Paul J. Bates

The insured died accidentally when a cocaine-filled condom burst in his stomach.

The appellant insurer refused to pay the life insurance proceeds to the respondent, the insured's former spouse and designated innocent beneficiary, arguing that public policy prevents a person from insuring against their own criminal act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the public policy rule preventing a criminal from profiting from their crime does not apply to an innocent beneficiary claiming in their own right, rather than through the criminal's estate.

The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was entitled to the insurance proceeds.

The requester, an insurance company, sought access to Crown files prepared for a criminal prosecution under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).

The Attorney General refused disclosure, and an Inquiry Officer ordered partial disclosure, finding that litigation privilege under s. 19 of FIPPA terminated when the criminal proceedings ended.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held that the Inquiry Officer's interpretation of s. 19 was unreasonable and wrong in law, as the statutory exemption for records prepared by Crown counsel for litigation does not incorporate common law limitations on litigation privilege.

The Attorney General's application was allowed, and the requester's application regarding privacy exemptions under s. 21 was dismissed.

The appeal concerned whether a municipality widening a road and installing a continuous centre median was required under s. 298(1) of the Municipal Act to provide another means of access to a commercial property whose direct left-turn access was restricted but not entirely eliminated.

The court held that s. 298(1) applies only where the effect of the by-law is to deprive the landowner of the only means of ingress and egress to the highway.

A mere limitation on access, even if commercially significant, does not trigger the statutory right to alternate access.

The respondents' remedy was confined to compensation for injurious affection under the Expropriations Act.

The appeal was allowed and the declaratory relief was set aside.

The appellant challenged the dismissal of an action on a livestock mortality insurance policy after a racehorse died from bismuth poisoning.

The Court of Appeal held that, once the trial judge found the malicious or intentional act exclusion inapplicable to the insured and his bailee, the poisoning constituted an accident as between the parties to the policy.

The court further held that the exclusion for administration of drugs, medication or inoculation applies to substances given for a beneficial medicinal purpose, not a lethal substance forced into the animal to injure or destroy it.

The insurer failed to prove the poison was given for medicinal purposes.

The appeal was allowed and judgment was entered for the policy amount plus prejudgment interest.

The appellant insurer appealed a declaration requiring payment of life insurance proceeds to the respondent, who was the named beneficiary under a policy maintained pursuant to a separation agreement.

The insured died accidentally from cocaine intoxication after ingesting narcotics, and the insurer argued both an implied contractual exclusion for criminal acts and a public policy bar against recovery flowing from criminal conduct.

The Court of Appeal held the policy was unambiguous, the insured did not intend to cause his own death, and the respondent claimed as an ordinary beneficiary rather than through the insured's estate.

Applying prior authority on the crime-profit rule, the court held that public policy did not bar recovery by an innocent beneficiary and dismissed the appeal.

The Superintendent of Financial Services issued a Prohibition Order against Transamerica, preventing the issuance of a variable insurance contract with a negotiable initial sales charge.

The Superintendent argued this feature could lead to unfair discrimination among insureds of the same class and expectation of life, violating the Insurance Act.

On appeal, the Financial Services Tribunal quashed the order, finding that differences in negotiated charges result from individual consumer choice and market competition, not from discriminatory acts by the insurer.

The Tribunal concluded the Prohibition Order was a disproportionate response to speculative harm and emphasized the need for full disclosure of the negotiable nature of the charges to consumers.