106 total
No order as to costs made following an appeal with divided success.
Following an appeal where the appellants achieved substantial but not total success, the Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement.
The appellants did not seek costs, and the court determined the respondents were not entitled to costs.
Consequently, the court made no order as to costs.
Insurance company merger transactions breached statutory accounting and transfer rules; trial remedy varied to unwind transactions.
The appellants, life insurance companies, appealed a trial judgment finding that transactions involving their participating accounts to finance a corporate acquisition breached the Insurance Companies Act.
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the transactions breached the Act by failing to comply with generally accepted accounting principles, improperly allocating expenses, and constituting prohibited transfers.
However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding the remedy, finding that the trial judge's order to return $390 million to the participating accounts via litigation trusts was overly broad and akin to an oppression remedy not available under the Act.
Instead, the Court ordered the transactions unwound as of the present, with adjustments for expense savings already received.
Leave to appeal class action certification order regarding parking violation fees dismissed.
The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a decision conditionally certifying a class action against a parking management company with significantly narrower parameters than proposed.
The plaintiffs challenged the motion judge's dismissal of causes of action under the Consumer Protection Act, 2002, unjust enrichment, and unconscionability, as well as the imposition of a limitation period and the exclusion of punitive damages as a common issue.
The Divisional Court found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order and no conflicting decisions warranting leave.
The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed in its entirety.
Successful respondents on appeal awarded fixed costs of $20,000.
Following a successful appeal by the respondents, the parties made written submissions on costs.
The respondents sought partial indemnity costs of $41,762.66, while the appellant sought substantial indemnity costs for a prior motion.
The Divisional Court ordered each party to bear its own costs of the motion and fixed the respondents' costs of the appeal at $20,000, finding the amount claimed to be beyond what was fair and reasonable.
Appeal dismissed; appellant's acquisition of mineral rights constitutes 'mining rights' subject to tax under the Mining Act.
The appellant appealed a decision finding it liable for tax under s. 189(1)(e) of the Mining Act.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the appellant's acquisition of mineral rights fell within the statutory definition of 'mining rights'.
The court held that the industry distinction between surface rights and surface access rights does not apply for the purpose of tax liability under the Act.
Leave to appeal granted to clarify whether departing investment advisers' solicitation of clients causes irreparable harm.
The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing its motion for an interlocutory injunction against a former investment adviser who joined a competing firm and contacted former clients.
The court granted leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that there were conflicting decisions regarding whether the loss of clients and damage to business reputation in the highly regulated financial services industry constitutes irreparable harm.
The court concluded it was desirable for an appellate court to clarify the law on this issue.
Appeal allowed in part to restrict witness questioning and exclude memoranda protected by deliberative secrecy.
The Attorney General of Canada appealed an order regarding the compellability of two witnesses and the disclosure of certain memoranda, asserting public interest immunity and deliberative secrecy under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that while certain paragraphs of one memorandum contained statements of fact not covered by deliberative secrecy, the trial judge erred in finding the public interest in disclosure outweighed deliberative secrecy for the remaining information.
The court restricted the scope of questioning and excluded another memorandum from evidence entirely.
Appeal dismissed; share valuator was not acting as an arbitrator and valuation is binding.
The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application to declare a share valuation null and void, and the granting of the respondents' application to declare the valuation binding.
The appellants argued the valuator acted as an arbitrator and failed to follow an understanding regarding document disclosure.
The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the valuator was not an arbitrator and had no contractual obligation to provide the requested documents.
The appeal, including an appeal on costs, was dismissed.
Appeal dismissed; injuries from a drive-by shooting do not arise from the use or operation of an automobile.
The appellant, an innocent bystander, was rendered paraplegic after being struck by a bullet fragment during a drive-by shooting.
She brought an action against the unidentified driver of the vehicle and her own automobile insurer under the OPCF 44R Endorsement.
The insurer successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the injuries did not arise directly or indirectly from the use or operation of an automobile.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the vehicle was used for an ordinary purpose, the shooting was a distinct and intervening act that broke the chain of causation.
Appeal of class certification dismissed; motions judge reasonably found class proceeding was the preferable procedure.
The appellants appealed a decision certifying two actions as class proceedings on behalf of participating life insurance policyholders.
The appellants argued the motions judge erred in finding a class proceeding was the preferable procedure under s. 5(1)(d) of the Class Proceedings Act, asserting that the Insurance Companies Act provided adequate alternative remedies for stakeholders.
The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motions judge made no error in principle and reasonably concluded that a class proceeding offered juridical advantages, including case management, access to justice through contingency fees, and judicial supervision of remedies.
Mortgagee in possession bound by tenant's right to set off prior judgment against rent under PNDA.
The tenant (TDL) leased property from a landlord and later signed a postponement and non-disturbance agreement (PNDA) with the landlord's mortgagee.
TDL obtained a judgment against the landlord for damages and costs, with a right to set off the amount against rent.
When the landlord defaulted on the mortgage, the mortgagee went into possession and demanded rent without the set-off.
The Court of Appeal held that under the PNDA, the mortgagee stepped into the landlord's shoes and assumed the existing state of accounts, including TDL's right of set-off.
The appeal was allowed.
Appeal allowed; trial judge erred in discharging jury based on speculation of juror bias.
The plaintiff in a personal injury action claimed her injuries interfered with her ability to care for her child.
During the jury trial, defence counsel asked about pre-accident discussions regarding the Children's Aid Society (CAS).
The trial judge discharged the jury, expressing concern that a juror employed by the CAS might make independent inquiries.
The defendants appealed.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by discharging the jury based on speculation rather than exploring less drastic remedies to cure any potential prejudice.
Order for security for costs set aside due to defendants' unreasonable delay in bringing the motion.
The plaintiff, a former franchisee, sued the franchisor for failing to renew its lease.
The defendants brought a motion for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(d), which was granted by the motions judge.
The plaintiff appealed to the Divisional Court, arguing that the defendants had unreasonably delayed in bringing the motion and that the order would stifle a valid claim.
The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the defendants had good reason to believe the plaintiff had insufficient assets years before bringing the motion, and that the motions judge failed to appreciate the evidence of delay.
The order for security for costs was set aside.
Ontario uninsured motorist coverage unavailable for Quebec accident barred by no-fault legislation.
The minor appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Quebec while a resident of Ontario.
The appellants sued the at-fault driver and their own insurer under the uninsured motorist coverage of their Ontario automobile policy.
The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action against the insurer, finding that Quebec's no-fault legislation applied and barred the tort claim.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under the lex loci delicti rule, Quebec substantive law applied.
Because Quebec's no-fault regime precluded any tort claim against the driver, the appellants were not 'legally entitled to recover' damages from her, which is a precondition for accessing uninsured motorist coverage under s. 265(1) of the Insurance Act.
Appeal dismissed; trial judge's finding of obstetrician's negligence in forceps delivery and suturing upheld.
The appellant obstetrician appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for negligence in the delivery of the respondent's child.
The trial judge found that the appellant fell below the standard of care by improperly using forceps, which caused injuries to the respondent's uterus, and by negligently suturing the injuries, which occluded her ureter.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in his factual findings and properly relied on the evidence of the respondents' expert.
Appeal dismissed; allegations of judicial bias rejected and trial judge's findings on commercial lease dispute upheld.
The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for extra-judicial efforts to shut down a restaurant and holding that they were not entitled to terminate the respondents' tenancy.
The appellants alleged bias on the part of the trial judge and substantive errors.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the threshold for bias was not met and the allegation was not raised at the earliest opportunity.
The court also upheld the trial judge's findings on the merits and confirmed the individual appellant's personal liability for tortious acts.
Successful municipal respondents awarded $50,000 each in partial indemnity costs following dismissal of developers' appeals.
Following the dismissal of two related appeals brought by groups of developers, the successful municipal respondents sought costs.
The City of Mississauga sought partial indemnity costs of $70,379.25, while the Region of Halton and City of Burlington sought full indemnity costs of approximately $176,000.
The Court of Appeal determined that costs should follow the event on a partial indemnity scale.
Considering the complexity of the issues, the prior proceedings before the Ontario Municipal Board and Divisional Court, and the consolidated hearing, the court awarded $50,000 to Mississauga and $50,000 to Halton and Burlington.
A conflict between a subdivision agreement and a development charge by-law exists only if the agreement precludes the by-law's charges.
Developers appealed decisions of the Divisional Court regarding the interpretation of 'conflict' under O. Reg. 82/98 between pre-existing subdivision agreements and municipal development charge by-laws.
The Court of Appeal held that the Divisional Court correctly applied a standard of correctness to the Ontario Municipal Board's decisions.
The Court affirmed that a conflict exists only if the subdivision agreement, properly interpreted, precludes the infrastructure charges imposed by the development charge by-law.
The appeals and cross-appeal were dismissed.
Plaintiffs' counsel disqualified after reviewing privileged electronic documents seized under an Anton Piller order.
The plaintiffs obtained an ex parte Anton Piller order to search and seize documents from the defendants' premises.
The order lacked a procedure for handling privileged documents.
During the search, electronic files containing privileged solicitor-client communications were seized and subsequently reviewed by the plaintiffs' counsel.
The defendants moved to disqualify the plaintiffs' solicitors.
The motions judge dismissed the motion, holding that the defendants had to prove pressing and substantial prejudice.
On appeal, the Divisional Court held this was an error of law; where relevant privileged documents are reviewed by opposing counsel, prejudice is assumed.
The appeal was allowed and the plaintiffs' solicitors were disqualified.
Appeals dismissed; Gu Group waived breach of contract damages and lost injunction damages by violating order.
The parties entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) to market CFC-free refrigerants.
The relationship deteriorated, leading to multiple lawsuits involving claims of breach of contract, misrepresentation, and conversion.
The trial judge found that the Lam Group breached the JVA but that the Gu Group had waived its right to damages by its subsequent conduct in negotiating a new agreement.
The trial judge also denied the Gu Group an inquiry into damages on the Lam Group's interlocutory injunction undertaking because the Gu Group had flagrantly violated the injunction.
The Lam Group's cross-appeal regarding pre-contractual misrepresentations and oppression was dismissed.
The trial judge's award of $50,000 in punitive damages against the Lam Group for the conversion of a laptop computer was upheld.
The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals and the cross-appeal.