Robert John Morris

The federal government amended the Canada Pension Plan to extend survivor benefits to same-sex partners, but limited eligibility to those whose partners died on or after January 1, 1998, and precluded payments for months before July 2000.

A class action challenged these temporal limits.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the temporal limits infringed section 15(1) of the Charter and were not justified under section 1.

However, the Court denied fully retroactive relief, finding that the prior exclusion of same-sex partners was based on a reasonable understanding of the law before the Court's landmark decision in M. v. H., and that the government acted in good faith.

The Court also held that estates do not have standing to advance section 15(1) claims.

The appellant bank sued several financial institutions and insurers for approximately $100 million arising from a massive equipment leasing fraud involving forged endorsements.

The respondent financial institutions successfully moved for summary judgment dismissing the appellant's claims for negligence, unjust enrichment, and money had and received.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the summary judgment, finding that the motion judge committed two fundamental errors: reversing the onus by requiring the responding party to establish a genuine issue for trial, and deciding the motions on the assumed fact that the endorsements were forged.

The Court ordered the entire action to proceed to trial, noting that novel claims should be decided on a full evidentiary record.

The moving parties, several banks and a financial institution, sought leave to appeal a motions judge's refusal to grant summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claims in conversion and preclusion.

The underlying action involved a fraudulent scheme where a customer forged endorsements on cheques and bank drafts, deposited them with the plaintiff collecting bank, and the moving parties subsequently reverse-cleared the instruments.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision that the conversion and preclusion claims raised genuine issues for trial, and noting the issues were of general importance to the banking industry.

The appellants appealed an order of Justice Douglas Coo.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal devoid of merit, agreed with the motion judge's reasons, and dismissed the appeal with costs awarded to the respondents.

The court appointed an inspector to investigate the affairs of the appellant corporation and ordered the appellants to fund the inspector's work.

The appellants appealed the order and argued that the funding requirement was an 'order for the payment of money' automatically stayed under Rule 63.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court held that an order to fund a court-appointed inspector is not an order for the payment of money, as it does not give monetary relief to a party and cannot be enforced by a writ of seizure and sale.

The court declared the automatic stay inapplicable and, in the alternative, exercised its discretion to lift the stay.

The appellants' cross-motion for a stay was dismissed.

Arrêt constitutionnel majeur portant sur l'exclusion des couples de même sexe de la définition du mariage aux fins de la common law.

La Cour a appliqué l'analyse du par. 15(1) de la Charte et conclu que la définition hétérosexuelle du mariage portait atteinte à la dignité et aux droits à l'égalité des couples de même sexe, sans justification au regard de l'article premier.

La Cour a rejeté les prétentions fondées sur la liberté de religion et l'égalité religieuse de l'église intervenante, concluant que l'affaire visait l'institution juridique du mariage plutôt que sa dimension religieuse.

Comme réparation, la Cour a déclaré invalide la définition existante dans la mesure où elle contenait les mots « d'un homme et d'une femme », l'a reformulée immédiatement comme l'union de deux personnes, et a ordonné la délivrance et l'enregistrement des mariages visés.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a Divisional Court decision finding that the common law definition of marriage as between 'one man and one woman' violated the equality rights of same-sex couples under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage demeaned their dignity and was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The Court allowed the cross-appeals on remedy, declaring the existing definition invalid and immediately reformulating it as 'the voluntary union for life of two persons to the exclusion of all others'.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to grant a stay of proceedings in an oppression remedy case.

They argued that California courts had exclusive jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motions judge's exercise of discretion and concluding that the oppression remedy was legitimately sought in Ontario.

Costs of $12,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that no enforceable agreement was reached for a fur salon licence, as essential terms were missing.

The respondent cross-appealed the finding that it negligently misrepresented its ability to terminate an existing licence, and appealed the costs award, specifically the allowance of expert witness fees as a full disbursement on a partial indemnity scale.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, cross-appeal, and costs appeal, holding that the trial judge made no palpable errors and correctly treated expert fees as disbursements not subject to partial indemnity reduction.

The Canadian Commercial Bank (CCB) faced a solvency crisis and received a $255 million advance from a support group consisting of governments and major banks.

When CCB was subsequently ordered to be wound up, the liquidator sought advice on whether the support group's claim for the advance should rank pari passu with other unsecured creditors or be postponed as a capital investment.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the advance was in substance a loan, not a capital investment, despite having some equity features like warrants.

The Court also held that the loan did not fall within the postponement provision of the Partnerships Act because the lenders were not receiving a share of the profits, but rather repayment of a fixed debt out of profits.

Finally, the Court declined to apply the doctrine of equitable subordination, finding no inequitable conduct by the support group.