Paul Alexander Robson

The Mortgagee Plaintiffs sought summary judgment to enforce a syndicated loan and mortgage against the Joseph-Walker Parties, who defaulted.

The Joseph-Walker Parties alleged fraud by other defendants and, later, by the Mortgagee Plaintiffs themselves, and sought to adjourn the motion.

The court denied the adjournment, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the Mortgagee Plaintiffs' claims or the fraud allegations against them.

Summary judgment was provisionally granted for the Mortgagee Plaintiffs, including payment of the outstanding loan amount, possession, and writs of possession, conditional on adding seven non-party mortgagees to the action to ensure they are bound by the order.

The court also addressed the consolidation of related proceedings and the principles of partial summary judgment.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike claims related to a family business dispute, arguing they were barred by the ultimate 15-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that it was not plain and obvious that the claims could not succeed.

The judge emphasized that Rule 21 motions are for clear cases based on pleadings, not for fact-finding, especially when issues like the precise 'act or omission' triggering the limitation period and potential willful concealment are disputed and require evidence.

The court also rejected the argument that an oppression remedy is automatically precluded by corporate dissolution, noting that such remedies can include damages for past wrongs and that technical dissolution does not necessarily mean a cessation of operations or asset misappropriation.

The appellants brought a motion for an extension of time to appeal a judgment and for leave to add Jasmine Javid as a party to the appeal.

The responding party opposed the extension and sought security for costs.

The court dismissed the motion for an extension of time, finding that the appellants failed to demonstrate a continuing intention to appeal, provide a satisfactory explanation for the significant delay, or show compelling merits for the proposed appeal.

The court also found that granting the extension would prejudice the responding party due to a pattern of delay and obfuscation.

As a result, the other requested relief fell away.

This endorsement addresses multiple motions in a protracted five-year-old action involving alleged fraudulent mortgage enforcement and power of sale transactions.

The court first dealt with a recusal motion brought by the defendant, Mr. D'Mello, alleging conflict of interest and bias against the presiding judge.

The recusal motion was dismissed, with the court finding no evidence of bias and noting Mr. D'Mello's history of unsubstantiated bias claims and attempts to delay proceedings.

The court then largely granted the plaintiff's disclosure motion, ordering Mr. D'Mello and his corporations to provide answers to undertakings and refusals, and produce corporate and trust account records relevant to the alleged fraudulent transactions and piercing of the corporate veil.

Mr. D'Mello's cross-motion for disclosure was dismissed due to lack of supporting evidence and the plaintiff's prior responses.

The appellant tenant sought a stay of an eviction order issued by the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) due to non-payment of rent.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay pending appeal, considering whether there was a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience.

The court found that the appellant failed to raise a serious issue on a question of law, as her grounds of appeal primarily involved questions of fact (misapprehension of evidence, novation).

Furthermore, the appellant did not provide sufficient evidence to establish irreparable harm beyond the inherent loss of a home in tenancy cases.

Considering the protracted nature of the dispute and the landlord's entitlement to resolution, the court dismissed the motion for a stay, concluding that it was not in the interests of justice to grant it.

The applicant, a lawyer, brought an application challenging the vires of the Law Society Tribunal’s costs rules, which the respondent Law Society moved to strike.

The scheduled hearing was adjourned because both parties failed to file necessary materials in advance, leading to procedural disputes and preventing the judge from fully preparing.

This lack of preparation also delayed the discovery of a potential judicial conflict of interest, necessitating the adjournment.

The court emphasized the importance of counsel ensuring all required materials are filed properly to avoid increasing court backlogs.

The moving parties, a former lawyer and his professional corporation, sought an urgent order to pay the net proceeds of a condominium sale into court, pending their motion to extend time for an appeal from an underlying judgment.

The judgment had declared a trust invalid and ordered the discharge of a mortgage and return of assets to an estate, which the moving parties had failed to comply with, leading to a contempt finding.

The moving parties argued the payment was necessary to protect a beneficiary's interests and alleged estate mismanagement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the allegations of mismanagement incredible and the payment into court unnecessary.

The court noted the moving parties' history of obstruction, non-compliance with court orders, and unlikelihood of the appeal proceeding due to unpaid costs.

This is a panel review of a single judge's order refusing an extension of time to appeal a summary trial judgment.

The moving party sought to introduce fresh evidence, which was denied due to lack of satisfactory explanation for its delay and minimal impact on the outcome.

The panel upheld the single judge's decision, finding no error in principle or misapprehension of material evidence in applying the test for extending time to appeal.

The panel agreed that the moving party had not formed an intention to appeal within the prescribed time and that the proposed grounds of appeal lacked merit.

The review motion was dismissed.

This appeal concerned whether the validity of a marriage contract could be re-litigated between parties embroiled in multiple, long-standing family, corporate, and bankruptcy law actions.

The appellant sought to raise the issue of the marriage contract's validity, arguing it was not definitively determined in prior contempt proceedings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's finding that the issue was integral to previous decisions and that allowing its re-litigation would constitute an abuse of process, especially given the appellant's failure to appeal earlier orders.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal previously rejected the appellants' claim to overturn the setting aside of a default foreclosure judgment but set aside the application judge's order for sale, directing a trial on whether one appellant (2670082 Ontario Corp.) was protected by the Land Titles Act.

In this costs decision, the Court found the respondent (Kelly Martin) wholly successful against one appellant (11037315 Canada Inc.) and awarded her partial indemnity costs.

The other appellant (2670082 Ontario Corp.) achieved partial success on appeal, and costs between 2670082 Ontario Corp. and the respondent were fixed but made payable in the cause of the future trial.

The appellants' overall request for substantial costs was rejected as excessive.

The appellant insurer appealed a lower court decision that found it had a continuing duty to defend the respondent insured in an underlying action.

The insured had purchased property with title insurance and was subsequently sued by a previous owner claiming invalid sale and unjust enrichment.

Although the insured later lost title to the property, the application judge found the amended statement of claim included a claim for damages against the insured, triggering the insurer's duty to defend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, affirming that the amended statement of claim could reasonably be read to include a claim for damages against the insured, thus upholding the duty to defend.

The appellants appealed an order setting aside a default judgment for foreclosure and possession.

The Court of Appeal upheld the setting aside of the default judgment based on equitable principles and irregular obtainment (lack of notice of assignment).

However, the court found the application judge erred in determining whether the subsequent purchaser (2670082 Ontario Corp.) was a bona fide purchaser for value without actual notice under the Land Titles Act, as the finding was based on constructive rather than actual knowledge.

The appeal was allowed in part, setting aside the order for sale and ordering a trial to determine if the subsequent purchaser was a bona fide purchaser for value without actual notice, which would affect their title.

The moving party, 11534599 Canada Corp., sought review of a motion judge's order that granted an extension of time to perfect its appeal on terms that suspended the payment of per diem interest for a specific period.

The original appeal stemmed from an order finding 115 in unlawful possession of a property and requiring mortgage assignment and payment with interest.

The motion judge had imposed the interest suspension to address prejudice caused by 115's delay and attempts to impose preconditions on the mortgage assignment. 115 argued that the motion judge, as a single judge, lacked jurisdiction to vary the original order by suspending interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motion, holding that the motion judge's order merely suspended interest pending the appeal's hearing and did not permanently alter the substance of the original order.

This term was deemed necessary in the interests of justice to grant the extension.

The appellant sought to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing her appeal for delay and to extend time to perfect the appeal.

The underlying appeal concerned a motion judge's decision to dismiss the appellant's action via reverse summary judgment, which sought to set aside a property transfer under power of sale due to alleged fraud and conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal granted the appellant's request, finding that despite some delay, she maintained an intention to appeal and had arguable grounds, particularly regarding the motion judge's assessment of "badges of fraud" in the context of a power of sale and the chargee's duties.

The court also clarified that a writ of possession requires a pre-existing order for possession, which the purchaser lacked.

The moving party, Ms. Sun, sought an extension of time to appeal a trial judgment concerning a failed residential real estate transaction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that Ms. Sun failed to demonstrate a bona fide intention to appeal within the relevant period, provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, or show sufficient merit in the proposed appeal.

The court also addressed the proper procedure for swearing affidavits when the deponent does not understand English and clarified that the appeal period runs from the release of reasons, not the signing of the judgment.

The appellant, 11534599 Canada Corp., sought a stay pending appeal of an order requiring it to provide possession of a property to the respondents and to assign a mortgage.

The original order was based on a finding that the appellant had taken illegal possession of the property, contrary to the Mortgages Act, and thus could not rely on the exception in s. 2(3) to refuse assignment.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay (serious issue, irreparable harm, balance of convenience).

While a serious issue regarding the interpretation of "peaceable possession" was found, the court determined the appellant would not suffer irreparable harm given the respondents' undertaking not to sell the property and the existing equity.

The balance of convenience favored the respondents, who would suffer significant hardship if they lost their principal residence.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

Mitchell Dubros appealed the dismissal of his certiorari application, which sought to quash his committal for trial on a charge of obstructing justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's decision, affirming that a preliminary inquiry judge's determination of evidentiary sufficiency is owed great deference.

The court held that there was "any evidence" to meet the threshold for committal, specifically evidence of threats made to dissuade witnesses, which constitutes obstruction of justice under s. 139(3) of the Criminal Code, and that the mental element of the offence was sufficiently established.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, Mitchell Dubros, a private investigator, sought an order of certiorari to quash a committal order for attempting to obstruct justice.

The charge arose from his alleged attempts to dissuade witnesses (Cynthia Mulligan, Pam Seatle, James Tumelty) from testifying in a criminal harassment case against Mike Bullard, by threatening to harm their reputations.

The court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's decision, applying the "scintilla of evidence" test for jurisdictional error.

It found that the preliminary inquiry judge did not err in committing the applicant to stand trial, as there was sufficient evidence that the applicant sought to dissuade Ms. Mulligan from testifying using threats and other corrupt methods.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

The appellant sought a motion to review a decision of the motion judge.

The motion judge had heard both the respondent's motion to stay proceedings and the appellant's motion for an extension of time simultaneously.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the motion judge's discretionary order, as the motion judge had reasonably connected his decision on the respondent's motion to his disposition of the appellant's motion.

The motion to review was dismissed with costs fixed at $2,500.00 all-inclusive.

The respondent brought a motion for recusal against the case management judge, alleging bias and lack of impartiality.

The judge had appointed herself as case management judge for complex, protracted proceedings involving the parties.

The respondent maintained the allegations despite being offered an opportunity to withdraw them, and was directed to bring a formal recusal motion.

The respondent failed to provide cogent evidence of bias.

Applying the high threshold for recusal motions, particularly within the case management context, the court found no actual bias or reasonable apprehension of bias.

The recusal motion was dismissed.