Paul Stewart Champ

The appellant, an HIV-positive inmate, was placed in administrative segregation due to safety concerns regarding his sexual relations with other inmates.

He applied for habeas corpus, which was dismissed by the application judge despite findings of minor procedural flaws in the segregation review process.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the application judge lacked discretion to deny the writ once a breach of procedural fairness was found.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the procedural flaws did not render the detention unlawful and that the application judge properly exercised his residual discretion to deny the writ.

The appellant police officer appealed a disciplinary hearing decision that found him guilty of unsatisfactory work performance and ordered his resignation or dismissal.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission allowed the appeal and ordered his reinstatement.

The Commission found that the Ottawa Police Service failed to strictly comply with its own performance review policies and the mandatory pre-conditions set out in section 29(3) of O. Reg. 268/10 before initiating the chief's complaint.

The hearing officer committed manifest errors of law by finding that substantial compliance was sufficient and that he had discretion to interpret the established procedures, as well as errors of fact by ignoring material evidence favourable to the appellant.

The applicant, an inmate awaiting sentencing for attempted murder and aggravated sexual assault related to HIV transmission, applied for habeas corpus to be removed from administrative segregation and placed in the general prison population with a cellmate.

The applicant argued a denial of procedural fairness and failure to conduct mandated five-day reviews.

The court found that while there was a denial of procedural fairness in how the reviews were documented, the applicant was aware of the reasons for his segregation.

Due to the high risk the applicant posed to other inmates, the court held that administrative segregation was lawful and necessary for safety.

The application was dismissed, but the institution was ordered to continue offering alternative accommodation proposals.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability, claiming the respondent refused to accommodate his workplace injury.

The application had been previously deferred pending a WSIB appeal.

After the WSIB issued a decision, the applicant requested to re-activate the application, which the Tribunal granted.

The respondent then requested to defer the application again, arguing there were still outstanding WSIB issues.

The Tribunal denied the respondent's request, finding that the WSIB had completed its inquiries and there were no likely outstanding decisions.

The application was ordered to be scheduled for a hearing.

The applicant, an international medical graduate, filed human rights applications against the university and hospital alleging discrimination after he was suspended from his neurosurgery residency program.

The respondents sought to dismiss the applications under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code or as an abuse of process, arguing the matters were resolved through settlement agreements reached during a related grievance arbitration.

The Tribunal found that the settlement agreements contained ongoing contingencies and the arbitrator remained seized of the matters.

Consequently, the Tribunal deferred the human rights applications pending the final conclusion of the grievance and arbitration process.

The applicant requested to re-activate his human rights application, which had been deferred pending the outcome of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB) appeal.

The WSIB issued a decision confirming the nature of the applicant's disability and his inability to perform pre-injury duties.

As there were no outstanding WSIB issues related to the substance of the application and the respondent did not oppose the request, the Tribunal granted the request to re-activate and directed the matter to mediation.

The appellant, a federal government employee, successfully appealed her income tax reassessment and subsequently sued the federal government for abuse of power and misfeasance in public office.

The respondent successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred because the appellant knew the material facts underlying her tort claims years earlier.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the appellant was entitled to seek a determination that her tax reassessment was invalid before commencing her tort action, as proving the reassessment's invalidity was a necessary element of her misfeasance claim.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment was set aside.

A human rights organization sought leave to intervene as a friend of the court in three related civil actions alleging human rights abuses in Guatemala by subsidiaries of Canadian mining companies.

The proposed intervention related to pending motions by the defendants to dismiss the claims for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The proposed intervenor argued it could assist the court by providing expertise on international human rights law, transnational corporate responsibility, and the potential scope of a duty of care owed by Canadian parent corporations for overseas conduct of subsidiaries.

The court held that the organization could provide a useful legal perspective on international standards and policy considerations without interfering with the evidentiary record.

Leave to intervene was granted with limits on written and oral submissions.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss a civil action on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction because the dispute arose under a collective agreement and therefore fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitration.

The underlying action concerned an alleged overpayment of approximately $48,000 to a former employee resulting from administrative error despite an agreement that the employee’s salary would be “red-circled.” The court considered whether the essential character of the dispute arose from the interpretation, application, administration, or violation of the collective agreement.

Given that the employee was no longer employed, the memorandum governing the salary arrangement was not incorporated into the collective agreement, and the union itself took the position that the matter was not arbitrable, the court held the dispute did not fall within arbitral jurisdiction.

The motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was therefore denied.

The respondent requested that the Tribunal defer consideration of the applicant's human rights application pending the outcome of a recently filed grievance.

The Tribunal reviewed the subject matter of both proceedings and found no overlap in the facts.

The grievance concerned a denial of a temporary assignment based on marital status, whereas the application alleged discrimination based on sex, marital, and family status related to a different temporary position and maternity leaves.

The request for deferral was denied, and directions were given for mediation or a preliminary hearing.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action on a motion for summary judgment, the successful defendants sought costs of $23,895.43.

The plaintiff argued for reduced costs because the defendants brought two separate summary judgment motions when one would have sufficed.

The court agreed that the duplication of proceedings warranted a reduction and fixed the defendants' costs at $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel production of documents from the federal government in aid of cross-examination on an affidavit filed for a pending summary judgment motion based on limitation periods.

The government argued the requested documents were irrelevant because the plaintiffs had never seen them and therefore they could not affect the discoverability analysis under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that documents relating to alleged defamatory communications and investigative conduct were relevant to determining when the cause of action accrued and when the limitation period began to run.

Given the relationship between the merits of the claims and the limitation defence, production was ordered.

The court also directed counsel to consider whether the summary judgment motion should be postponed until documentary production and discovery were completed.

On a Rule 21 motion, the moving parties sought to stay or dismiss a negligence and breach of contract action for want of court jurisdiction.

The court applied the essential character framework and considered whether the dispute arose from collective agreement administration or from alleged promises and representations made outside that framework.

The court held that the pleaded claim, including alleged negligent misrepresentation and reliance relating to disability litigation steps and a missed limitation period, was arguable as a civil negligence claim not confined to labour board exclusivity.

The motion to stay or dismiss was therefore refused, and directions were set for further submissions.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of power, negligence, and Charter breaches arising from an income tax reassessment.

The plaintiff conceded the malicious prosecution claim.

For the remaining claims, the court held that the limitation period commenced when the plaintiff discovered the material facts underlying her claims, which occurred by 1998 or at the latest 2001 when she included them in her Notice of Tax Appeal.

The court rejected the argument that the cause of action only accrued after her tax appeal was successfully resolved in 2005.

As the action was commenced in 2007, it was statute-barred and dismissed.

The applicant, a medical resident, filed a human rights application against the University of Ottawa and four doctors, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, colour, place of origin, citizenship, and ethnic origin.

The respondents requested the removal of the personal respondents, arguing the University accepted full liability for their actions as its agents.

The Tribunal removed three of the doctors whose involvement was limited to their official capacities and who were not alleged to have engaged in personal discriminatory conduct.

The Tribunal declined to remove the fourth doctor at this stage, as the applicant alleged she made personal discriminatory comments, which could warrant a specific remedy against her if proven.

The parties consented to an order for costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs fixed at $12,000 plus $805.23 for HST and disbursements.

The appellant deposited a materially altered cheque into his account at the respondent credit union as part of a wire transfer scam.

After the drawee bank dishonoured the cheque, the respondent exercised its common law right of charge-back against the appellant's accounts and sued for the unrecovered balance.

The trial judge found for the respondent.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the right of charge-back was extinguished once the respondent received funds from the drawee bank, and alternatively, that the respondent was negligent in failing to warn him that the credit was provisional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a collecting bank does not lose its right of charge-back upon receiving payment from the drawee bank, and that the respondent owed no duty to warn the appellant in these circumstances.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability regarding the respondent's refusal to fund in vitro fertilization treatments.

The applicant requested an order to consolidate her application with four already consolidated applications proceeding as a Lead Case.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that adding a fifth case would complicate and lengthen the proceedings, and that the existing Lead Case already covered a range of biomedical conditions causing infertility.

The Tribunal set a schedule for submissions on whether to defer the application pending the outcome of the Lead Case.

The plaintiff brought a wrongful dismissal action in Ontario against his British Columbia employer after being dismissed from his employment in Nevada.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside service and stay the proceedings, arguing Ontario lacked jurisdiction and was not the convenient forum.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding jurisdiction simpliciter and that Ontario was the convenient forum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's appeal, holding that there was a real and substantial connection to Ontario and that the motion judge did not err in considering the plaintiff's loss of juridical advantage if forced to litigate in Nevada.