Paul H. Starkman

The defendant, Lisa Snowball, brought a motion to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on her property and release funds held in trust, which the plaintiff, The Regional Municipality of Halton, opposed.

Halton alleged the property and funds were connected to a multi-million dollar fraud scheme involving Snowball's former boyfriend and Halton employees.

Snowball argued that Halton failed to make full disclosure when obtaining the CPL, acted in bad faith during negotiations, and that the plaintiff's expert evidence should be struck for non-compliance with Rule 53.03.

The Master rejected Snowball's preliminary arguments, finding Halton had presented "better evidence" for the CPL, did not act in bad faith, and had substantially complied with expert disclosure rules.

Applying the CPL discharge test, the Master found a triable issue regarding Halton's interest in the land, given the complex financial transactions and Snowball's inability to credibly explain her financial capacity.

Balancing the equities, the Master concluded that justice was better served by preserving the status quo, as the property was not unique and there was no evidence of an intended sale.

Snowball's motion was denied.

The defendants brought a motion seeking a declaration that the plaintiff's construction lien had expired, an order discharging the lien, and the return of cash security.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing that a consent timetable order extended the mandatory two-year period under section 37 of the Construction Lien Act (CLA) for setting the action down for trial.

The court found that sections 37 and 46 of the CLA are mandatory and cannot be extended by party agreement or consent order, citing binding appellate authority.

The court also found no evidence of an agreement to extend the time limit.

Consequently, the lien was declared expired, discharged, and the cash security ordered returned, while the action continued as an ordinary breach of contract claim.

The plaintiffs brought two motions.

The first sought further document production and answers to undertakings/refusals regarding limestone supplied to their property.

The second sought to vary a previous order (February 13, 2019) allowing the defendants to take stone samples, alleging fraud and new evidence.

The court found that the defendants had largely complied with undertakings and dismissed the non-undertakings aspect of the first motion.

For the second motion, the court determined that the plaintiffs failed to prove fraud on a balance of probabilities, that the alleged fraud was not material, and that the plaintiffs did not exercise due diligence, as the information was largely available to them previously.

Both motions brought by the plaintiffs were dismissed, and the previous inspection order was amended to allow a different qualified stonemason to attend due to delay.

Costs were awarded to the defendants.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for real estate commission, intentional interference with economic relations, conspiracy, and breach of good faith.

The plaintiff alleged that the individual defendants used two corporate entities as alter egos to avoid paying commission on a property sale by structuring a second transaction after the first one failed.

The court found that the evidence regarding the corporate ownership structures and the defendants' intentionality in terminating the first agreement and entering the second was not definitively established on the record, raising genuine issues requiring a trial.

Consequently, the motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The defendants were, however, granted leave to amend their Statement of Defence.

The appellants appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice regarding an assessment of legal costs.

The appellants challenged the admission of business records (dockets and accounts) at the assessment hearing and argued that the assessment officer erred in limiting cross-examination on the clerk's dockets.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellants' counsel had conceded the admissibility of the business records and that the assessment officer properly limited cross-examination to the clerk's entries rather than the work performed by the firm.

The appellants were permitted to challenge the work carried out and the assessment officer substantially discounted the clerk's time.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The defendant landlord moved for security for costs against the plaintiff tenant under Rule 56.01(1)(d) and (e), alleging insufficient assets and a frivolous claim.

The plaintiff argued that its financial difficulties stemmed from the defendant's alleged breach of a lease amending agreement, which involved delayed renovations and illegal distress of chattels.

The court found the defendant met the low threshold for demonstrating insufficient assets but declined to order security for costs, exercising its discretion based on the principle that an order should not prevent a meritorious claim from proceeding, especially when the plaintiff's impecuniosity is allegedly caused by the defendant's actions.

The motion for security for costs was dismissed, and the defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs.

The defendant brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP legislation) to dismiss a defamation action initiated by the plaintiff, a former town councillor.

The plaintiff alleged defamation based on statements made by the defendant during the 2014 municipal election campaign concerning the plaintiff's record on development issues.

The court found that the defendant's statements related to matters of public interest, the plaintiff's claim lacked substantial merit, and the defendant had a valid defence of fair comment.

The court also determined that the plaintiff's evidence of harm was exceedingly weak, and the public interest in protecting the defendant's political speech outweighed any minimal harm to the plaintiff.

Consequently, the motion to dismiss the action was granted.

However, the defendant's request for damages for bad faith or improper purpose was denied due to insufficient evidence.

The plaintiff, Sirron Systems Inc., appealed a Master's order granting security for costs to the defendants, Scott, Pichelli & Easter Limited, Peter Pichelli, and Joel Easter.

The Master had ordered Sirron Systems Inc. to post $33,252.11.

The appeal challenged the Master's findings regarding the plaintiff's assets, impecuniosity, and the merits of the claim, arguing palpable and overriding errors.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Master's holistic assessment, particularly noting that the plaintiff did not allege impecuniosity before the Master and that the merits of the case were neutral.

The appellant mortgaged a golf course property to the respondent for $2,700,000.

After the appellant defaulted on the mortgage, the respondent obtained a default judgment for foreclosure and took possession of the property.

The appellant subsequently moved to set aside the default judgment and sought relief from forfeiture.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable prospect of payment, no evidence of ability to redeem, and no special circumstances warranting equitable intervention.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, distinguishing the case from Winters v. Hunking on the basis that the appellant provided no appraisal evidence of property value or equity, the property was investment property rather than a family homestead, and the appellant's delay was inadequately explained.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding refusals and undertakings from examinations for discovery.

The plaintiff sought to compel answers from the defendants and the Attorney General, while the Attorney General sought to compel answers from the plaintiff, clarify the scope of the pleadings, and obtain foundational information for the plaintiff's expert report.

The court ordered the plaintiff to produce a refused sales graph, amend its pleadings to clarify the temporal scope and damages claim, and provide the foundational information for its expert report.

The plaintiff's motion against the Attorney General was dismissed, as the court found the undertaking regarding correspondence with U.S. regulators was adequately answered.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding refusals and undertakings from examinations for discovery.

The plaintiff sought to compel answers from the defendants and the Attorney General, while the Attorney General sought to compel answers from the plaintiff, clarify the scope of the pleadings, and obtain foundational information for the plaintiff's expert report.

The court ordered the plaintiff to produce a refused sales graph, amend its pleadings to clarify the temporal scope and damages claim, and provide the foundational information for its expert report.

The plaintiff's motion against the Attorney General was dismissed, as the court found the undertaking regarding correspondence with U.S. regulators was adequately answered.

The appellant landlord appealed a motion judge's decision finding that the parties had agreed to reinstate a commercial lease and that the landlord fundamentally breached that agreement by insisting on additional terms before allowing the tenant to re-enter the premises.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings of fact, which were supported by the evidence.

The court found that the tenant had matched the landlord's terms for reinstatement and that the landlord's subsequent demand for additional payments constituted a fundamental breach of the reinstatement agreement.

The defendants appealed a Master's order granting the plaintiffs leave to amend their Statement of Claim to seek damages for breach of a settlement agreement.

The defendants argued the new causes of action were barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Master's decision.

The court held that, at the pleadings stage, the plaintiffs' reliance on the defendants' ameliorative efforts to cure the breach may have rendered legal proceedings inappropriate, thereby postponing the commencement of the limitation period.

The appellants, judgment creditors of the respondent McCallum from a defamation action, sought a stay pending their appeal of a motion judge's decision dismissing their action under Rule 21.

The action sought to set aside a 1993 conveyance of McCallum's interest in the matrimonial home to his wife Boughner as a fraudulent conveyance under section 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The motion judge found the appellants lacked standing as "creditors or others" under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The appellants moved for a stay to prevent Boughner from disposing of the property pending appeal.

The motion was dismissed on the basis that there was no serious issue to be tried and no evidence of irreparable harm or balance of convenience favoring the stay.

Following the dismissal of the moving party's motion, the responding party sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on a Rule 49 offer to settle and allegations of improper conduct.

The court found that the offer to settle did not strictly comply with Rule 49.10(1) because it included undeterminable costs, and the moving party's conduct was not reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous.

Applying the principles of fair and reasonable costs, the court reduced the responding party's claimed hours for preparation and awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $27,000.

The applicant lawyer successfully moved to oppose confirmation of an Assessment Officer's ruling regarding unpaid legal accounts, while the respondents' motion to oppose was dismissed.

The applicant sought costs of $21,109.76 for the two motions, including a portion on a substantial indemnity basis due to the respondents' late adjournment request.

The court found no conduct justifying an elevated scale of costs and awarded partial indemnity costs.

Emphasizing proportionality, the court fixed the costs payable by the respondents to the applicant at $15,448.46 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

Following summary judgment motions where success was divided, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiff recovered $6,132.96 in the main action, while the defendant recovered $51,801.05 in the counterclaim, with the amounts set off against each other.

Both parties sought partial indemnity costs, with the plaintiff claiming $106,063.41 and the defendant claiming $76,730.39.

Given the divided success and the amounts recovered falling within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court and Simplified Procedure, the court ordered that both parties bear their own costs.

The applicant lawyer and respondent clients both brought motions to oppose the confirmation of an Assessment Officer's decision regarding unpaid legal accounts.

The clients argued the Assessment Officer made numerous errors, including reversing the onus of proof, misapprehending evidence, and improperly relying on business records for a law clerk who did not testify.

The court dismissed the clients' motion, finding that the Assessment Officer properly applied the burden of proof, made no palpable and overriding factual errors, and correctly admitted the dockets as business records.

The lawyer's motion was granted solely to remit the issue of costs back to the Assessment Officer, as the parties had not been given an opportunity to make submissions regarding a Rule 49 offer to settle.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action under Rule 21, the successful defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs' claim, which alleged a fraudulent conveyance, was dismissed because they lacked standing under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The court found that the plaintiffs' unproved and serious allegations of fraud constituted reprehensible conduct warranting elevated costs.

The court fixed the defendants' costs at $20,000 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the action, which sought to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance, on three grounds: lack of standing, the claim being statute-barred, and lack of legal capacity.

The court granted the motion, dismissing the action.

The primary reason for dismissal was the plaintiffs' lack of standing under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, as they were not "creditors or others" at the time of the impugned transfer in 1993.

Additionally, the plaintiffs failed to obtain proper court approval under section 38(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to commence proceedings against the non-bankrupt transferee.

The court disagreed that the claim was barred by the Real Property Limitations Act, finding that an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance is not an action to "recover land."