SCC 1992

The accused was acquitted of first-degree murder at trial.

The Crown appealed, arguing that defence counsel incorrectly summarized evidence concerning access to the accused's car in his address to the jury, and the trial judge failed to correct these errors.

The Quebec Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the Crown had met the burden of showing that the verdict would not necessarily have been the same had the evidence been correctly summarized.

The respondent appealed a refusal for reimbursement of medical equipment to the Commission des affaires sociales.

Two commissioners heard the appeal and drafted a favourable decision, but the Commission's president reviewed it and disagreed.

A compulsory plenary meeting was held, leading one commissioner to change her mind, and the president then decided the matter against the respondent.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Commission's institutionalized consultation process violated the rules of natural justice by creating systemic pressure and an appearance of bias, and dismissed the Commission's appeal.

The accused was involved in a motor vehicle accident and taken to a hospital.

A police officer made a demand for blood samples under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code, but failed to include the assurances from section 254(4) that the samples would only be taken by or under the direction of a qualified medical practitioner and would not endanger the accused's life or health.

The accused refused the demand and was charged with failing to comply.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a valid demand must incorporate these medical assurances.

Because the demand was invalid, the accused could not be convicted of refusing it, and the Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged in separate informations with assault causing bodily harm (indictable) and assault (summary).

At trial, defence counsel suggested dealing with both charges at once, and the Crown consented.

The appellant was convicted of both charges.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to try separate informations together.

The Supreme Court of Canada reconsidered its previous rulings and held that a court has jurisdiction to try separate informations together, including a mix of summary and indictable offences, provided both the accused and the prosecution consent, and the accused waives the right to a preliminary inquiry and trial in a higher court.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Attorney General of Quebec appealed a decision declaring that various instruments amalgamating the cities of Rouyn and Noranda were unconstitutional for failing to comply with s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the entire legislative process, including the ministerial orders and letters patent, was subject to the mandatory bilingualism requirements of s. 133.

The Court declared the instruments nullities but suspended the declaration of invalidity for one year to allow the National Assembly to remedy the defects.

The police installed an unauthorized electronic tracking device (a 'beeper') in the appellant's vehicle after a search warrant had expired.

They used the device to monitor his movements, which eventually led to evidence connecting him to the destruction of a communications tower.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the installation and monitoring constituted an unreasonable search in violation of s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the majority concluded that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) because it was real evidence, the police acted in good faith out of urgency to protect the public from a suspected serial killer, and the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Criminal Code obscenity provisions after being charged in connection with the sale, possession, and display of sexually explicit videotapes, magazines, and sexual devices.

The Court held that s. 163(8) infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, but upheld the provision under s. 1 on the basis that its true objective was preventing harm to society, particularly harm associated with degrading or dehumanizing sexual material.

The Court reformulated the obscenity analysis around harm, community tolerance, degradation or dehumanization, and internal necessities or artistic merit.

Because the courts below had applied materially different approaches, the appeal was allowed and a new trial was directed on all charges.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal which held that a federal statutory provision conferring a professional title was unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Marceau J.A. from the court below.

The Court held that the mere conferring and holding of a title is a neutral act unconstrained by the division of powers, provided it is not directly linked to the regulation of the profession.

The appellant filed an appearance and declaration of incidental appeal in the office of the Provincial Court instead of the Court of Appeal.

Over two years later, the appellant sought special leave from the Court of Appeal to file the documents properly, arguing the trial court clerk failed to forward them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding it lacked jurisdiction to extend the time limit beyond six months under art. 523 C.C.P. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that while the documents were filed in the wrong office, the time limit for an incidental appeal is not strict like a principal appeal.

The Court held that the Court of Appeal had broad discretionary power under art. 523 C.C.P. to correct the procedural error and should have exercised it to prevent the loss of the appellant's right of appeal, as the respondents suffered no prejudice.

The respondent was offered a public service position subject to obtaining a security clearance.

CSIS advised against granting the clearance, and the Deputy Minister denied it.

The respondent complained to the Security Intelligence Review Committee, which recommended granting the clearance.

The Deputy Minister refused to follow the recommendation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the word 'recommendations' in section 52(2) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act should be given its ordinary meaning of offering advice, and does not constitute a binding decision.

The Deputy Minister retains the ultimate authority and responsibility to grant or deny security clearances.

The respondents brought an action for damages against a doctor and the appellant hospital alleging medical malpractice.

The Superior Court found no fault on the part of the doctor and dismissed the action.

The Court of Appeal reversed this judgment and found both the doctor and the hospital liable.

In a companion appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the doctor's appeal and found no fault.

Consequently, the Court allowed the hospital's appeal, holding that the hospital could only be liable if the doctor was found to be at fault.

The respondents' five-year-old daughter suffered a severed artery and was taken to a general hospital, where the appellant doctor treated her.

Realizing he could not repair the artery, the appellant transferred her to a paediatric hospital without administering a blood transfusion.

The child later suffered a cardio-respiratory arrest resulting in severe brain damage.

The trial judge dismissed the medical malpractice action, finding the appellant exercised sound judgment, but the Court of Appeal reversed this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal erred by substituting its own assessment of the facts and expert evidence for that of the trial judge without identifying a palpable and overriding error.

The appellant, a commissioned officer in the Canadian Armed Forces, was charged with being absent without leave after failing to report to a new posting.

She argued that she honestly believed she had resigned from the Armed Forces and therefore lacked the requisite mens rea.

She also challenged the constitutionality of the General Court Martial under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the structure of the General Court Martial infringed s. 11(d) of the Charter, applying its concurrent decision in R. v. Généreux.

The Court also noted that an honest mistake about the legal consequences of one's actions does not constitute a defence to the charge.

The appellant, a member of the Canadian Armed Forces, challenged convictions entered by a General Court Martial on the basis that the military tribunal lacked the independence required by s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court held that s. 11 applies to General Court Martial proceedings and that a separate military justice system is constitutionally permissible, but found that the tribunal's structure at the time lacked sufficient security of tenure, financial security, and institutional independence.

The court further held that the infringement was not justified under s. 1.

The appellant's ss. 7 and 15 arguments failed, and evidence obtained through a constitutionally defective search was nevertheless admissible under s. 24(2).

A new trial was ordered.

A public interest group sought standing to challenge the constitutionality of amendments to the Immigration Act, 1976, which altered the refugee determination process.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the group raised serious issues of invalidity and had a genuine interest, it failed the third branch of the public interest standing test.

The Court found that individual refugee claimants directly affected by the legislation could and were already challenging the provisions, meaning there was another reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the cross-appeal to strike the claim was allowed.

Following the 1985 Reference re Manitoba Language Rights decision, a dispute arose regarding which instruments had to be translated to comply with s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 23 applies to orders in council of a legislative nature, determined by their form, content, and effect.

The Court also held that documents incorporated by reference in legislation must be translated if the primary instrument is legislative, the incorporation is true, and the document was generated by the government, unless there is a bona fide reason for incorporation without translation.

The period of temporary validity for unilingual Acts was extended.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that reversed in part a Superior Court judgment dismissing a claim for a compensatory allowance regarding a jointly purchased family residence paid for by the husband.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the Superior Court's judgment, finding no reason to vary the trial judge's finding and agreeing with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal.

The parties were married under the separation of property regime.

The appellant wife owned the family residence, which was financed by a loan from her father.

The respondent husband repaid the loan and paid for taxes, insurance, and maintenance.

Upon divorce, the respondent claimed a $40,000 compensatory allowance for his contributions to the property.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding the contributions equivalent to rent and a choice of lifestyle.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision and awarded the allowance.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the trial judge's decision.

The Court held that the trial judge reasonably exercised his discretion under art. 559 of the Civil Code of Quebec by considering the overall matrimonial situation, including the wife's withdrawal from the labour market and the father's favourable loan terms, which justified the enrichment.

The appellant was convicted of causing a disturbance after shouting obscenities at a neighbour from his veranda.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal court held that the conduct itself constituted a disturbance, and the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, holding that a 'disturbance' under the Criminal Code requires an externally manifested disturbance of the public peace, not merely emotional upset or annoyance.

Criminal appeal from an order setting aside an acquittal and directing a new trial after the trial judge limited both sides to four peremptory challenges and denied the Crown any stand bys.

The Supreme Court held, by majority, that the Crown's substantially greater ability to shape the jury through stand bys and peremptory challenges created a reasonable apprehension of partiality and infringed the accused's right to a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1.

The Court also held that statements made after counsel had been retained were properly excluded because the police response to the accused's inquiry about contact from his father was misleading in the circumstances.

The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored.