Robert Rueter

The appellant, a mayor, faced a compliance audit of her election campaign finances which revealed apparent contraventions of the Municipal Elections Act.

The municipal council passed a by-law authorizing the commencement of legal proceedings and retained outside counsel to prosecute.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application to quash the by-law and strike down s. 81 of the Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that s. 81 is not impermissibly vague, does not violate s. 7 of the Charter, and that the delegation of prosecutorial power to outside counsel was lawful and administrative in nature.

Following an appeal, the Court of Appeal issued a supplementary costs endorsement regarding the costs of the underlying summary judgment motion.

The Court directed that the costs of the motion be fixed by the motion judge in light of the appeal's result, unfettered by the terms of the original judgment.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against the respondents for damages related to cracked heat recovery steam generators at a power plant.

The motion judge had ruled the claims were barred by the 12-month limitation period under the Professional Engineers Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of claims based on engineering design deficiencies but allowed the appeal regarding the proposed amended claims for breach of a product durability warranty, finding a genuine issue for trial as to whether those claims fell outside the scope of professional engineering services and were subject to a six-year limitation period.

The appellant appealed an order regarding the meaning of a publication in a defamation action.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the respondent's publication did not say or imply the appellant was guilty of impropriety, only that he was suspected of it.

The Court also agreed that meanings from other publications could not be imputed to the respondent.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $90,000 in general damages for defamation arising from a newspaper article.

The article reported on a mistrial in a murder case, suggesting the respondent, a senior government official, had improperly pressured a forensic scientist to change his evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the article was defamatory and that the defence of absolute privilege under s. 4(1) of the Libel and Slander Act did not apply because the report was not a fair and accurate account of the proceedings.

The court also dismissed the cross-appeal seeking increased and punitive damages, finding the damage award appropriate and no malice established.

The appellant, the sole shareholder of a bankrupt hotel, appealed a vesting order and an order approving the sale of the hotel's assets by a court-appointed receiver.

The appellant argued that the receiver failed to disclose the identity of the principals behind the purchaser, which tainted the sale process.

The purchaser brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing it was moot because the vesting order had already been registered on title under the Land Titles Act.

The Court of Appeal held that once a vesting order is registered on title without a stay, its attributes as a court order are spent and it becomes a conveyance, rendering any appeal from the order moot.

The Court also dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding that the identity of the purchaser's principals was not material to the receiver's sale process.

The plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendant to organize a consumer club.

The defendant delivered a notice terminating the agreement, which the plaintiff argued was ineffective based on the renewal terms.

The plaintiff sued for breach of contract and the defendant successfully moved for partial summary judgment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the termination provision ambiguous and held that extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances is always admissible to interpret a contract.

The court concluded there was a genuine issue for trial and allowed the appeal.

The appellants, A, B, and C, sought an order of certiorari to quash a subpoena compelling A to testify in a criminal trial, or alternatively, a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to perceived threats to their security.

B and C were living outside Canada.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, holding that a Charter remedy was not available to persons outside Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court erred in failing to consider the safety of the appellants and in finding that remedies were unavailable to persons outside the country in these special circumstances.

A new hearing was directed.

The Restrictive Trade Practices Commission ordered several persons to appear before a Hearing Officer to give evidence in an inquiry under the Combines Investigation Act.

The Hearing Officer made rulings limiting the role of counsel, including denying the right to cross-examine witnesses, excluding a potential witness, and ruling that the Director need not disclose his reasons for commencing the inquiry.

The appellants sought to quash these rulings.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the inquiry was purely investigatory and that neither the Act nor the common law doctrine of fairness required the Director to disclose his reasons or permitted counsel to cross-examine witnesses at this preliminary stage.

The appellants appealed a decision denying them deferred benefits under a multi-employer pension plan established by an international union, after a new plan was established for members of the local union.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower courts that the benefits under the original plan had not yet vested and that the respondents had complied with the requirements of the plan.

The Court noted that neither the federal nor provincial pension legislation was designed to deal with the specific circumstances of the case.

The appellant, a retail employee, converted to the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, which required her to strictly observe the Sabbath from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday.

Her employer required full-time sales clerks to work on Saturdays.

When the appellant refused to work Saturdays, she was demoted to part-time status.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that an intent to discriminate is not a necessary element of discrimination under the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The Court recognized the concept of adverse effect discrimination and established that employers have a duty to take reasonable steps to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs, short of undue hardship.

As the employer provided no evidence of undue hardship, the appeal was allowed.

The City of Barrie applied to the Ontario Municipal Board to annex parts of neighbouring townships.

During the hearing, the Minister of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs submitted a letter stating the government's policy on the projected population of Barrie.

The Board ruled it was bound by this policy and refused to allow the objectors to cross-examine the government representative who delivered the letter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board erred in denying the objectors the opportunity to cross-examine the representative, as the relevant statutes established a clear right to meet the case against them by cross-examination.