prejudice.

The respondents' solicitors failed to discharge this burden and were removed from the record.

The company TCT became insolvent and an interim receiver, KPMG, was appointed.

The order appointing KPMG stated it could not be considered a successor employer and prohibited proceedings against it without leave.

KPMG terminated unionized employees and sold assets to a new company, which hired some employees without union representation.

The union sought leave under s. 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to bring a successor employer application before the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

The Supreme Court held that the bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to determine successor employer status, which belongs exclusively to the labour board.

The Court also held that the traditional Mancini test applies to s. 215 leave applications, requiring only a prima facie case, and granted the union leave to proceed.

The appellants appealed their extradition committals, arguing that section 32(1)(b) of the Extradition Act infringed section 7 of the Charter because it did not require evidence to be certified as available for trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals and remitted the matters to the extradition judges to be determined in accordance with the concurrent decision in United States of America v. Ferras, which upheld the constitutionality of the provisions.

The United States sought the extradition of the appellants under the 'record of the case' method.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the evidentiary provisions of the Extradition Act, arguing they violated section 7 of the Charter by allowing committal on unreliable evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions are constitutional because section 29(1) of the Act grants the extradition judge the discretion to refuse committal if the evidence is manifestly unreliable or unavailable for trial.

The appeals were dismissed and the committals for extradition were upheld.

The appellant, a director of public security, asked a subordinate officer to prepare a supplementary accident report regarding his daughter's car accident.

The supplementary report concluded his daughter was not at fault, saving the appellant a $250 insurance deductible.

He was convicted of breach of trust by a public officer under s. 122 of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, establishing a five-part test for the offence.

The Court held that the offence requires both a serious and marked departure from the standards expected of the office, and an intention to use the office for a purpose other than the public good.

The appellant's conduct was found to be a mere error in judgment lacking the requisite mens rea and actus reus.

The Ministry of Correctional Services appealed an order granting a requester's counsel access to records subject to a claim of solicitor-client privilege for the purpose of arguing a judicial review application under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that records subject to a claim of solicitor-client privilege may only be disclosed where 'absolutely necessary'.

The Court found no such absolute necessity in this case.

The Court also held that while the procedural provisions of the Access Act prohibiting disclosure apply to the Commissioner, courts on judicial review are governed by their own procedural rules but must adopt procedures to protect confidentiality until a substantive decision is made.

The respondent's long-term disability benefits were terminated by her insurer based on video surveillance, despite a lack of medical evidence indicating she could return to work.

After five years of denied benefits, the insurer reinstated them shortly before trial.

The trial judge awarded $20,000 in damages for mental distress but denied punitive damages, finding no bad faith.

The Court of Appeal upheld the mental distress award and added $100,000 in punitive damages.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the insurer's appeal in part, setting aside the punitive damages but upholding the mental distress award.

The Court held that damages for mental distress for breach of contract are recoverable under the Hadley v. Baxendale principle if they were within the reasonable contemplation of the parties, which is the case for disability insurance contracts.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 10 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act applies only to civilian staff appointed and employed by the RCMP Commissioner.

It does not apply to civilian staff appointed or employed by a municipality under a police services agreement entered into by the Solicitor General pursuant to s. 20 of the Act.

The respondents, members of a pension plan, sought to terminate the pension trust and distribute its $11 million surplus among themselves using the common law rule in Saunders v. Vautier.

The employer, Rogers Communications Inc., had previously closed the plan, taken contribution holidays, and merged it with other plans.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the rule in Saunders v. Vautier does not apply to employment pension trusts, which are heavily regulated by the Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985 (PBSA).

The Court found that the PBSA provides a comprehensive scheme for plan termination and that the members must seek recourse through the Superintendent of Financial Institutions rather than relying on the common law rule to bypass the statutory framework.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered whether general deterrence is a principle of sentencing under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

The Court held that the YCJA introduced a new sentencing regime that deliberately excluded general deterrence as a factor in youth sentencing.

The Court also held that section 42(2)(o) of the YCJA does not require a sentencing judge to impose at least two-thirds of a sentence in custody and one-third under supervision, granting the judge discretion to determine the appropriate length of the custody and supervision portions.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, adopting the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The parties divorced after a 20-year marriage.

The appellant husband sought to discontinue his spousal support payments, arguing he was unemployed and the respondent wife had a duty to become self-sufficient.

The trial judge and Court of Appeal dismissed his application.

The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed, holding that while the Divorce Act prohibits considering spousal misconduct itself in support orders, the emotional consequences of such misconduct that impair a spouse's ability to achieve self-sufficiency are relevant.

The Court also confirmed that self-sufficiency is an objective, not a strict duty, and that a payor's after-acquired capital assets can be considered in determining their ability to pay.

Appeals and cross-appeals arising from the collapses of two airlines operating leased aircraft and leaving substantial unpaid airport and civil air navigation charges.

The Court held that legal titleholders were not personally liable for unpaid navigation charges under s. 55 of the Civil Air Navigation Services Commercialization Act because 'owner' was limited to persons with legal custody, control, or possession in the statutory context.

However, the seizure and detention remedies under s. 56 of that Act and s. 9 of the Airport Transfer (Miscellaneous Matters) Act operated against aircraft owned or operated by the defaulting airlines and could not be defeated by leasing arrangements or by separating attached engines.

The remedies extended to security posted in substitution for the aircraft, subject to the motions judges’ supervisory discretion to craft fair terms.

Interest continued to run until payment, posting of security, or bankruptcy.

The appellant, owner of the famous VEUVE CLICQUOT trade-mark for champagne, sought to prevent the respondents from using the trade-name and registered trade-marks 'Cliquot' in association with their mid-priced women's clothing stores.

The appellant alleged that the respondents' use caused confusion under section 20 of the Trade-marks Act and depreciated the value of the goodwill attaching to its mark under section 22.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no likelihood of confusion given the significant differences in the wares and channels of trade.

The Court also dismissed the section 22 claim, holding that the appellant failed to establish that consumers would make a mental association between the clothing stores and the champagne mark, or that any such association would likely depreciate the value of the appellant's goodwill.

The appellant, manufacturer of BARBIE dolls, opposed the respondent's application to register the trade-mark 'Barbie's' for its chain of restaurants.

The Trade-marks Opposition Board rejected the opposition, finding no likelihood of confusion given the significant difference in the nature of the wares and services.

The Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal upheld the decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was reasonable.

The Court confirmed that while a trade-mark's fame is an important factor, it does not trump all other factors under section 6(5) of the Trade-marks Act, and the totality of the circumstances must be considered.

The appellant religious order operated a residential school and held a claims-made comprehensive general liability policy.

During the policy period, the appellant became aware of allegations of abuse at the school and notified the insurer of potential future claims.

After the policy expired, numerous former students brought actions.

The insurer denied a duty to defend, arguing the claims were not made during the policy period.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the policy was unambiguously a claims-made policy.

Because a 'claim' requires the communication of an intention to hold the insured responsible for damages, and no such intention was communicated by the subsequent plaintiffs during the policy period, the insurer had no duty to defend those actions.

The Minister of Finance appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario which held that the definition of 'hedging' in the Mining Tax Act was restricted to contracts settled by physical delivery of gold from an Ontario mine.

The respondent, a mining company, had realized significant gains from financial hedging transactions that did not result in physical delivery, and excluded these gains from its profit computation based on the Minister's former administrative practice.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the statutory definition of 'hedging' extends to transactions that do not result in physical delivery.

The Court applied the modern approach to statutory interpretation, finding that the narrower interpretation would render parts of the statutory definition redundant.