Paul Stewart Champ

A unionized health authority employee was suspended for attending work under the influence of alcohol.

After disclosing her alcohol addiction and refusing a last-chance abstinence agreement, the employer terminated her employment; her union grieved and she was reinstated on similar terms, then terminated again for allegedly breaching those terms.

The employee filed a human rights complaint alleging failure to accommodate her disability, and a human rights adjudicator assumed jurisdiction and found discrimination.

The majority held that Manitoba's mandatory dispute resolution clause in The Labour Relations Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the labour arbitrator over all disputes arising from the collective agreement, and that The Human Rights Code does not clearly express legislative intent to grant concurrent jurisdiction to the human rights adjudicator over such disputes.

The appeal was allowed and the reviewing judge's order setting aside the adjudicator's decision was reinstated.

The applicant, a Deputy Chief facing misconduct charges under the Police Services Act, brought a motion for third-party production of various documents from the Ottawa Police Service, including the personnel and application files of a civilian complainant.

The Commission assumed jurisdiction to order third-party production and applied the four-part West Park test.

The motion was dismissed regarding the personnel and application files as the applicant failed to establish their arguable relevance, but granted regarding specific notes and emails from two other individuals that were found to be arguably relevant.

The appellant, a police officer and union president, was suspended by the Chief of Police following criminal charges.

He brought an action for damages and declaratory relief, alleging Charter breaches and misfeasance in public office.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because the dispute fell under the collective agreement or required judicial review.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the collective agreement expressly did not apply to the appellant during his union secondment, and that an action is a permissible route to seek relief in the nature of judicial review, particularly when damages are claimed.

Three retired female members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police commenced a constitutional application challenging pension provisions that prevented job-sharing members from purchasing full-time pension credits for their service, a benefit available to members on unpaid leave.

The majority of the Court held that the pension plan's treatment of job-sharers created a distinction based on the enumerated ground of sex, as the program was disproportionately composed of women with childcare responsibilities.

The Court found that this arrangement perpetuated a long-standing source of economic disadvantage to women — gender biases embedded in pension plans historically designed for full-time male employees — thereby establishing a prima facie breach of s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Attorney General failed to demonstrate a pressing and substantial objective capable of justifying the limitation under s. 1 of the Charter.

The Court granted a declaration that the inability of full-time RCMP members who temporarily reduced working hours under a job-sharing agreement to purchase full-time pension credit for that service violated their s. 15(1) equality rights.

The appeal was allowed with costs throughout, with three justices dissenting on the application of the equality framework and the sufficiency of causal nexus.

The defendant insurer moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for short-term and long-term disability benefits, arguing the claims were statute-barred, no LTD application was submitted, policy breaches occurred, and the insurer was prejudiced by lack of medical evidence.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding that the action was commenced within the applicable limitation period, adequate proof of claim for LTD benefits was submitted, and the insurer was not prejudiced.

Leave was granted to the plaintiff to amend her Statement of Claim.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for an injunction, the court determined the costs of the motion.

The plaintiff argued costs should be in the cause, while the defendants sought substantial indemnity costs payable forthwith.

The court applied the presumptive 'pay as you go' rule under Rule 57.03, finding no reason to depart from it.

The court rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs, finding the motion was not frivolous or an abuse of process.

Partial indemnity costs totaling $44,000 were awarded to the various defendants, with payment extended due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for lack of jurisdiction.

The plaintiff, a police officer on leave serving as union president, was suspended and barred from police facilities following criminal charges.

He sued, alleging interference with his union duties.

The court found that the essential character of the dispute arose either under the collective agreement or the disciplinary regime of the Police Services Act.

Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent former employees and their new competing businesses from soliciting its customers.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case, as the non-competition agreements were either expired or likely unenforceable.

Furthermore, the court found no irreparable harm, concluding that damages would be an adequate remedy if the plaintiff ultimately succeeded at trial.

The appellant, a disabled veteran and freelance journalist, commenced a defamation action in Small Claims Court against the Minister of Veterans Affairs for statements published in The Hill Times characterizing the appellant's criticism of a veterans' pension program as "mistruths" stated to suit his own agenda.

The respondents moved to dismiss the claim under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, which provides for summary dismissal of proceedings arising from expression relating to matters of public interest.

The deputy judge dismissed the claim, finding the statements related to a matter of public interest and that the appellant had not advanced credible and compelling evidence of substantial merit.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether a deputy judge of the Small Claims Court has jurisdiction to make orders under section 137.1.

The court held that deputy judges lack such jurisdiction, as the statute expressly refers to "judge" without including deputy judges, and the Legislature has demonstrated a pattern of expressly referencing deputy judges when it intends to grant them authority.

The Plaintiffs sought costs on a partial indemnity basis after successfully opposing a motion for summary judgment and a Rule 21 motion to strike a claim concerning a breach of their s.6 Charter Mobility Rights.

The Defendant largely agreed to the quantum of costs but disputed the portion related to the novel Charter issue.

The court awarded $30,000 in costs, excluding the $7,000 associated with the novel Charter claim, which was ordered to be 'in the cause'.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for negligence and defamation on the basis that the two-year limitation period had expired, and a motion to strike the plaintiffs' claim for a breach of their section 6 Charter mobility rights.

The court found that the plaintiffs could not have reasonably discovered the material facts of their claim until the release of the Iacobucci Inquiry Report, meaning the limitation period had not expired.

The court also refused to strike the section 6 Charter claim, finding it was not plain and obvious that the claim would fail given the practical restrictions on the plaintiffs' ability to leave Canada.

Both motions were dismissed.

The plaintiff, a 58-year-old top-performing sales manager with eight years of service, brought a wrongful dismissal action against his former employer.

The court found the plaintiff was an employee, not an independent contractor, from the start of his engagement.

The court awarded a 12-month reasonable notice period, calculating damages based on base salary and an upward trend in commissions.

The court dismissed the claim for aggravated damages due to insufficient evidence of mental distress, but awarded $50,000 in punitive damages because the employer alleged just cause in bad faith as a negotiation tactic and significantly delayed paying statutory entitlements.

The appellant police officer was dismissed for unsatisfactory work performance after a hearing officer found the police service's ad hoc performance evaluation procedures were sufficient despite deviating from mandatory policies.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission allowed the officer's appeal, finding the strict application of the performance review policies was a mandatory precondition under O. Reg. 268/10.

The Divisional Court set aside the Commission's decision on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal allowed the officer's appeal and restored the Commission's decision, holding that the Commission's interpretation of the regulation was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The plaintiff moved to compel the defendant to produce three categories of documents: employment applications of successful candidates, assessment notes for successful applicants, and remuneration details for successful applicants.

The defendant resisted on grounds of relevance, privacy, and proportionality.

The court found the documents relevant to the plaintiff's claim of being blacklisted and wrongfully denied re-employment.

While acknowledging privacy concerns, the court ordered production of application packages and assessment documents for successful candidates, subject to the deemed undertaking and potential confidentiality orders.

However, the court limited the production of remuneration documents to aggregated benefit information, finding individual payroll histories disproportionate.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to determine the reasonable notice period following her without-cause termination.

The 41-year-old plaintiff was employed as a middle manager for 2.5 years.

The court found that the employer's contributions to CPP and EI should be included in the calculation of her compensation package.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court fixed the reasonable notice period at six months and awarded damages of $23,315, representing the balance owing after deducting severance payments already made.

The Ottawa Police Services applied for judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission, which had reinstated a police officer previously dismissed for unsatisfactory work performance.

The Commission had found that the police service failed to strictly follow its established procedures under O. Reg. 268/10 before initiating the complaint.

The Divisional Court (majority) held that the Commission's strict interpretation of the regulation was unreasonable, finding that the police service's extensive ad hoc efforts to assist the officer substantially complied with the statutory requirements.

The application for judicial review was granted, the Commission's decision was set aside, and the matter was remitted.

The applicant requested reconsideration of a previous Tribunal decision in his favour, arguing that the awards for injury to dignity and lost income were too low.

The Tribunal denied the request to reconsider the award for injury to dignity, finding it was an attempt to reargue the case.

The Tribunal directed further submissions on the lost income calculation.

The respondent's request to stay the original order pending the reconsideration was denied, as there was no prospect of irreparable harm.

The respondent school board sought $60,000 in partial indemnity costs following the dismissal of the applicants' application for judicial review regarding a school closure.

The applicants argued they should be shielded from costs as public interest litigants, or alternatively that costs should be fixed at $15,000.

The Divisional Court rejected the public interest immunity argument, noting the applicants acted partly in self-interest and adopted a 'no holds barred' approach that increased costs.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court fixed costs payable to the respondent at $35,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant, a combo truck driver, suffered a workplace injury to his shoulder and groin.

After a period of modified work and a return to regular duties, the applicant claimed he was still disabled and requested further accommodation.

The respondent, believing the applicant was malingering and attempting to leverage his injury for better employment terms, refused to offer further modified work and effectively terminated his employment.

The Tribunal found that the issue of the applicant's disability and the initial failure to accommodate had been appropriately dealt with by the WSIB.

However, the Tribunal concluded that the respondent breached both the procedural and substantive components of the duty to accommodate when it refused to engage in further dialogue and terminated the applicant's employment.

The applicant was awarded $15,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect, along with compensation for lost wages and retraining costs.

The applicants sought judicial review of a school board's decision to close two secondary schools and build a new one, alleging procedural unfairness, lack of statutory authority, and unreasonableness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the board substantially complied with the Ministry's school closure guidelines and its own policies.

The court held that the public consultation process was meaningful and that the failure to disclose certain confidential student survey data did not breach the duty of procedural fairness, as it did not prejudice the applicants' ability to participate.