SCC 1990

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal dismissing an appeal from conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously dismissed the appeal for the reasons given by the majority of the Court of Appeal, finding it unnecessary to consider the applicability of the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant hotel owner applied for fire insurance, which was accepted without a requirement to maintain his automatic extinguisher system.

The subsequently issued policy contained a clause requiring bi-annual maintenance by an authorized representative.

Following a fire where the extinguisher failed, the insurers denied coverage based on the maintenance clause.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that under the Civil Code of Lower Canada, the insurance contract was formed upon acceptance of the application.

Because the insurer did not indicate the inconsistency between the application and the policy in writing, the application prevailed, and the insurers were liable to compensate the appellant.

The respondent, a police officer, was injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by the appellant's negligence.

During his recovery, the respondent was unable to work but continued to receive his full salary pursuant to his collective agreement.

He sued the appellant for damages, including a claim for lost wages.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent could not recover damages for loss of earnings because he had not suffered an actual financial loss, as his employer had continued to pay his salary.

The Court ruled that wage benefits paid while a plaintiff is unable to work must be deducted from a claim for lost earnings to avoid double recovery, unless the employer has a subrogated claim.

The appellant, a Treaty 8 Indian, killed a grizzly bear in self-defence while hunting for food.

A year later, in financial need, he obtained a licence and sold the hide.

He was charged with trafficking in wildlife under the provincial Wildlife Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while Treaty 8 originally protected commercial hunting, the 1930 Natural Resources Transfer Agreement restricted this to hunting for food.

The sale of the hide was a commercial act, not hunting for food, and therefore the provincial prohibition applied.

The appeal was dismissed, though a stay of proceedings was ordered due to the unique circumstances.

The appellant, a battered woman, shot and killed her common law partner in the back of the head as he left the room following an argument where he physically abused her and threatened to kill her.

At trial, a psychiatrist testified as an expert on battered woman syndrome to explain her state of mind and why she reasonably apprehended death or grievous bodily harm.

The jury acquitted the appellant, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that expert testimony on battered woman syndrome is admissible to assist the jury in assessing the reasonableness of a battered woman's apprehension of death and her belief that lethal force was necessary.

The Attorney General of Quebec appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that had overturned the respondents' convictions for contempt of court.

The respondents had been convicted by the Superior Court for failing to comply with an order restricting publication.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals and restored the convictions, applying its previous decision in R. v. Vermette regarding the jurisdiction of the Superior Court.

The appellant, an Ontario lawyer, sought a declaration that certain Rules of Civil Procedure permitting the assessment of costs against solicitors personally were unconstitutional.

The application was brought without any supporting affidavit or factual allegations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a Charter challenge based on the alleged unconstitutional effects of legislation cannot proceed in a factual vacuum.

The appeal was dismissed because the application lacked the necessary adjudicative and legislative facts to support the constitutional challenge.

The appellants, hypothecary creditors, sought to recover under a fire insurance policy containing a standard mortgage clause after the insured property was destroyed by arson.

The insurers refused to pay, arguing the policy was void ab initio due to misrepresentations by the hypothecary debtor when purchasing the policy.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the standard mortgage clause creates a separate and distinct contract between the insurers and the hypothecary creditors.

This independent contract cannot be invalidated by any act, neglect, omission, or misrepresentation of the hypothecary debtor, whether occurring at the inception of the policy or subsequently.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision requiring it to indemnify the respondent hypothecary creditor after the insured property was intentionally burned by the hypothecary debtor.

The insurer argued that under the Civil Code of Lower Canada, it was not liable for prejudice arising from the insured's intentional fault.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the standard hypothecary clause creates a separate insurance contract between the insurer and the hypothecary creditor.

Because the creditor, not the debtor, is the insured under this second contract, the debtor's intentional fault is treated as the act of a third party and cannot be invoked against the creditor.

The plaintiff brought an action alleging he contracted mesothelioma from asbestos exposure and claimed the defendants conspired to withhold information about the dangers of asbestos.

The defendants applied to strike out the conspiracy claims as disclosing no reasonable claim.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a statement of claim should only be struck out if it is 'plain and obvious' that it discloses no reasonable claim.

The Court found it was not plain and obvious that the conspiracy claim would fail, and the action was allowed to proceed.

The appellants were charged with having sexual intercourse with a female under the age of 14, contrary to s. 146(1) of the Criminal Code.

They challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 146(1) violated s. 7 because it created an absolute liability offence punishable by imprisonment, denying the accused a defence of honest mistake of fact regarding the complainant's age.

The Court found this infringement was not justified under s. 1.

However, the Court held that the provision did not violate the equality rights under s. 15, as the biological realities of the offence meant it could only be committed by males.

The appeals were allowed, the offending words were struck down, and new trials were ordered.

The appellant was found intoxicated in the driver's seat of a stolen vehicle and charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

At trial, he was acquitted on the basis that he was too intoxicated to form the requisite intent.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the offence of having care or control while impaired is a general intent offence for which voluntary intoxication is not a defence.

The Court further held that the unavailability of the intoxication defence for this offence does not violate sections 7 or 11(d) of the Charter, or alternatively, any such violation is justified under section 1.

The National Battlefields Commission, a federal entity, provided a free sightseeing bus service in the Plains of Abraham Park using independent carriers who did not hold provincial transport permits.

The respondent sought a declaration that the carriers required permits under the Quebec Transport Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provincial permit system was constitutionally inapplicable to the federal service because it would subject vital and essential aspects of the federal undertaking to provincial discretionary control.

The appeal was allowed.

The parties separated after a 25-year marriage.

The respondent had retired from the armed forces and was receiving monthly pension payments.

The trial judge included the pension as a matrimonial asset and ordered the respondent to pay the appellant half of the future monthly payments.

The Court of Appeal reversed this, finding the pension was income, not a matrimonial asset.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that pensions are matrimonial assets subject to equal division under the Nova Scotia Matrimonial Property Act.

The Court found no operational conflict between the provincial property legislation and the federal Canadian Forces Superannuation Act's prohibition against alienation.

The Crown appealed a decision substituting a manslaughter conviction for first-degree murder for a 17-year-old offender.

The respondent cross-appealed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 213(a) of the Criminal Code was unconstitutional.

Furthermore, the Court found that the police failed to comply with section 56 of the Young Offenders Act during the interrogation, rendering the young offender's inculpatory statements inadmissible.

The appeal was dismissed, the cross-appeal was allowed, and a new trial for manslaughter was ordered.

The respondents were convicted of attempted murder after an accomplice shot a convenience store clerk during an armed robbery.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the respondents could be convicted as parties under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code if they knew or ought to have known that the shooting was a probable consequence of the robbery.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that because the principles of fundamental justice require subjective foresight of death to convict a principal of attempted murder, the same minimum degree of mens rea is constitutionally required to convict a party.

The objective foreseeability component ('ought to have known') in s. 21(2) violates s. 7 of the Charter and cannot be justified under s. 1 in cases where subjective foresight is constitutionally required.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after stabbing a cab driver to death during a robbery and forcible confinement.

He challenged the constitutionality of the constructive murder provisions and the classification of murder during forcible confinement as first degree murder carrying a mandatory life sentence without parole for 25 years.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the constructive murder provision violated the Charter, the conviction should be upheld because the jury would have reached the same verdict.

The Court also upheld the constitutionality of elevating murder during forcible confinement to first degree murder, finding it did not violate principles of fundamental justice, arbitrary detention, or cruel and unusual punishment.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 214(5) of the Criminal Code after killing a woman while attempting to commit a sexual assault.

He appealed, challenging the constitutionality of ss. 213(a) and 214(5) under the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while s. 213(a) is unconstitutional, s. 214(5) does not violate s. 7 of the Charter as it merely classifies murders for sentencing purposes and is not arbitrary or irrational.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

The respondent was convicted of second degree murder after an accomplice shot and killed a victim they had kidnapped for ransom.

The trial judge instructed the jury on constructive murder under s. 213(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal struck down s. 213(a) based on R. v. Vaillancourt and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that s. 213(a) violates ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter and is not saved by s. 1, for the reasons given in R. v. Martineau.

The Court also declined to apply the curative proviso, as a properly instructed jury would not necessarily have convicted the respondent.

The respondent and an accomplice committed a break and enter during which the accomplice shot and killed two people.

The respondent was convicted of second degree murder under the constructive murder provisions of s. 213(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 213(a) violates sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter because it allows for a murder conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of subjective foresight of death.

The provision was not saved by section 1 of the Charter, and the appeal by the Crown was dismissed.