Sarah Stackhouse

The court sentenced Jerome Crawford for human trafficking and related offences, considering the circumstances of the offence, the impact on the victim, the offender’s background, and the harsh conditions of pre-trial custody.

The sentence imposed was four years in jail, less credit for pre-trial custody, with concurrent sentences for related counts.

The decision discusses the importance of proportionality, the impact of systemic racism, and the need for individualized sentencing.

The offender, Miekel Allen, pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded and prohibited firearm.

The court considered both aggravating factors, such as the nature of the loaded prohibited handgun and its accessibility, and significant mitigating factors, including the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, pre-trial custody, guilty plea, remorse, pro-social goals, strong family support, difficult childhood, and social context evidence.

The Crown sought a two-year penitentiary sentence, while the Defence requested a conditional sentence.

The court imposed an 18-month reformatory sentence, reduced to 11 months after accounting for pre-sentence custody and harsh conditions, along with a 10-year firearms prohibition and a DNA order.

This decision addresses pre-trial applications in a human trafficking case.

The accused sought production of third-party records and leave to adduce evidence of the complainant's other sexual activity under section 276(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown also sought leave to adduce evidence of the complainant's other sexual activity under common law principles.

The court granted the defence's application for third-party records in part, ordering specific police records to be produced.

The applications regarding other sexual history evidence were also granted in part.

The Crown was permitted to introduce evidence of the complainant's prior involvement in the sex trade, including sexual photographs and her street name.

The defence was permitted to cross-examine the complainant on whether her prior sex work was independent and on specific text messages with the accused that might contradict her narrative of being trafficked.

However, certain evidence, such as a police officer's text message and later police records suggesting independent sex work, was deemed inadmissible due to lack of relevance or not constituting a specific instance of sexual activity.

The accused applied to exclude evidence seized under a search warrant, alleging violations of his s. 8 Charter rights due to misleading statements and insufficient grounds in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the affiant's conduct was negligent, it did not subvert the prior authorization process.

Even after excising false statements from the ITO, sufficient grounds remained to issue the warrant, thus no Charter violation was established.

The accused, a teacher, was charged with assault with a weapon.

The defence brought a third-party records application seeking disclosure of school records and police records relating to the complainant's history of violent or aggressive conduct and credibility issues.

The court applied the two-stage O'Connor test to determine disclosability.

At stage one, the court found the records likely relevant to the defence of self-defence.

At stage two, the court balanced the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the complainant's privacy interests.

The court ordered disclosure of school records documenting violent disposition and misconduct from age 12 onwards, and police occurrence reports meeting the criteria under section 123 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

Strict conditions were imposed on the use and retention of disclosed materials.

Demetre Hibbert and Raquel Williams sought to exclude gun and drug evidence seized under search warrants, alleging s. 8 Charter violations due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found that a traffic stop leading to information in the Information to Obtain (ITO) violated Mr. Hibbert's s. 9 Charter rights, leading to the excision of that paragraph.

Furthermore, the court determined that the ITO lacked sufficient credible and reliable evidence to establish reasonable and probable grounds that the items would be found in Mr. Hibbert's BMW or Ms. Williams' residence three months after the alleged shooting, primarily due to the staleness of the information and speculative inferences regarding ongoing criminal activity or gang feuds.

Consequently, both Mr. Hibbert's and Ms. Williams' s. 8 Charter rights were violated, rendering the search warrants invalid.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 milliliters of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample analysis results.

The defendant challenged the positioning of the police cruiser, the placement of the defendant in the police vehicle for testing, and the adequacy of the right to counsel.

The court found no Charter violations regarding the cruiser positioning or placement in the vehicle.

However, the court found that the Crown failed to produce the required certificate from an analyst attesting to the accuracy of the alcohol standard solution used to calibrate the breathalyzer device.

Without this certificate, the court could not rely on the breath sample readings and entered an acquittal.

The accused, J.D., was charged with three counts of sexual assault against his wife, D.D. The incidents allegedly occurred between January and April 2017.

The defense argued that D.D.'s testimony was not credible or reliable, suggesting a motive to fabricate due to ongoing family law proceedings, and highlighted inconsistencies in her statements.

The Crown argued D.D.'s testimony was credible, supported by an audio recording demonstrating the accused's animus and his admissions regarding alcohol use.

The court found J.D.'s testimony regarding his drinking problematic and inconsistent.

However, due to significant inconsistencies in D.D.'s testimony, particularly regarding the number and details of alleged assaults and "French Vanilla incidents," and a lack of thorough investigation into D.D.'s cell phone, the court was left with a reasonable doubt.

The court could not decide whom to believe and therefore found J.D. not guilty on all three counts.

The applicants challenged the issuance of three search warrants and sought disclosure of a confidential informant's (CI) handler's notes under step five of the Garofoli process.

They argued that the CI handler was a co-affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) or, alternatively, that the notes were relevant to demonstrate material omissions or deliberate/reckless falsehoods in the ITO, which could lead to the warrants being set aside.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the CI handler was not a co-affiant and that the applicants had not demonstrated a reasonable possibility that the disclosure of the handler's notes would assist in challenging the issuance of the search warrants.

The applicants, Demetre Hibbert and Raquel Williams, challenged search warrants that led to the seizure of a firearm and drugs, arguing insufficient grounds and seeking exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

They requested judicial summaries of redacted portions of the Information to Obtain (ITO), specifically Appendix "D" and other paragraphs, which were withheld based on Confidential Informant (CI) privilege.

The court, acting as case management judge for pre-trial Charter applications, ordered the Crown to provide judicial summaries under step two of the Garofoli process.

The court emphasized that a mere assertion of CI privilege was insufficient; the summaries needed to enable applicants' counsel to meaningfully participate in the editing process.

The court also prepared a judicial summary comparing different drafts of Appendix "D" as requested by the applicants.

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of possessing child pornography contrary to section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code and one count of distributing child pornography contrary to section 163.1(3) of the Criminal Code.

Over a three-day period in September 2016, the accused engaged in online chats with an undercover police officer, discussing sexual acts with minors and sending two images of child pornography.

A search of his computer revealed 526 unique images of child pornography.

The Crown sought a sentence of two years less one day, while the defence sought 12 months.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 months in jail, with concurrent sentences on both counts, along with ancillary orders including probation, SOIRA registration, and a section 161 order restricting contact with minors and internet use.

At a preliminary hearing, the Crown sought committal of two defendants on various charges arising from a shooting investigation and subsequent search warrants.

The Crown did not seek committal of D.H. on the shooting or drugs charges, and D.H. conceded committal on a firearm charge.

The central issue was whether R.W. should be committed to stand trial for possession of drugs and proceeds of crime found in her apartment.

The justice found sufficient evidence to commit R.W. on counts for possession of marijuana, possession of methamphetamine for trafficking, and possession of heroin for trafficking, but discharged her on the proceeds of crime count.

The accused was charged with sexual interference against his daughter, who alleged he touched her inappropriately while sharing a bed when she was 9 or 10 years old.

The complainant disclosed the incident years later to a teacher.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant, her sister, her mother, and the accused.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the accused's denial unpersuasive but concluded the complainant's evidence was unreliable due to inconsistencies, particularly regarding her prior disclosure to her sister.

The Crown failed to prove the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in an acquittal.

The defendant was charged with two counts of sexual assault against a female tenant who rented a basement apartment from him and his wife.

The Crown proceeded summarily on both charges.

The first alleged incident occurred between June 20-30, 2016, when the defendant allegedly touched the complainant's breast and vagina outside her clothing while hugging her as she left his home.

The second alleged incident occurred on or about August 4, 2016, when the defendant allegedly touched the complainant's breast outside her clothing and attempted to place her hand on his crotch while she was in the basement apartment.

The defendant denied all allegations and testified that his son was present during the first incident and his wife and younger son were present during the second incident, making the alleged assaults impossible.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and the defendant's evidence evasive and argumentative.

The defendant was acquitted on the first count due to an apparent inconsistency in the complainant's evidence regarding whether the defendant's older son was present during the alleged assault, which created a reasonable doubt.

However, the defendant was convicted on the second count, as the complainant's evidence was coherent, logical, and not significantly contradicted, and the defendant's defence evidence contained multiple contradictions and implausibilities.

The Crown applied for a pre-trial ruling on the voluntariness of statements made by the defendant, C.C., during a police interview concerning charges of sexual assault and sexual interference.

The defence sought to exclude statements made after C.C.'s arrest, arguing they were involuntary due to emotional, physical, and psychological condition, oppressive questioning, and inducements.

The court found no evidence that C.C.'s will was overborne, noting his consistent reliance on the right to silence regarding the allegations, the non-oppressive nature of the interview, and the absence of a "quid pro quo" inducement.

The court ruled the statements were voluntarily made and admissible.

The defendant was charged with two counts of uttering a threat to cause death and one count of sexual assault against his wife.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the complainant's evidence, as she was the sole Crown witness.

The defendant testified in his own defence.

The trial judge assessed the credibility and reliability of both witnesses and found the complainant's evidence to be credible, consistent, and logical, while finding significant gaps in logic and implausibility in the defendant's evidence.

The defendant's narrative failed to explain why the complainant would leave the home on two separate occasions if his version of events were true.

The trial judge found the defendant guilty on all three counts.

The defendant was charged with failing to stop at the scene of an accident with intent to escape civil or criminal liability, impaired operation of a motor vehicle, and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial proceeded as a blended trial and voluntariness voir dire.

The court found the defendant's statements in the breath room to be voluntary.

The defendant's evidence was rejected as implausible, illogical, and inconsistent.

The court found that while the eyewitness identification was unreliable, the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the driver of the van involved in the collision.

The court also found that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol and that he intentionally refused to provide a breath sample.

The defendant was found guilty on all three counts.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" (impaired driving with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood) following a roadside stop.

During a pat-down search incident to arrest, a female officer unzipped the accused's sweater without warning, exposing her breasts in a see-through bra while two male officers watched from nearby.

The court found this constituted an unreasonable strip search in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

The Crown failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds justifying the strip search, and the search was conducted in the field without demonstrated necessity or urgency.

The evidence of the breath tests was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and the charge was dismissed.

The accused brought a motion to stay prosecution on the grounds that his Charter rights under section 11(b) (right to be tried within a reasonable time) were violated.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, driving with blood alcohol over 80 mg, and dangerous driving.

The total delay from charge to trial was approximately 15 months, with 10 months of institutional delay.

The court applied the four-factor test from R v. Morin and found that while the delay was not desirable, it did not constitute a violation of the accused's Charter rights.

The court found minimal prejudice to the accused and balanced this against society's strong interest in having the matter tried on the merits.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused was charged with two counts of robbery, one count of intent to commit robbery, and one count of being masked with intent to commit robbery arising from two jewellery store robberies occurring one month apart at the same location.

The central issue at trial was the identity of the robber.

The court admitted similar fact evidence between the two incidents, finding a high degree of similarity in method, timing, location, and distinctive conduct including vaulting display counters and stealing only gold chains.

Fingerprint evidence recovered from the store during the second robbery was accepted as matching the accused and consistent with the intruder’s movements captured on surveillance video.

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed both robberies and that the circumstances implied threats of violence sufficient to constitute robbery.