Roselyn Zisman

The respondent brought a motion for contempt against the applicant for refusing to share transportation for access visits as required by an order dated July 18, 2013.

The applicant brought a cross-motion to strike paragraph 12 of that order, claiming it had been included by mistake.

The court dismissed the contempt motion, finding the applicant had not wilfully disobeyed a court order, and granted the motion to strike the transportation provision.

The court also addressed a subsequent motion regarding the applicant's travel to Florida for American Thanksgiving, and considered whether costs should be awarded against respondent's counsel personally for failing to appear at the November 13 hearing.

A trial concerning child support, spousal support, and determination of the respondent's income for support purposes in a common law relationship.

The parties cohabited from October 2004 until separation in March 2011 and had one child with cerebral palsy.

The applicant remained out of the workforce as the child's primary caregiver.

The court found the respondent intentionally left employment to avoid spousal support obligations and imputed income to him.

The court awarded retroactive and ongoing child and spousal support, with a three-year review period for spousal support.

In this family law trial, the applicant father sought access to his daughter while the respondent mother sought child support for three children, spousal support (ongoing and retroactive), special expenses, payment of medical and dental bills, payment of legal bills, and a restraining order.

The parties were married for approximately 19 years and separated in 2006.

The court found that the mother was entitled to child support for two children and spousal support on both compensatory and non-compensatory grounds, but imputed income to the mother based on her demonstrated skills and capacity to earn.

The court rejected the mother's claims for retroactive support, dental expenses, car payments, and a restraining order.

The father was ordered to pay child support and spousal support effective September 1, 2013, with the child support obligation terminating when the eldest child completed university in April 2015.

The defendant was charged with fraud over $5,000 and public mischief for allegedly falsely reporting his motor vehicle stolen to his insurance company and police, receiving insurance proceeds of approximately $17,500, when he was actually involved in a fail-to-remain motor vehicle collision.

A production order was obtained for cellphone records registered to the defendant's girlfriend but used by the defendant.

The defendant brought a section 8 Charter application to exclude the evidence, arguing he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cellphone records despite not being the registered owner.

The court found the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records but dismissed the application, holding that the production order was properly issued on reasonable grounds to believe an offence had been committed, and that even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would be admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant sought to vary a child support order of $2,148 per month made on consent in Ontario by obtaining a provisional order in England reducing support to £130 per month.

The respondent opposed the variation and sought release of funds held in trust from the sale of the applicant's Ontario home.

The court found that the applicant had attorned to Ontario's jurisdiction by commencing a motion to change in Ontario while proceedings were pending under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act.

The court declined to confirm the provisional English order, finding discrepancies and omissions in the applicant's financial disclosure and determining that Ontario was the more convenient forum.

The court ordered the applicant to proceed with a motion to change in Ontario and released the trust funds to the respondent.

This is a costs decision arising from a temporary motion by the mother to relocate her child from Ontario to Nova Scotia.

The mother was successful in obtaining permission to relocate.

The court awarded costs to the successful mother, considering factors under the Family Law Rules including the importance of the issues, the reasonableness of each party's behavior, the lawyer's rates, time spent, expenses, and other relevant matters.

The father's failure to serve an offer to settle and his lack of full financial disclosure were significant factors in the costs award.

The respondent father brought a motion to implement recommendations of a report from the Office of the Children's Lawyer regarding custody and access arrangements.

The applicant mother disputed the recommendations and filed a cross-motion.

The court dismissed the father's motion, finding the mother was the successful party.

The mother sought costs of $2,726.05, while the father sought $9,715.00 or alternatively no costs order.

The court awarded costs to the mother in the amount of $2,900.00 inclusive of disbursements and taxes, finding the mother was the successful party on the primary issue and more successful on the secondary issue regarding summer access.

This is a costs decision following a motion to change a separation agreement.

The applicant mother sought to recover her legal costs of $29,896.76 after successfully obtaining an order requiring the respondent father to pay his proportionate share of the children's extraordinary expenses.

The mother had served a comprehensive, severable offer to settle that was more favourable to the father than the court's final order.

The father, who was self-represented, did not respond to the offer and litigated each issue unsuccessfully.

The court awarded costs to the mother on a full recovery basis, finding that she had acted reasonably and that the father's failure to accept a reasonable settlement offer and his attempt to disregard contractual obligations regarding child support warranted a substantial costs award.

This is a ruling on a preliminary jurisdictional issue concerning whether a motion to change a custody order should be heard in the Ontario Court of Justice or the Superior Court of Justice.

The original order was made by the Superior Court of Justice, Family Court Branch in Hamilton pursuant to section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act, granting custody to the applicants with access to the respondent mother at their discretion.

The respondent mother sought to vary the order.

The court determined that since a section 57.1 order is deemed to be a custody order under the Children's Law Reform Act, and the original order was made in the Superior Court of Justice, any variation of that order must proceed in the Superior Court of Justice.

The motion was transferred to the Superior Court of Justice in Milton.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with exceeding the legal blood alcohol limit, contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was found sleeping in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle in a parking lot.

The Crown relied on the presumption in section 258(1)(a) that an accused found in the driver's seat is presumed to have care or control unless they satisfy the court they did not intend to drive.

The accused testified he deliberately pulled over after realizing he was too impaired and fatigued to continue driving, and intended to wait for his girlfriend to pick him up.

The trial judge found the accused credible and determined he had rebutted the presumption.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a realistic risk the accused would change his mind and drive.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

A temporary care and custody hearing under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Children's Aid Society sought to place three children in the care of their respective parents subject to extensive terms of supervision.

The children had been exposed to significant parental conflict, domestic violence, physical discipline, and emotional harm.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of both physical and emotional harm and granted the society's application with 65 detailed terms and conditions governing parental conduct, access arrangements, counselling, school attendance, and communication protocols.

The applicant mother brought a motion to stay an order of Justice Flaherty dated August 30, 2013, which changed the primary residence of the child from a shared parenting arrangement to the respondent father in Hamilton, reducing the mother's access to one evening per week and alternate weekends.

The mother alleged procedural unfairness due to the trial judge's hearing difficulties, misapprehension of evidence, and failure to give proper weight to the Office of the Children's Lawyer's recommendations.

The court granted the stay, finding a serious issue for appeal, irreparable harm to the child, and that the balance of convenience favored the child's return to her mother's primary care in Oakville pending the appeal.

The applicant mother brought a motion to stay a trial judge's order that changed the primary residence of the child to the respondent father and required the child to attend school in Hamilton.

The trial judge had issued a handwritten endorsement without providing reasons for judgment.

The court found it had jurisdiction to hear the motion under subrule 38(35) of the Family Law Rules.

Applying the three-part test for a stay pending appeal, the court found a serious issue to be tried due to the lack of reasons and potential misapprehension of evidence, irreparable harm to the child if forced to change schools and primary caregivers abruptly, and that the balance of convenience favoured the mother.

The motion to stay was granted, returning the child to the mother's primary care and her previous school in Oakville pending the appeal.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of a 14-year-old child who had been apprehended from her mother.

The child had a history of self-harm and had been sexually assaulted by a family friend.

The mother struggled with health issues, missed the child's counselling appointments, and failed to provide adequate supervision.

Both the mother and the child sought the child's return home.

The court found that the child could not be adequately protected by a supervision order and ordered that the child remain in the temporary care and custody of the society, with access at the society's discretion.

A temporary care and custody motion under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act concerning a 14-year-old child who had been apprehended from her mother's care.

The child had experienced significant trauma including physical and sexual abuse while in her father's care in the United States, and subsequently suffered from self-harm and suicidal ideation while in her mother's care in Ontario.

The mother failed to ensure consistent counselling, regular school attendance, and adequate supervision.

The court found that the child could not be adequately protected by an order returning her to the mother with or without supervision, and ordered that the child remain in the care and custody of the society with supervised access.

The applicant mother sought permission to relocate with the child to Nova Scotia prior to trial.

The respondent father opposed the relocation.

The court found that the mother had been the de facto custodial parent, that the child was thriving in her care, and that compelling financial circumstances existed justifying the move.

The court granted temporary custody to the mother and permitted the relocation to Nova Scotia, while retaining jurisdiction over all custody, access, and support issues.

The court found that the mother would inevitably prevail at trial and that the only remaining triable issue was the nature and extent of the father's access.

This is a costs decision arising from a temporary motion for custody and child support of a child born in December 2011.

The applicant mother sought custody, a specified access schedule, and child support.

The respondent father opposed the custody order and sought a different access schedule with overnight visits, as well as the appointment of the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The court granted temporary custody to the mother with specified day access to the father (no overnights), ordered child support based on the father's prior year income, and declined to appoint the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The mother was substantially successful on all issues.

The court awarded costs to the mother, finding she acted reasonably throughout and served a reasonable offer to settle, while the father acted unreasonably by failing to make a counter-offer to settle.

A child protection application brought by the Children's Aid Society seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection under section 37(2)(b)(i) of the Child and Family Services Act due to risk of physical harm.

The mother consented to the finding through an agreed statement of facts.

The father contested the application.

The court found overwhelming evidence that the children were at risk of physical harm while in the father's care, including: the father's misuse and abuse of prescription medications (particularly oxycodone), his involvement in a dangerous driving incident while impaired by drugs with the children in the vehicle, his pattern of "doctor shopping" to obtain controlled substances, and his physical and verbal abuse of the mother in the presence of the children.

The court made a finding that the children were in need of protection and ordered a parenting capacity assessment to proceed.

The respondent father brought a motion to vary a temporary custody and access order made on November 13, 2012, seeking to implement recommendations from an Office of the Children's Lawyer report dated June 19, 2013.

The father sought joint custody with expanded access.

The applicant mother opposed the motion, disputing factual findings in the report and arguing that joint custody was not workable given the parties' inability to communicate and cooperate.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the father failed to establish a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant variation of the temporary order.

The court held that the Office of the Children's Lawyer report, while containing useful observations, did not provide an adequate basis for implementing joint custody or significantly expanded access at the interim stage, particularly given the parties' ongoing hostility and lack of meaningful communication.

A summary judgment motion by the mother for sole custody of the child, a final restraining order, and supervised access for the father.

The father, who had been convicted of aggravated assault and unlawful confinement, did not file responding materials.

The court found that the mother met the legal onus of proving there was no genuine issue for trial.

The court granted sole custody to the mother, ordered supervised access for the father, and continued the restraining order based on the father's serious criminal convictions, his unfounded accusations against the mother, installation of spyware on the child's computer, and the material change in circumstances since the separation agreement.