Peter A. Daley

The plaintiff moved to restore its action to the trial list under Rule 48.11, while the defendant cross-moved to dismiss the action for delay under Rule 24.01.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the significant delay in prosecuting the action since its inception in 2012, and also failed to demonstrate that the defendant would not suffer non-compensable prejudice if the action were restored.

The court drew an adverse inference from the plaintiff's reliance on lawyer affidavits rather than a deponent with direct personal knowledge.

Given the plaintiff's history of contempt findings and failure to pay costs in related litigation, the court concluded the plaintiff lacked good faith in prosecuting the action.

Consequently, the plaintiff's motion was dismissed, and the defendant's motion to dismiss the action for delay was granted, with an order to discharge the certificate of pending litigation.

The appellant employer appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding that it had wrongfully dismissed the respondent employee without cause.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons and failed to address inconsistencies in witness testimony regarding whether the employee had resigned.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient, properly relied on documentary evidence (termination letter and Record of Employment), and contained no palpable and overriding error.

The applicant mother brought a motion for an order under section 30 of the Children's Law Reform Act to appoint a qualified person to assess the needs of the parties' 11-year-old child.

The child had expressed a strong desire not to spend time with the applicant and experienced physical and emotional symptoms of stress regarding access visits.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer and a reunification therapist both provided evidence that the child was capable of forming her own views and that forcing a further assessment would be counterproductive and potentially harmful.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there was already sufficient expert and clinical evidence available for trial and that a further assessment would not be in the child's best interests.

The plaintiffs in a complex medical malpractice action served a neuroradiology expert report late, breaching a case management order and necessitating a second adjournment of the trial.

The defendant doctors sought $30,000 in costs thrown away for wasted trial preparation time.

The court emphasized the importance of complying with case management orders and the court's inherent jurisdiction to award costs for abuse of process.

Taking into account the lack of detailed dockets, the court's knowledge of the file, the need for deterrence, and the plaintiff's physical limitations, the court ordered the plaintiffs to pay $20,000 in costs thrown away to the defendant doctors in any event of the cause.

The deceased died intestate.

The applicant, claiming to be the deceased's common-law spouse, sought appointment as estate trustee and intended to advance a dependant's support claim.

The respondent, the deceased's biological son and former Crown Ward, brought a motion to be appointed estate trustee or litigation administrator.

The court appointed the respondent as Litigation Administrator under Rule 9.02 and determined that an independent Estate Trustee During Litigation (ETDL) should be appointed under Rule 75.06 to manage and protect the estate assets pending the resolution of the disputes.

The Regional Municipality of Peel Police Services Board applied for an order declaring Darren John a vexatious litigant under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

John had initiated numerous actions against the Board and other parties, many of which were dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, and had accumulated over $140,000 in unpaid costs.

He also engaged in abusive conduct and failed to comply with court rules.

The court found that John persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted and conducted proceedings in a vexatious manner, aligning with the principles established in Re Lang Michener.

The application was granted, prohibiting John from instituting or continuing any proceedings in Ontario courts without leave of a Superior Court judge.

The respondent, Darren John, brought an oral motion for the recusal of the presiding judge, Daley RSJ, from hearing the applicant's vexatious litigant application, alleging actual or reasonable apprehension of bias.

The respondent based his claim on previous adverse rulings and cost awards made by the judge against him in other actions.

The court dismissed the recusal motion, finding no evidence to support the allegation of bias or reasonable apprehension of bias, emphasizing the high threshold for such motions and the presumption of judicial impartiality.

The plaintiff brought an action for constructive dismissal against her former employer.

The defendants counterclaimed against the plaintiff and her parents, alleging conspiracy, misrepresentation, and breach of contract regarding the plaintiff's salary and potential tax liabilities.

The defendants to the counterclaim moved for summary judgment to dismiss the counterclaim.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the counterclaim, finding that the plaintiffs by counterclaim failed to adduce any evidence of actual damages suffered, which is an essential element of the torts alleged.

The applicants commenced a judicial review application in Brampton concerning a Small Claims Court action originating in Timmins.

The Regional Senior Judge, on his own motion, raised the issue of whether the application should be transferred to Sudbury in the Northeast Region.

The applicants opposed the transfer, alleging institutional bias in the Northeast Region.

The court rejected the bias allegations, finding no cogent evidence to displace the presumption of judicial impartiality.

Exercising its inherent jurisdiction to control its own process, the court ordered the application transferred to Sudbury, as the underlying litigation, parties, and community interest were all located in the Northeast Region.

The applicant sought an interim injunction to prevent the Town of Caledon from enforcing a work order requiring the removal of 5,500 tonnes of illegal fill from his property, as well as an order of mandamus for document disclosure.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test, noting the high hurdle for enjoining a public authority enforcing its by-laws in the public interest.

Finding no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the Town, the court dismissed the motion for injunctive relief and mandamus.

Following a summary judgment motion where the defendant successfully had the plaintiff's main action dismissed but was denied summary judgment on his counterclaim, the court determined costs.

The defendant, who was partially self-represented, sought costs of $26,325.

The plaintiff failed to provide a costs outline.

The court awarded the defendant all-inclusive costs of $10,000, taking into account the simplified procedure rules and the defendant's status as a self-represented litigant for part of the proceedings.

The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action and to grant judgment on his counterclaim for unpaid services.

The plaintiff elected not to file any responding evidence, relying solely on its pleadings.

The court drew an adverse inference against the plaintiff and dismissed its action, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

However, the court dismissed the defendant's motion for judgment on the counterclaim, finding the evidentiary record inadequate to determine liability and damages, and directed the counterclaim to proceed to a simplified procedure trial.

The applicant brought a motion for a temporary restraining order against the respondent under section 46 of the Family Law Act following a history of alleged domestic violence.

The respondent had recently been acquitted of criminal assault charges against the applicant and their daughter, though the trial judge found him probably guilty.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Malik, the court admitted the factual findings from the criminal trial and accorded them significant weight.

Finding that the applicant had reasonable grounds to fear for her physical and psychological safety, the court granted the restraining order.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment in a simplified procedure action arising from a failed real estate transaction.

The defendants, as purchasers, failed to close the transaction and pay the balance of the purchase price.

The court granted partial summary judgment on liability, finding the defendants breached the agreement of purchase and sale, as they offered no defence to the breach.

However, due to errors and confusion in the plaintiffs' evidence regarding damages and mitigation, the court directed the issue of damages to proceed to a summary trial under Rule 76.

The applicant municipality brought an unopposed application for certiorari and mandamus to set aside a guilty plea accepted by a Justice of the Peace.

The respondent had originally pleaded not guilty to a careless driving charge, and a trial commenced before a different Justice of the Peace.

The court held that the second Justice of the Peace exceeded her jurisdiction by accepting a guilty plea during a trial over which she was not presiding, contrary to sections 30 and 46 of the Provincial Offences Act.

The application was granted, the guilty plea was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the original Justice of the Peace to continue the trial.

The applicant brought a motion for interim relief in a family law proceeding characterized by the respondent's significant financial nondisclosure.

The court ordered the respondent to pay $50,000 in interim disbursements to allow the applicant to retain financial and tax experts to value complex corporate assets.

The court also imputed income to the applicant and ordered the respondent to pay $5,500 per month in interim spousal support, retroactive to January 1, 2019.

Finally, the respondent was ordered to designate the applicant as an irrevocable beneficiary on a $250,000 life insurance policy to secure the interim support obligation.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of the respondent's summary judgment motion in an estate litigation matter.

The applicants sought substantial indemnity costs against the respondent personally.

The court found the respondent personally liable for costs, rather than the estate, as the litigation stemmed from his personal conduct as power of attorney and estate trustee.

Crucially, the court found the respondent's counsel breached his duty of candour to the court by failing to disclose a directly on-point, adverse binding authority (Wall v. Shaw) during submissions.

This breach of professional conduct was a significant factor in the decision to award substantial indemnity costs to the applicants.

The defendants, a lawyer and his law firm, brought a summary judgment motion seeking the dismissal of a professional negligence action.

They argued the action was statute-barred, lacked expert evidence on negligence, and lacked evidence on damages.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the existence and nature of the solicitor-client relationship, whether a duty of care was breached by failing to disclose environmental and archaeological reports, and the discoverability of the claim for limitation purposes.

The court also addressed the evidentiary burden on summary judgment motions, particularly concerning expert evidence in professional negligence cases, and reconciled conflicting Court of Appeal decisions.

The respondent brought a motion for recusal against the case management judge, alleging bias and lack of impartiality.

The judge had appointed herself as case management judge for complex, protracted proceedings involving the parties.

The respondent maintained the allegations despite being offered an opportunity to withdraw them, and was directed to bring a formal recusal motion.

The respondent failed to provide cogent evidence of bias.

Applying the high threshold for recusal motions, particularly within the case management context, the court found no actual bias or reasonable apprehension of bias.

The recusal motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff commercial tenant sought a mandatory interlocutory injunction to regain possession of commercial premises and recover seized equipment after being evicted by the defendant landlord.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide a meaningful undertaking as to damages, did not demonstrate a serious issue to be tried as the landlord had lawfully terminated the tenancy for non-payment of rent and non-compliance with insurance requirements, and did not establish irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience favored the landlord.