Paul Alexander Robson

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss three proceedings commenced by the plaintiffs regarding a long-standing family business dispute.

The plaintiffs alleged fraud, conspiracy, and misappropriation of funds dating back to the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The court granted the motions, finding that the actions were an abuse of process as they attempted to relitigate issues that had been resolved in prior litigation and settlements.

The court also held that the claims were barred by broad releases signed by the plaintiffs in 2005, 2012, and 2015, and were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and the Trustee Act.

Mitchell Dubros appealed the dismissal of his certiorari application, which sought to quash his committal for trial on a charge of obstructing justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's decision, affirming that a preliminary inquiry judge's determination of evidentiary sufficiency is owed great deference.

The court held that there was "any evidence" to meet the threshold for committal, specifically evidence of threats made to dissuade witnesses, which constitutes obstruction of justice under s. 139(3) of the Criminal Code, and that the mental element of the offence was sufficiently established.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants for the recovery of $45,000.

The individual defendant, an officer of a corporate client, withdrew the funds with only one signature, despite knowing the account required two signatures.

The bank mistakenly permitted the withdrawal and subsequently reimbursed the corporate client.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, holding that the individual defendant was not an innocent recipient and was unjustly enriched by the mistake of fact.

Summary judgment was granted for the principal amount plus interest, but the claim for punitive damages was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's urgent application, which amounted to an unjustified attempt to obtain a Mareva injunction, the respondents sought costs on a full indemnity basis.

The court found that the applicant's unsubstantiated allegations of fraud, failure to attend cross-examination, and refusal to pay undisputed mortgage arrears warranted an elevated costs award.

Balancing the indemnity principle with access to justice, the court awarded costs to the respondents on a substantial indemnity basis fixed at $20,000.

The moving party sought an extension of time and leave to appeal from an unreported order of the lower court.

The Divisional Court granted the extension of time but dismissed the motion for leave to appeal with costs fixed at $5,000.

An interim stay previously ordered was terminated.

The appellant filed a notice of appeal from an interlocutory family law order without first obtaining leave to appeal.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

After the appellant failed to respond within the required timeframe, citing COVID-19 illness, the court dismissed the appeal as it required leave.

The dismissal was without prejudice to the appellant bringing a proper motion for leave to appeal, for which the court set strict deadlines.

The moving party sought a stay of an order requiring her to vacate the matrimonial home, pending a motion for leave to appeal.

The court noted that deadlines were temporarily suspended due to COVID-19, making an extension of time unnecessary.

The court granted a temporary stay of the eviction order until the final disposition of the motion for leave to appeal and set a timetable for the delivery of motion materials.

The moving party sought a stay of an order requiring her to leave the matrimonial home pending a motion for leave to appeal.

The court noted that deadlines were suspended due to COVID-19, so an extension of time was not required.

The court granted a temporary stay of the order until the final disposition of the motion for leave to appeal and set a timetable for the delivery of motion materials.

The applicant, Mitchell Dubros, a private investigator, sought an order of certiorari to quash a committal order for attempting to obstruct justice.

The charge arose from his alleged attempts to dissuade witnesses (Cynthia Mulligan, Pam Seatle, James Tumelty) from testifying in a criminal harassment case against Mike Bullard, by threatening to harm their reputations.

The court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's decision, applying the "scintilla of evidence" test for jurisdictional error.

It found that the preliminary inquiry judge did not err in committing the applicant to stand trial, as there was sufficient evidence that the applicant sought to dissuade Ms. Mulligan from testifying using threats and other corrupt methods.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

The appellant sought a motion to review a decision of the motion judge.

The motion judge had heard both the respondent's motion to stay proceedings and the appellant's motion for an extension of time simultaneously.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the motion judge's discretionary order, as the motion judge had reasonably connected his decision on the respondent's motion to his disposition of the appellant's motion.

The motion to review was dismissed with costs fixed at $2,500.00 all-inclusive.

The respondent brought a motion for recusal against the case management judge, alleging bias and lack of impartiality.

The judge had appointed herself as case management judge for complex, protracted proceedings involving the parties.

The respondent maintained the allegations despite being offered an opportunity to withdraw them, and was directed to bring a formal recusal motion.

The respondent failed to provide cogent evidence of bias.

Applying the high threshold for recusal motions, particularly within the case management context, the court found no actual bias or reasonable apprehension of bias.

The recusal motion was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appellants' appeal from a summary judgment decision against them in the amount of approximately $950,000, setting aside the judgment and directing the matter proceed to trial.

The appellants sought enhanced costs and personal liability for opposing counsel, alleging that respondents' counsel misled the court by failing to ensure the amended statement of defence was included in the appeal book.

The court rejected the enhanced costs request but addressed the broader issue of counsel's obligations to ensure the court has all material necessary for a full appreciation of the matter under appeal.

The moving party sought extensions of time to appeal three orders from the Superior Court: a contempt order dated October 10, 2017, a costs order dated January 26, 2018, and a sentencing order dated September 21, 2018, which struck the moving party's pleadings and allowed the respondent to proceed to an uncontested trial.

The motion judge dismissed the extensions for the first two orders on the basis of abuse of process, given the substantial delays, lack of satisfactory explanation, and the moving party's pattern of non-compliance with court orders and procedural rules.

However, the motion judge granted an extension for the sentencing order due to its severe procedural consequences, and stayed that order pending appeal.

The appellants, Ashok and Usha Badhwar, appealed a summary judgment granted against them in the amount of $954,842.55 on a guarantee they signed for their son's company.

The motion judge refused to consider a defence regarding lack of consideration because it was not explicitly pleaded, despite acknowledging it could be a genuine issue for trial.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in her approach to pleadings and in refusing to consider a defence that was adequately pleaded when read generously.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment, and directed the matter proceed to trial on all issues.

Supplementary reasons to an appeal of an order striking the appellant's fresh as amended statement of claim.

The respondents requested the court re-open the appeal and withdraw, alter, or modify its decision, arguing the court misapprehended the timing of the demand for particulars, the history of the bankruptcy proceeding, and conflated oral submissions with pleading content.

The court rejected the second and third arguments and, while acknowledging the respondents' point regarding the timing of the demand for particulars, declined to re-open the appeal as it was not in the interests of justice and the result would have been the same.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order striking his fresh as amended statement of claim without leave to amend and dismissing his action for malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office against the Law Society of Ontario and four individuals involved in investigations and proceedings concerning the appellant over 15 years.

The motion judge found the appellant had failed to provide sufficient particulars of improper purpose or ulterior motive as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the appellant had sufficiently pleaded the elements of both torts through his pleadings and response to the demand for particulars, except as to one respondent against whom no particulars were provided.

The court dismissed the appellant's motion to admit fresh evidence and vacated the costs order, awarding the appellant partial costs of the appeal.

The respondent was previously found in contempt for failing to comply with multiple financial disclosure orders in a family law proceeding.

Despite being given numerous opportunities and being fined, the respondent persisted in his failure to provide complete banking records, authorizations, and a proper business valuation.

The applicant sought orders for the respondent's incarceration and to strike his pleadings.

The court declined to order incarceration, finding it would not likely bring about compliance and would disadvantage the applicant.

However, applying the three-part test from Ferguson v. Charlton, the court struck the respondent's pleadings due to his egregious and deliberate non-compliance, allowing the applicant to proceed to an uncontested hearing.

The applicant brought a motion to find the respondent in contempt of two prior court orders requiring financial disclosure, including the production of tax returns, bank statements, and a business valuation of his exotic car rental business.

The court found that the respondent had deliberately and wilfully breached both orders by failing to serve his Answer and Financial Statement on time, failing to produce his actual filed tax returns, failing to produce bank and PayPal statements, and failing to retain a Chartered Business Valuator.

The court found the respondent in contempt beyond a reasonable doubt and adjourned the matter for submissions on penalty and costs.

The plaintiffs, an exotic car rental company, sued the renter and an unauthorized driver after a rented Aston Martin was destroyed in a collision.

The unauthorized driver's insurer moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action against the driver, relying on the no-fault property damage regime under s. 263 of the Insurance Act.

The plaintiffs also moved for summary judgment against the renter for breach of contract.

The court granted the insurer's motion, dismissing the action against the driver because s. 263(5)(a) strictly bars property damage claims against anyone other than the insured's own insurer.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion against the renter, finding that s. 263(5)(a.1) requires a finding of fault or negligence, which involved genuine issues of material fact requiring a trial.

The Crown sought summary judgment to dismiss two actions brought by the plaintiffs, Paul Alexander Cooper and Candice Hopkins, as statute-barred under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act and the Limitations Act, 2002.

One action had been administratively dismissed, which the plaintiffs sought to set aside.

The court set aside the administrative dismissal to deal with both actions concurrently.

The plaintiffs argued that Mr. Cooper's alleged incapacity suspended the limitation period.

The court rejected the incapacity argument, finding the evidence from a chiropractor insufficient and unqualified.

Both actions were ultimately dismissed as statute-barred due to failure to provide proper notice to the Crown and expiry of the basic limitation period.