Phillip W. Sutherland

The applicant sought interim orders permitting relocation of the child from Richmond Hill to Guelph, along with custody, schooling, and support orders.

The court applied the best interests test under the Children’s Law Reform Act and the framework from Gordon v. Goertz.

Finding compelling interim circumstances, including housing instability and financial advantages of the move, the court permitted the relocation and determined the disruption to the child and the respondent’s parenting time would be minimal.

Requests for interim child support and section 7 contributions were adjourned due to incomplete financial disclosure.

The court emphasized that interim mobility orders require compelling circumstances but may be granted where the child’s best interests clearly favour the move.

The plaintiff bank moved for summary judgment against a guarantor spouse seeking payment under a personal guarantee and possession of the mortgaged property securing the debt.

The responding guarantor argued that the guarantee and subsequent collateral mortgage were unenforceable due to non‑disclosure, misrepresentation, undue influence by her spouse, lack of proper independent legal advice, and unconscionability.

The court held that the bank satisfied its obligations by requiring independent legal advice and had no duty to investigate the adequacy of that advice where authentic letters were provided.

Although the marital relationship raised a presumption of undue influence, the bank rebutted the presumption through the guarantor’s repeated acknowledgments of independent legal advice and voluntary execution of the agreements.

Summary judgment was granted for the bank for the guaranteed amount and possession of the property, but leave to issue a writ of possession was denied pending better evidence regarding actual possession of the property.

The applicant brought a motion to suspend the respondent’s access to the parties’ children and require supervised access.

The respondent brought a motion seeking enforcement of a prior final order requiring the children’s residence to remain within 80 kilometres of Barrie and compliance with the access provisions.

The court held that the applicant’s motion could not proceed before a case conference under Rule 14(4) of the Family Law Rules and that no urgency justified an exemption.

The court found the applicant had moved the children more than 80 kilometres from Barrie without consent or court order, contrary to the final order.

A temporary order was made requiring the applicant to return the children’s residence to within 80 kilometres of Barrie and to comply with the final order.

Following a motion in family proceedings in which the applicant obtained a temporary restraining order under s. 46 of the Family Law Act but not to the full extent sought, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and the presumption that the successful party is entitled to costs, the court considered proportionality, the parties’ conduct, the absence of settlement offers, and the financial circumstances of the respondent.

The applicant sought partial indemnity costs of $4,415.79, while the respondent argued for $2,500 with a payment plan.

The court found the claimed disbursements reasonable but the time spent slightly excessive.

Costs were fixed at $3,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable in monthly instalments.

The respondent mother sought leave to bring a status review application of a prior final order that had made the child a crown ward without access following a lengthy trial.

The court considered the test under s. 65.1(5) of the Child and Family Services Act, which requires credible and weighty evidence demonstrating that a review hearing may be warranted in the child’s best interests.

The court found the moving parent had not demonstrated meaningful change or engagement with therapeutic supports addressing the issues that led to the crown wardship order.

Evidence showed the child had improved significantly in foster care and the parent remained focused on her own desire for access rather than the child’s best interests.

Leave to bring the status review application was denied and the society’s motion to dismiss was granted.

The moving party mother brought a motion for increased, overnight access to her daughter and for interim spousal support.

The responding party father opposed overnight access, citing concerns about the mother's Huntington's Disease and depression, and argued income should be imputed to her as she was intentionally unemployed.

The court granted the mother supervised overnight access, finding no evidence of risk to the child.

The court declined to impute income to the mother, finding she was not intentionally unemployed given her pending disability appeals, and ordered the father to pay mid-range spousal support of $601 per month.

The appellants, developers of a residential subdivision, appealed an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision requiring them to pay $568,391 as their proportionate share of municipal infrastructure costs previously front-ended by a neighbouring developer.

The appellants argued that the Development Charges Act, 1989 prohibited the imposition of such charges.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while the Act prohibited imposing a charge by way of agreement, it did not prohibit the OMB from imposing the charge directly as a condition of draft plan approval under section 51(25) of the Planning Act to ensure a fair and equitable allocation of infrastructure costs.

The appellant private school appealed a trial judgment awarding $8,800 in damages to the respondents for the expulsion of their eight-year-old daughter without notice or a hearing.

The school argued the trial judge based the decision on a breach of an implied contractual term of natural justice, which was not pleaded.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the allegations of procedural unfairness were central to the dispute from the beginning and were sufficiently pleaded in the context of a breach of fiduciary duty, meaning the school knew the case it had to meet.