SCC 1991

The Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to appeal from the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal reported at (1990), 75 C.R. (3d) 238.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a judgment of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada refused the application for leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding an incident with a security clerk.

The trial judge found that even if the security clerk had no justification for touching the appellant's arm, the appellant's response—threatening to punch the small female clerk in the mouth with obscenities and a gesture—was unreasonable and excessive.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the majority of the Court of Appeal that there was evidence to support this finding and dismissed the appeal.

The respondents were prevented by airport officials from distributing political pamphlets and recruiting members at a federal airport.

The appeal concerned whether the airport regulations and related governmental action infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and, if so, whether the restriction was justified under s. 1.

The Court held that political expression in non-security areas of an airport engaged Charter protection and that the blanket prohibition on solicitation and advertising infringed that freedom.

The restriction was not saved under s. 1, with members of the Court variously emphasizing overbreadth, vagueness, lack of a sufficient objective, and the impropriety of relying on government property rights alone to suppress expression.

The appellant insurance company appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal regarding a fire loss claim.

Coverage had been denied on the basis that the respondent insured failed to disclose the cancellation of an earlier policy for non-payment of premium and serious insurance fraud.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting reasons at the Court of Appeal, and restored the trial judgment dismissing the insured's action.

The respondent bank extended credit to the appellant company, secured by merchandise.

Upon default, the bank took possession of the merchandise but, unable to find a buyer, gratuitously abandoned it to a third-party lessor.

The bank sued for the balance of the loan, and the appellant cross-demanded for the value of the abandoned goods.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank breached its duty of good faith under the Bank Act by abandoning the property without notifying the debtor or restoring the status quo.

The appeal was allowed, and the bank was ordered to pay the value of the goods as damages.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder to the Supreme Court of Canada, challenging the constitutionality of the constructive murder provisions under section 213(a) of the Criminal Code.

By consent of the Crown, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that overturned his acquittals for criminal negligence causing death and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, agreeing that the trial judge failed to consider evidence relating to the manner in which the appellant was operating his vehicle prior to the collision.

The Crown appealed a judgment setting aside a murder conviction and substituting a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

The Supreme Court held that the court below erred by treating the first branch of s. 16(2) of the Criminal Code as extending to moral wrongfulness and by invoking s. 7 of the Charter to re-interpret that branch contrary to existing authority.

However, applying the majority reasoning in Chaulk, the Court concluded the accused's delusional state rendered him incapable of knowing the act was morally wrong under the second branch of s. 16(2).

The appellate substitution of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity under s. 686(1)(d) was therefore upheld and the Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after shooting a highway patrol officer.

At trial, he admitted to the killing but raised the defence of insanity.

The Crown adduced evidence that the appellant was a suspect in a New York murder to explain his flight, and Crown counsel made highly prejudicial remarks about a defence psychiatric expert during the address to the jury.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the presumption of sanity in s. 16(4) of the Criminal Code infringes s. 11(d) of the Charter, it is saved by s. 1.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge's failure to comment on Crown counsel's prejudicial remarks in the jury charge constituted an error of law that could not be cured by the proviso.

The appellant killed his wife and raised the defence of insanity at his first degree murder trial, arguing he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and delusions.

The trial judge instructed the jury that 'wrong' in s. 16(2) of the Criminal Code meant legally wrong, relying on previous Supreme Court jurisprudence.

The jury convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada applied its recent decision in R. v. Chaulk, holding that 'wrong' means morally wrong.

The Court found the jury was misdirected and ordered a new trial, while affirming that the presumption of sanity in s. 16(4) is a justifiable limit on the Charter right to be presumed innocent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for indecent assault and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge's reliance on the complainant's testimony resulted in an unreasonable verdict.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no inherent improbability in the complainant's evidence to justify interfering with the trial judge's express credibility findings.

The Court concluded the verdict was supported by the evidence.

The appellants appealed their convictions for operating a broadcasting undertaking contrary to the Radio Act and the Broadcasting Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, adopting the reasons of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal.

The appellants appealed from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal that dismissed an appeal from a judgment continuing an interlocutory injunction.

The injunction restrained the appellants and members of their bands from fishing in accordance with Tribal Council by-laws.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's decision not to interfere with the Chambers Judge's disposition.

The respondents were locked out by their employer during a labour dispute.

A collective agreement was signed and a memorandum governing the return to work was agreed upon, with a portion of the workforce returning immediately and the rest gradually recalled.

The appellant Commission held that the workers not immediately recalled were only eligible for unemployment insurance benefits once production reached a certain level.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Federal Court of Appeal's decision that the stoppage of work terminated on the date the collective agreement was signed, as the lack of intent to perform the contract of service had ended.

The appellant's ship grounded after avoiding a collision with the respondent's ship, which was found solely at fault.

The appellant's ship later grounded a second time due to unrelated causes.

Both sets of damage were repaired concurrently in dry dock.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent was liable for the loss of profit for the entire 27-day period required to repair the first grounding, as the second grounding did not cause any additional loss of profit-earning capacity.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of sexual assault against a fifteen-year-old complainant based on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal and entered a conviction, finding no evidentiary basis for the defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the evidence relied upon by the trial judge was incapable of lending an 'air of reality' to the defence, and affirmed that substituting a conviction was appropriate as a new trial would serve no purpose.

A bank appealed a Quebec Court of Appeal decision that had curtailed its recovery after enforcing Bank Act security against a manufacturer's inventory.

The Supreme Court held the debtor was in default on demand loans, the bank was justified in calling the loans, and the debtor had consented to delivery of the secured inventory for realization.

The Court further held that contractual clauses authorizing possession and sale were valid and not contrary to public policy or the Bank Act where the debtor did not object.

The Court restored the trial judgment, rejected the higher inventory valuation advanced on appeal, and dismissed the cross-appeal and new damages claims.

The appellant challenged both the common law rule allowing the Crown to raise insanity over an accused’s objection and the Criminal Code provision requiring automatic detention of an insanity acquittee pending the pleasure of the Lieutenant Governor.

The Court held that the common law rule violated s. 7 because it impermissibly deprived an accused of control over the conduct of the defence, and it reformulated the rule so that the Crown may generally raise insanity only after the trier of fact has otherwise concluded the accused is guilty, or where the accused has put mental capacity in issue.

The Court further held that s. 542(2) was intra vires Parliament’s criminal law power, but violated ss. 7 and 9 of the Charter because it mandated automatic, arbitrary, and indeterminate detention without a hearing and without standards.

The appeal was allowed, a judicial stay of proceedings was entered, and the declaration of invalidity was suspended for six months with interim detention limits.

The respondent, a school teacher, was convicted of sexually assaulting seven male pupils.

The Court of Appeal overturned the convictions, finding the trial judge erred in considering the cumulative effect of the evidence and that there was insufficient proof of sexual motivation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Court of Appeal erred in its interpretation of sexual assault by requiring specific sexual intent, contrary to established jurisprudence.

Furthermore, the Court held that when an appellate court finds an error of law regarding the admission of evidence, it cannot substitute its own opinion on the sufficiency of the remaining evidence to convict, but must order a new trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.