SCC 1990

The appellants, Ministers of the Crown, were found guilty of contempt of court by the Federal Court of Appeal for failing to comply with an order to produce a file.

The order was served on their solicitor, but there was no evidence the Ministers had actual personal knowledge of it.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that contempt of court requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of actual knowledge of the order.

The Court found that service on a solicitor under the Federal Court Rules does not create a presumption of actual knowledge for the purposes of a quasi-criminal contempt proceeding, nor does vicarious liability apply to hold the Ministers responsible for the actions of their officials.

The respondent held a registered copyright in two operating system programs for its computers.

The appellants copied the programs, which were embedded in silicon chips, and sold clone computers.

The appellants admitted the written assembly language versions were copyrightable but argued the silicon chips were not.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the programs embedded in the silicon chip are a reproduction of the programs in assembly language and are protected by copyright under s. 3(1) of the Copyright Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was arrested for robbery, consulted counsel, and stated he did not wish to make a statement to the police.

He was then placed in a cell with an undercover police officer who engaged him in conversation and elicited incriminating statements.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the accused's right to remain silent under section 7 of the Charter was violated by the police trickery.

The Court concluded that the admission of the conscripted statements would render the trial unfair and bring the administration of justice into disrepute, excluding the evidence under section 24(2) and restoring the acquittal.

The appellants, who negotiated a tax rebate from the Government of Manitoba on behalf of several Indian bands, sought to garnish the settlement funds before judgment to secure their contingency fees.

The respondent bands argued the funds were protected from attachment under sections 89(1) and 90(1)(b) of the Indian Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the funds could not be garnished.

While the Court split on whether 'Her Majesty' in section 90(1)(b) includes the provincial Crown, the majority concluded that either the funds were protected by the Indian Act or the provincial Garnishment Act did not apply to the Crown in these circumstances.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury regarding unsavoury witnesses, the theory of the defence, and in responding to a jury request for transcripts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions complied with the Vetrovec requirements, adequately set forth the defence theory, and properly handled the jury's request for transcripts by inviting them to return if they needed further assistance after commencing deliberations.

The appellants, elementary school students, were acquitted at trial of sexually assaulting a fellow student.

The trial judge had a reasonable doubt as to their involvement and found the date of the offence was an essential element that had not been proved.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in considering the evidence of the complainant and an accomplice in isolation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appellants' appeal, holding that the trial judge's failure to consider the evidence in its totality was the result of misdirection, which constituted an error of law alone giving the Court of Appeal jurisdiction to intervene.

The appellant, a young offender, was charged with aggravated sexual assault against a five-year-old child.

At trial, the unsworn testimony of the child was corroborated as to the occurrence of the assault, but no independent evidence implicated the appellant as the perpetrator.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, holding that corroborating evidence must connect the accused to the crime.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that under section 586 of the Criminal Code, the corroborating evidence need only confirm the child's story in some material particular, and does not strictly need to implicate the accused independently.

The appellants challenged a provincial commission of inquiry into alleged dealings between named private individuals, a corporation, and public officials.

The majority held that, in pith and substance, the inquiry functioned as a substitute police investigation and preliminary inquiry into a specific Criminal Code offence, thereby intruding on Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law and criminal procedure under s. 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The naming of private individuals, the close mirroring of s. 121 of the Criminal Code, and the inquiry's coercive powers were found cumulatively to render the Order in Council ultra vires.

The Court therefore allowed the appeal and did not decide the remaining Charter issues.

The appellant employer challenged a labour tribunal order authorizing an employee to pursue arbitration of a dismissal grievance after the union had withdrawn it through a general grievance settlement reached during collective agreement renewal.

The Court held that the union's duty of fair representation required serious, good faith consideration of the employee's dismissal grievance and that the union acted arbitrarily and with serious negligence by disposing of it without the employee's knowledge on grounds unrelated to the merits.

The Court further held that a settlement agreement between union and employer was not equivalent to an arbitral award or civil transaction barring further recourse, and that the Labour Court had jurisdiction under ss. 47.2 to 47.6 of the Labour Code to refer the claim to arbitration where no arbitral decision on the merits had yet been made.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent employee sued his union in the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench, alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation after the union pursued grievances on behalf of other employees that resulted in the respondent losing a promotion.

The trial judge dismissed the action, but the Court of Appeal allowed it.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the union's appeal, holding that the ordinary courts lack jurisdiction to entertain the claim.

The comprehensive legislative scheme of the Canada Labour Code, which includes a statutory duty of fair representation and a privative clause, ousts the common law duty by necessary implication and assigns exclusive jurisdiction to the Canada Labour Relations Board.

The appellant was stopped by a police officer while driving away from a hotel shortly after closing time.

The officer noted signs of impairment, and the appellant subsequently failed a breathalyzer test.

The appellant challenged his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the stop was unauthorized and violated his right against arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the stop was authorized by section 119 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Court found the stop was not arbitrary as the officer had an articulable cause, and even if it were considered a random stop, it would be justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The appellant was stopped by police during a random routine traffic check without any suspicion of unlawful activity.

He admitted his driver's licence was suspended and was convicted of driving while suspended.

He appealed, arguing the random stop violated his Charter rights against arbitrary detention and unreasonable search and seizure.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the random stop constituted an arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter, it was a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under section 1 due to the pressing and substantial concern of highway safety.

The respondent was charged with communicating in a public place for the purpose of obtaining the sexual services of a prostitute contrary to s. 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted the respondent, but the Court of Appeal set aside the conviction, holding that the provision infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that while the provision infringes s. 2(b), it is a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under s. 1.

The Court further held that the provision does not infringe the guarantee of freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter, as its target is expressive conduct rather than conduct of an associational nature.

The appellant was charged with communicating in a public place for the purpose of engaging in prostitution after offering sexual services to an undercover police officer.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding the Criminal Code provision violated freedom of expression under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal and entered a conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting its reasoning from a companion reference case to hold that while the provision infringes freedom of expression, it is a demonstrably justified reasonable limit, and it does not violate the right to life, liberty, and security of the person on grounds of vagueness.

On a constitutional reference concerning prostitution-related Criminal Code provisions, the Court considered whether the bawdy-house offence and the public communication offence infringed freedom of expression and the principles of fundamental justice.

The majority held that the public communication offence engaged s. 2(b) because it prohibited public communication for the purpose of prostitution, but found the infringement justified under s. 1 in light of Parliament’s objective of addressing the social nuisance associated with street solicitation.

The majority further held that neither provision was impermissibly vague and that s. 7 did not protect the asserted economic liberty to pursue prostitution as a profession.

The appeal was dismissed, with two judges dissenting on the basis that the communication provision unjustifiably infringed both ss. 2(b) and 7.

The appellant, a member of the Musqueam Indian Band, was charged under the Fisheries Act with fishing with a drift net longer than permitted by the Band's Indian food fishing licence.

He defended the charge on the basis that he was exercising an existing aboriginal right to fish and that the net length restriction was inconsistent with s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Supreme Court of Canada established a framework for analyzing s. 35(1) claims, holding that an aboriginal right is not extinguished by mere regulation and that any government regulation infringing upon an aboriginal right must be justified.

The Court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, ordering a new trial to determine whether the net length restriction constituted a prima facie infringement and, if so, whether it was justified.

Members of a Huron band were prosecuted for cutting trees, camping, and making fires in a provincial park while carrying out ancestral customs and religious rites.

The Court held that a 1760 document signed by General Murray was a treaty within s. 88 of the Indian Act, remained in force, and protected the exercise of the respondents' customs and religion on territory frequented by the Hurons in 1760, so long as the activity was not incompatible with Crown occupancy.

The Court adopted a broad and liberal approach to treaty interpretation, capacity, and extinguishment, and found that provincial park regulation could not be enforced against the respondents in these circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, a lawyer and undischarged bankrupt, pleaded guilty to fraud and breach of trust for misappropriating client funds.

The sentencing judge ordered him to pay compensation to the Law Society, which had partially reimbursed the victims, and to one victim for the balance of his loss.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the compensation order required the prior consent of the bankruptcy court.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a compensation order under the Criminal Code is a personal order that does not require bankruptcy court consent to be made, though consent is required before it can be enforced against the bankrupt's property.

The Court also affirmed that the Law Society is a 'person aggrieved' through subrogation.

The appellants, A, B, and C, sought an order of certiorari to quash a subpoena compelling A to testify in a criminal trial, or alternatively, a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to perceived threats to their security.

B and C were living outside Canada.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, holding that a Charter remedy was not available to persons outside Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court erred in failing to consider the safety of the appellants and in finding that remedies were unavailable to persons outside the country in these special circumstances.

A new hearing was directed.

The Supreme Court of Canada previously ordered that all proceedings in this appeal, including the judgment and reasons for judgment, be sealed to protect the safety of the appellants.

The Court subsequently notified the parties of its intention to make the proceedings public unless cause was shown.

As neither the appellants nor the Crown provided a valid reason to continue the sealing order, the Court concluded that the circumstances warranting confidentiality were no longer present.

The Court ordered the release of the court file, including the reasons for judgment.