Robert Fetterly

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol.

On June 5, 2012, police observed the defendant's vehicle exhibiting inaccurate driving.

After stopping the vehicle, officers detected alcohol on the defendant's breath and administered an approved screening device (ASD) test at roadside, which resulted in a Fail.

The defendant was arrested and transported to the detachment where breath samples were provided to a qualified technician using an Intoxilyzer 8000C, resulting in a reading of 100 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant challenged the validity of the roadside ASD procedure, arguing there was doubt as to whether an approved device was used and that the meaning of the Fail result was ambiguous.

The court rejected these arguments and found the Crown had proven the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assaulting her husband following a domestic dispute.

She argued that inadmissible evidence from a withdrawn count was introduced, that the verdict was unreasonable, and that the sentence of a conditional discharge with probation was excessive.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that although evidence relating to another count should not have been introduced, the error caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The court found there was ample evidence supporting the finding that the appellant intentionally applied force without consent and rejected arguments of self-defence and Charter violations.

The sentence, including non-association conditions and counselling requirements, fell within the acceptable range and disclosed no error in principle.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence raised two Charter applications: first, alleging a breach of section 8 rights regarding the validity of the screening demand; and second, alleging a breach of section 9 rights regarding arbitrary detention.

The court found that the screening demand was properly made based on reasonable suspicion and that the detention was justified under section 498 of the Criminal Code as the accused was held until sober and safe to be released.

Both Charter applications were dismissed and the accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with personation and wilfully obstructing a peace officer after a driver stopped during a traffic investigation falsely identified himself as another individual.

The Crown relied primarily on the investigating officer’s in‑court identification of the accused more than two years after the stop, supported by limited circumstantial evidence relating to personal information provided by the driver.

The court emphasized the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identification evidence, particularly stranger identification and in‑dock identifications unsupported by contemporaneous descriptions or photo lineups.

The officer had made no contemporaneous notes of the driver’s physical characteristics and recalled only generic descriptors.

Considering the frailties of the identification evidence and the weakness of the circumstantial evidence, the court held that the Crown failed to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

Two defendants jointly charged with assault causing bodily harm brought separate applications under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings based on breach of their right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The offence occurred on April 18, 2010, and the application was heard on February 14, 2012, representing over 20 months of delay.

The court found approximately 12 months of unjustified delay after accounting for neutral time and inherent case requirements.

The delay was primarily attributable to the crown's failure to recognize that an essential witness required a Punjabi interpreter, leading to the adjournment of the first trial date set for May 19, 2011.

The court granted the applications and entered a stay of proceedings for both defendants.

The accused, charged with driving with an excess blood alcohol level, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the trial date was 17 months and 12 days.

The court attributed 9 months and 8 days to institutional delay, finding the initial 5 months to be neutral delay caused by the defence exploring resolution.

Concluding that the institutional delay was within acceptable guidelines and that the accused suffered minimal specific prejudice, the court dismissed the application.

At the beginning of his trial for impaired driving, the defendant moved for a stay of proceedings under s. 24 of the Charter, alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total time from the swearing of the information to the trial date was nearly 14 months.

The court found that a significant portion of the delay was neutral, including time for the parties to be ready for trial and a four-month delay caused by the investigating officer being injured in a serious motor vehicle accident.

The court concluded that the institutional delay was under six months, well within the Morin guidelines, and that the defendant had contributed to the delay through poor trial time estimates and late filing of applications.

The application for a stay was dismissed.