Robert E. Charney

The applicant sought an extension of time to bring a motion for leave to appeal a costs order issued by Smith J. The court dismissed the motion, finding the applicant's explanation for the delay illogical and noting significant prejudice to the respondents due to the unpaid costs.

Furthermore, the proposed appeal lacked merit, as the applicant's grounds were too general and did not demonstrate a palpable and overriding error or error of law, which is required for leave to appeal costs orders.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the university's Senate Appeals Committee, which upheld his withdrawal from a Masters program for failing to complete his thesis within the maximum allowable time.

The applicant argued the committee failed to accommodate his disability, excluded relevant evidence, and unreasonably denied him a further extension or the right to re-apply.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the committee lacked jurisdiction over discrimination claims, reasonably excluded irrelevant evidence, and made reasonable factual findings that the applicant was unlikely to complete his thesis even with an extension.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Transportation's decisions to request a medical examination and subsequently suspend his driver's licence, as well as the Licence Appeal Tribunal's decision dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Minister's actions were prompted by a police report raising concerns about the applicant's hearing and vision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the LAT reasonably concluded it lacked jurisdiction under the Highway Traffic Act to hear the appeal.

The Court also held that the Minister's decisions were reasonable, procedurally fair, and did not violate the applicant's Charter rights.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a previous order that had set aside a default judgment against one defendant, alleging fraud and misconduct by opposing counsel.

The court dismissed this motion, finding no evidence of fraud and concluding that the plaintiff's counsel deliberately chose not to participate in the earlier hearing, thus precluding relief under Rule 37.14(1).

The court also granted the plaintiff's separate motion to correct the name of the other defendant in the default judgment and writ of seizure and sale.

Costs were ordered to be borne by each party due to shared blame for the procedural issues.

The defendants Nik Handa and Re/Max Realty Services Inc. brought a motion for summary judgment seeking $650,000 in commission from the plaintiff Nadeem Qureshi, related to an aborted real estate transaction where Re/Max acted as Qureshi's agent.

Qureshi brought a cross-motion to dismiss the counterclaim.

The core dispute involved the interpretation of the "To Be Determined" (TBD) commission clause in the Buyer's Representation Agreement (BRA) and whether subsequent agreements (Commission Agreement and revised Co-op Agreement) incorporated a fixed commission amount binding on Qureshi.

The court found that the commission amount was an essential term not sufficiently determined in any contract signed by Qureshi, and the revised Co-op Agreement did not incorporate the Commission Agreement's terms to bind Qureshi for payment.

The defendants' motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and Qureshi's cross-motion was granted.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the decision of Sutherland J. dated June 11, 2024.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were fixed at $1,000 all-inclusive to the responding parties who appeared, with the amount reduced due to the failure to file a cost outline.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Koehnen J. dated June 13, 2024.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal and made no order as to costs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Stewart J. dated June 3, 2024.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal and made no order as to costs.

The moving party brought a motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a prior decision, and for leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court granted the extension of time but denied the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties in the fixed amount of $5,000 all-inclusive.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment in a breach of contract action against a home builder.

The defendant objected to certain paragraphs in the plaintiff's supporting affidavit, arguing they contained evidence of settlement negotiations and should be struck.

At a case conference to determine the timing of the defendant's challenge, the court applied the hybrid approach to striking affidavits and held that the admissibility of the impugned paragraphs should be determined by the judge hearing the summary judgment motion, rather than in a pre-emptive motion.

The moving party (appellant) brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing her appeal for delay and sought an extension of time to perfect her appeal.

The underlying appeal related to a summary judgment declaring that the respondent was not the parent of the moving party's child.

The court treated the motion as one under Rule 37.14(1)(c) to set aside the Registrar's order.

The court found that while the moving party had an intention to appeal, the delay of over two years was significant and prejudicial.

Furthermore, the proposed appeal lacked merit as it improperly sought to introduce voluminous fresh evidence without meeting the Palmer test for admission on appeal.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Divisional Court from a final family law order dealing with parenting time, child support, and mobility.

The respondent objected, arguing the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction because the order was made under the federal Divorce Act, not provincial legislation.

The court agreed, finding that the trial judge's orders stemmed from the Divorce Act, meaning the appeal must be heard by the Court of Appeal pursuant to the Courts of Justice Act.

The appeal to the Divisional Court was quashed.

The defendants, Wayne Christopher Smile and Jennifer Ann-Marie Smile, brought a motion to set aside a default judgment for possession obtained by Scotia Mortgage Corporation in a mortgage enforcement action.

The defendants argued that documents titled "Non-Negotiable Notice of Acceptance" and "Certificate of Dishonour" constituted a valid defence.

The court applied the five-factor test for setting aside default judgment, considering promptness, plausible excuse, arguable defence, prejudice, and the integrity of justice.

The court found that the defendants failed to meet any of the criteria, specifically noting the lack of a legal basis for their purported defence.

The motion was dismissed.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) decision granting an eviction for purchaser's own use under s. 49 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The tenant argued the LTB erred in finding the property contained three or fewer units and denied her procedural fairness by refusing an adjournment and a video walkthrough.

The tenant also brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the fresh evidence motion, finding the evidence was available at the hearing and irrelevant to any legal error.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the number of units was a factual finding not reviewable on appeal, and the LTB reasonably exercised its discretion regarding the adjournment and evidentiary procedures.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a default judgment and terminate garnishments, arguing improper service of the statement of claim and a plausible defence under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court granted the motion, finding that the defendants promptly sought relief, provided a plausible excuse for default (lack of notice), and demonstrated an arguable defence.

The court emphasized the 'better practice' of serving default judgment motions and ordered the return of garnished funds (except for a small undisputed amount) as no exceptional circumstances for a freezing order were shown.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision that dismissed her motion to set aside a prior consent dismissal order.

The respondents moved to dismiss the appeal for delay.

The Divisional Court found that the appellant could not appeal a consent order without leave under s. 133(a) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Furthermore, the order dismissing the motion to set aside the consent order was interlocutory, not final, and therefore could not be appealed to the Divisional Court under s. 31 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appeal was quashed without costs.

The applicant, a declared vexatious litigant, sought leave under s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act to institute a proceeding against the Crown regarding the Ontario government's decision on the Ontario Science Centre.

The court dismissed the application for leave, finding that the proposed proceeding lacked a legal basis and reasonable grounds, and the applicant failed to demonstrate standing to raise the public policy issues.

The moving parties sought an extension of time to file a motion for leave to appeal a Small Claims Court order that denied their motion to set aside a default judgment and awarded $100 in costs against them.

The moving parties argued the appeal was solely regarding costs under s. 133 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, noting that under s. 31 of the Courts of Justice Act and O. Reg. 626/00, no appeal lies from a Small Claims Court order for less than the prescribed amount of $3,500, which also applies to costs orders.

The applicant sought judicial review of an adjudicator's decision awarding the respondent $93,445.92 under the Construction Act.

The dispute centered on whether the adjudicator had jurisdiction under the Act's transitional provisions, given the contract covered clean-up work for two separate wastewater ponds (Pond #7 and Pond #14) with different procurement dates.

The Divisional Court held that the works on the two ponds constituted separate improvements on non-contiguous lands.

Consequently, the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction over claims related to Pond #7, as its procurement process commenced before the adjudication provisions came into force.

The court quashed the award for Pond #7 and reduced the total award to $11,638.17 for Pond #14.

The Estate Trustee sought declarations that the deceased was the sole owner of a property, that it vested in the Estate Trustee, and for immediate vacant possession to facilitate its sale for estate administration.

The respondent, a beneficiary occupying the property, sought an adjournment of the application and resisted immediate eviction, having commenced a dependant support application.

The court declared the property vested in the Estate Trustee and authorized its sale.

While denying immediate vacant possession, the court ordered the respondent to provide full access for appraisal and showings, vacate during these visits, and vacate the property entirely seven days before closing.

Costs were awarded to the applicant from the Estate.