Paul H. Starkman

The defendant brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP legislation) to dismiss a defamation action initiated by the plaintiff, a former town councillor.

The plaintiff alleged defamation based on statements made by the defendant during the 2014 municipal election campaign concerning the plaintiff's record on development issues.

The court found that the defendant's statements related to matters of public interest, the plaintiff's claim lacked substantial merit, and the defendant had a valid defence of fair comment.

The court also determined that the plaintiff's evidence of harm was exceedingly weak, and the public interest in protecting the defendant's political speech outweighed any minimal harm to the plaintiff.

Consequently, the motion to dismiss the action was granted.

However, the defendant's request for damages for bad faith or improper purpose was denied due to insufficient evidence.

The plaintiff, Sirron Systems Inc., appealed a Master's order granting security for costs to the defendants, Scott, Pichelli & Easter Limited, Peter Pichelli, and Joel Easter.

The Master had ordered Sirron Systems Inc. to post $33,252.11.

The appeal challenged the Master's findings regarding the plaintiff's assets, impecuniosity, and the merits of the claim, arguing palpable and overriding errors.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Master's holistic assessment, particularly noting that the plaintiff did not allege impecuniosity before the Master and that the merits of the case were neutral.

The appellant mortgaged a golf course property to the respondent for $2,700,000.

After the appellant defaulted on the mortgage, the respondent obtained a default judgment for foreclosure and took possession of the property.

The appellant subsequently moved to set aside the default judgment and sought relief from forfeiture.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable prospect of payment, no evidence of ability to redeem, and no special circumstances warranting equitable intervention.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, distinguishing the case from Winters v. Hunking on the basis that the appellant provided no appraisal evidence of property value or equity, the property was investment property rather than a family homestead, and the appellant's delay was inadequately explained.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding refusals and undertakings from examinations for discovery.

The plaintiff sought to compel answers from the defendants and the Attorney General, while the Attorney General sought to compel answers from the plaintiff, clarify the scope of the pleadings, and obtain foundational information for the plaintiff's expert report.

The court ordered the plaintiff to produce a refused sales graph, amend its pleadings to clarify the temporal scope and damages claim, and provide the foundational information for its expert report.

The plaintiff's motion against the Attorney General was dismissed, as the court found the undertaking regarding correspondence with U.S. regulators was adequately answered.

The appellant landlord appealed a motion judge's decision finding that the parties had agreed to reinstate a commercial lease and that the landlord fundamentally breached that agreement by insisting on additional terms before allowing the tenant to re-enter the premises.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings of fact, which were supported by the evidence.

The court found that the tenant had matched the landlord's terms for reinstatement and that the landlord's subsequent demand for additional payments constituted a fundamental breach of the reinstatement agreement.

The defendants appealed a Master's order granting the plaintiffs leave to amend their Statement of Claim to seek damages for breach of a settlement agreement.

The defendants argued the new causes of action were barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Master's decision.

The court held that, at the pleadings stage, the plaintiffs' reliance on the defendants' ameliorative efforts to cure the breach may have rendered legal proceedings inappropriate, thereby postponing the commencement of the limitation period.

The appellants, judgment creditors of the respondent McCallum from a defamation action, sought a stay pending their appeal of a motion judge's decision dismissing their action under Rule 21.

The action sought to set aside a 1993 conveyance of McCallum's interest in the matrimonial home to his wife Boughner as a fraudulent conveyance under section 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The motion judge found the appellants lacked standing as "creditors or others" under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The appellants moved for a stay to prevent Boughner from disposing of the property pending appeal.

The motion was dismissed on the basis that there was no serious issue to be tried and no evidence of irreparable harm or balance of convenience favoring the stay.

Following the dismissal of the moving party's motion, the responding party sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on a Rule 49 offer to settle and allegations of improper conduct.

The court found that the offer to settle did not strictly comply with Rule 49.10(1) because it included undeterminable costs, and the moving party's conduct was not reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous.

Applying the principles of fair and reasonable costs, the court reduced the responding party's claimed hours for preparation and awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $27,000.

The applicant lawyer successfully moved to oppose confirmation of an Assessment Officer's ruling regarding unpaid legal accounts, while the respondents' motion to oppose was dismissed.

The applicant sought costs of $21,109.76 for the two motions, including a portion on a substantial indemnity basis due to the respondents' late adjournment request.

The court found no conduct justifying an elevated scale of costs and awarded partial indemnity costs.

Emphasizing proportionality, the court fixed the costs payable by the respondents to the applicant at $15,448.46 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

Following summary judgment motions where success was divided, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiff recovered $6,132.96 in the main action, while the defendant recovered $51,801.05 in the counterclaim, with the amounts set off against each other.

Both parties sought partial indemnity costs, with the plaintiff claiming $106,063.41 and the defendant claiming $76,730.39.

Given the divided success and the amounts recovered falling within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court and Simplified Procedure, the court ordered that both parties bear their own costs.

The applicant lawyer and respondent clients both brought motions to oppose the confirmation of an Assessment Officer's decision regarding unpaid legal accounts.

The clients argued the Assessment Officer made numerous errors, including reversing the onus of proof, misapprehending evidence, and improperly relying on business records for a law clerk who did not testify.

The court dismissed the clients' motion, finding that the Assessment Officer properly applied the burden of proof, made no palpable and overriding factual errors, and correctly admitted the dockets as business records.

The lawyer's motion was granted solely to remit the issue of costs back to the Assessment Officer, as the parties had not been given an opportunity to make submissions regarding a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim to allege a breach of minutes of settlement by the defendants.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing the proposed amendments were barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, as the plaintiffs ought to have discovered the alleged defects in the replacement materials upon delivery.

The court granted leave to amend, finding it was not clear that the claim was statute-barred, as the plaintiffs may have reasonably relied on the defendants' good faith in fulfilling the settlement.

The court also granted the plaintiffs' request to transfer the action to the ordinary procedure due to an increase in claimed damages.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action under Rule 21, the successful defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs' claim, which alleged a fraudulent conveyance, was dismissed because they lacked standing under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The court found that the plaintiffs' unproved and serious allegations of fraud constituted reprehensible conduct warranting elevated costs.

The court fixed the defendants' costs at $20,000 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the action, which sought to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance, on three grounds: lack of standing, the claim being statute-barred, and lack of legal capacity.

The court granted the motion, dismissing the action.

The primary reason for dismissal was the plaintiffs' lack of standing under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, as they were not "creditors or others" at the time of the impugned transfer in 1993.

Additionally, the plaintiffs failed to obtain proper court approval under section 38(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to commence proceedings against the non-bankrupt transferee.

The court disagreed that the claim was barred by the Real Property Limitations Act, finding that an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance is not an action to "recover land."

This endorsement sets out a timetable for the delivery of costs submissions and bills of costs for both the main action and counterclaim.

Following a previous decision dated May 2, 2017, the parties were unable to agree on costs, prompting the court to establish a schedule for their submissions.

The plaintiff landlord and defendant tenant both brought summary judgment motions concerning a commercial lease dispute.

The landlord re-entered the premises for non-payment of rent and non-performance of covenants.

The court found the re-entry for non-payment of rent valid, but the re-entry for non-performance of covenants invalid due to non-compliance with the Commercial Tenancies Act.

The court further found that the parties subsequently entered into an agreement to reinstate the lease, which the landlord then fundamentally breached by refusing access and imposing new conditions.

Damages were awarded to both parties, with the tenant receiving a significantly larger award for wrongful termination of the reinstated lease and rushed moving costs, while the landlord received re-entry costs incurred prior to its fundamental breach.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs against the corporate plaintiff under Rule 56.01(1)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff had sued for specific performance or damages of $600,000 arising from a dispute over the purchase and expansion of commercial condominium units.

The defendants argued the plaintiff lacked sufficient assets in Ontario to satisfy a potential costs award.

The Master dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff had an ongoing business, significant bank balances, and a steady rental income stream, meaning there was no good reason to believe it had insufficient assets.

The defendants, having successfully moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action under Rule 21, sought costs of over $35,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff argued the amount was excessive for a straightforward motion and pointed to his own costs outline of approximately $6,600.

The court found that while the Department of Justice lawyers were entitled to costs, the hours claimed were disproportionate to the narrow legal question involved.

The court awarded the defendants $15,000 in all-inclusive partial indemnity costs, balancing the moving party's burden with the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party.

The defendant, MCAP Financial Corporation, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action, which alleged that MCAP acted improvidently in selling a mortgaged property under power of sale.

The court found that there were genuine issues requiring a trial regarding the reasonableness of MCAP's conduct in the sale process, including the property valuation methodology, the consideration of environmental remediation tax advantages, the marketing efforts, and the evaluation of multiple offers.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The plaintiff participated in a charitable donation tax shelter, claiming substantial tax refunds which were later disallowed by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA).

The plaintiff brought a claim in Superior Court alleging CRA and its employees owed a duty to police the registration of the charity associated with the scheme and to warn the public.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim.

The court allowed the motion, finding no duty of care owed by CRA to warn taxpayers about unsuccessful tax schemes, that the Charter claim was bald and untenable, and that claims against individual employees were an abuse of process.

The court also struck damages related to the lost tax deduction as being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Court.