Peter A. Daley

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion for leave to introduce a supplementary affidavit in response to the defendants' summary judgment motion.

The affidavit addressed two issues: a conversation regarding legal representation and the plaintiffs' financial losses, including an accounting opinion.

Applying Rule 39.02(2) and Rule 1.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court granted leave for both aspects of the supplementary affidavit, finding the evidence relevant and necessary for a just determination on the merits, particularly given the complexity and potential value of the case, and that the defendants were not surprised by the accounting opinion.

This is a costs ruling following the dismissal of recusal motions brought by the Moving Parties (Sam Cosentino, Concetta Cosentino, and Cesare Cosentino).

The court rejected the Moving Parties' request to refer costs to an assessment officer, affirming that judges typically fix costs to avoid delay.

It found that the Moving Parties should have reasonably anticipated the responding defendants' participation and associated legal costs.

While the recusal motion was ill-conceived and involved a substantial record, the court determined that the Moving Parties' conduct was not egregious enough to warrant substantial indemnity costs.

The court adjusted some cost claims for duplication of counsel and excluded time spent on non-party witnesses, ultimately awarding partial indemnity costs to the successful defendants.

The applicants, having lost their initial application to quash a by-law prohibiting water pipe smoking, sought no costs.

The respondent, The Regional Municipality of Peel, sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis.

The court rejected the applicants' submission for no costs, finding their application was not one of first impression and they knew the risks given prior similar cases.

While acknowledging some merit to the respondent's arguments for substantial indemnity due to re-arguing settled matters and one applicant opening a new lounge, the court found the applicants' conduct not egregious enough to warrant elevated costs.

Applying principles of reasonableness under Rule 57.01(1), the court awarded partial indemnity costs, but reduced the amount by $10,000 due to junior counsel's attendance at the hearing not being deemed necessary for the proper presentation of the respondent's case.

The moving parties (Sam, Concetta, and Cesare Cosentino) sought the recusal of the case management judge, Daley RSJ, in seven related high-conflict family litigation actions, alleging bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias.

They also sought a transfer of the actions from Brampton to Toronto.

The court dismissed both the recusal motions and the transfer request, finding no cogent evidence to overcome the strong presumption of judicial impartiality.

The judge emphasized the higher threshold for recusal in a case management context, where close interaction and familiarity with the case are expected.

The applicants sought a declaration that a by-law banning waterpipes was invalid.

At the outset of submissions, the applicants moved for leave to file a supplementary affidavit after cross-examinations were completed.

The respondents opposed.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the document attached to the affidavit was not a "public document" under common law or the Evidence Act, and the applicants failed to meet the high threshold under Rule 39.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The evidence was not responsive to matters raised on cross-examination, and no reasonable explanation for the late filing was provided.

The applicants, owners of several waterpipe lounges, sought to quash provisions of a Regional Municipality of Peel by-law prohibiting waterpipe smoking in enclosed public places.

They argued the by-law conflicted with provincial legislation, was enacted in bad faith, and was ultra vires as it effectively prohibited their businesses.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the Region had the statutory authority under the Municipal Act, 2001 to enact the by-law for the protection of public health and safety.

The court also found no conflict with the Occupational Health and Safety Act and no evidence of bad faith.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to adjourn the trial of a motor vehicle accident claim, alleging serious misconduct and fraud by the defendant's medical expert and defence counsel.

The plaintiffs sought time to investigate these claims and introduce prior tribunal and judicial findings against the expert.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidentiary basis for the allegations and noting that prior tribunal decisions and judicial comments on the expert's credibility are inadmissible in the civil trial.

The court held that an adjournment would cause undue delay and prejudice the administration of justice.

The defendant, The Corporation of the City of Brampton, brought a summary judgment motion seeking to dismiss the plaintiff's action, but later abandoned it.

The plaintiff, Inzola Group Limited, sought costs for the abandoned motion on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found the plaintiff was entitled to partial indemnity costs for the period up to September 2016 and substantial indemnity costs for the period between September and November 2016, concluding that the defendant acted unreasonably in delaying the abandonment of the motion after critical evidence emerged.

The court fixed the total costs payable by the defendant to the plaintiff.

The applicants sought a declaration of exclusive use over a right-of-way (ROW) connected to their property and permanent injunctions against the Ontario Heritage Trust (OHT) and Nicola Ross.

The OHT, as the servient tenement owner, permitted public access to the ROW, which also served as access to the Bruce Trail.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the easement did not grant exclusive use to the applicants and that there was no substantial interference with their rights.

The court also found the applicants lacked "clean hands" due to misleading evidence and dismissed the injunction claim against Ms. Ross, noting her statements were consistent with OHT's position and not made with malice.

The defendants sought summary judgment in a medical negligence action, proposing to address causation and standard of care.

The case management judge, applying the Hryniak v. Mauldin framework, assessed whether the proposed motion, requiring a mini-trial with extensive viva voce expert evidence, would be proportionate, timely, and affordable.

Given the complexity of competing medical opinions on delayed diagnosis and the effectiveness of antiviral treatment, the anticipated length of the mini-trial (7-10 days), and the unlikelihood of resolving all triable issues, the judge concluded that the motion would not meet the goals of efficient dispute resolution.

Consequently, the defendants' proposed summary judgment motion was denied, and the scheduled motion dates were vacated, with the judge remaining seized to schedule an early trial.

The applicants sought to remove the respondent from his position as mayor due to alleged conflicts of interest, but their applications were dismissed.

This endorsement addresses the respondent's request for costs.

The court awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs, totaling $78,298.93, to be paid by the applicants.

Kelly Darnley was ordered to pay $66,298.93 and Charles Bristoll $12,000.

The court declined substantial indemnity costs, finding the applicants' conduct not reprehensible, but noted their broad and unsupported allegations unnecessarily increased complexity.

The plaintiff brought a motion to exclude potential jurors or permit challenges for cause in a civil motor vehicle accident case, arguing that jurors who pay automobile insurance premiums have an inherent conflict of interest.

The court adjourned the motion, directing the plaintiff to serve the Attorney General and inviting The Advocates' Society to intervene as a friend of the court, recognizing the novel and broad implications of the issues raised regarding civil jury selection and impartiality.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The respondents brought a request under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to dismiss the application as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, citing numerous prior cases involving the applicant.

The court dismissed the respondents' Rule 2.1.01 request, holding that determining whether the applicant was relitigating would require an extensive review of many prior decisions, which meant the pleadings were not *on their face* frivolous, vexatious, or abusive.

The interim stay on the application was vacated, and the applicant was awarded costs.

The defendant brought a motion seeking a rehearing or variation of a previous endorsement by Murray J. concerning a settlement agreement, arguing that no final decision was made or that there was a misapprehension of evidence and denial of natural justice.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to carry Murray J.'s endorsement into operation and enforce the settlement agreement.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding that Murray J.'s endorsement constituted a final "decision" under s. 123 of the Courts of Justice Act, precluding a rehearing.

The court also found that the defendant's lengthy and unexplained delay, coupled with a lack of new evidence, prevented relief under Rule 59.06.

The plaintiff's cross-motion to enforce Murray J.'s endorsement was granted.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to amend her statement of claim to change the defendant's name from "Sheraton Hotels and Resorts" to "Four Points by Sheraton Toronto Airport" and to change the location of the alleged slip and fall.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that it was not a case of misnomer but an attempt to add a new party after the limitation period had expired.

The court found no evidence to support the plaintiff's claim of misnomer or that the proposed defendant had timely notice of the incident, and noted significant prejudice to the proposed defendant.

The offender, a first-time offender, was found guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a 21-month custodial sentence, while the offender proposed a conditional sentence of 18 months to two years less a day.

The court imposed a 20-month conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence while recognizing the offender's strong rehabilitation prospects and low risk of reoffending.

The sentence included strict house arrest conditions, a DNA order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition, followed by 12 months of probation.

The plaintiff, Royal Bank of Canada, sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion for summary judgment against the defendant for unpaid credit debts.

The motion judge had dismissed summary judgment, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the defendant's unpleaded defences of non est factum and unconscionability.

The court, in this leave to appeal motion, found reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, particularly regarding the consideration of unpleaded defences.

However, leave to appeal was denied because the proposed appeal did not involve matters of such importance that transcended the immediate parties' interests or would enhance existing jurisprudence.

The third-party Wasylko Architect Inc. brought a motion to transfer an action from Milton to London, which the plaintiff opposed.

The action concerned property damages in London due to construction work.

The court applied Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) holistically, considering factors such as where events occurred, damages were sustained, the subject matter's location, local community interest, convenience of parties and witnesses, and court facility availability.

The court found London to be a significantly better venue due to the strong factual connection to London and Milton's inability to accommodate a lengthy trial, which would cause significant delays.

The motion was granted, transferring the main action and related third-party actions to London.

The Crown brought an application during a criminal fraud prosecution seeking admission of a spreadsheet summary prepared by a police investigator analyzing drug purchase and billing records.

The spreadsheet relied on information from Ministry of Health databases and records obtained from a pharmaceutical wholesaler.

The court held that the Crown failed to establish that the underlying documents constituted admissible business records under s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act or at common law.

Because the source documents themselves were inadmissible, the summary derived from them could not be admitted.

The court also expressed serious concerns regarding the reliability and completeness of the underlying data sources.

In a fraud prosecution alleging billing of the Ontario Drug Benefit Plan for drugs not dispensed, the Crown sought a pre‑trial ruling admitting “prescriber verification letters” completed by physicians during a government audit.

The Crown argued the documents were admissible as business records under s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act or under the principled hearsay exception.

The court found the letters were not business records because they were not created or maintained in the ordinary course of medical practice and were prepared during an investigation.

Reliability concerns also arose from physicians’ testimony that their answers may have been influenced by memory gaps or investigator comments.

The court held the principled hearsay exception was not satisfied because reliability and necessity were not established.