ODC 2015

The moving party sought to set aside an order quashing his appeal from the Landlord and Tenant Board.

He argued that the Board's consent order was invalid because his former counsel forced him to accept the settlement under duress.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the counsel's firm legal advice did not amount to duress at law and that there was no unfairness in the prior proceedings.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel, which had set aside a Hearing Panel's dismissal of professional misconduct complaints related to mortgage transactions.

The Appeal Panel found the Hearing Panel erred in law by incorrectly defining fraud and by concluding a lawyer need not disclose material facts if they reasonably believe the lender already knows them.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that a lawyer has a strict duty to disclose all material facts to a lender client, and that the Appeal Panel reasonably concluded the Hearing Panel's legal errors rendered its factual findings unsafe.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order upholding a Master's decision that denied relief from the deemed undertaking rule.

The moving party wished to disclose discovery documents to regulatory authorities regarding alleged securities infractions and to police regarding alleged perjury by a defendant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the lower court's application of the Supreme Court's framework.

The court emphasized that bald allegations without documentary evidence are insufficient to establish the exceptional circumstances required to override the deemed undertaking rule.

The applicant, an OPP officer facing disciplinary proceedings under Part V of the Police Services Act, sought a stay of those proceedings pending his application for judicial review.

In his judicial review application, the applicant challenged the constitutionality of the disciplinary process, arguing it violated his rights under section 7 of the Charter and procedural fairness.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant could suffer irreparable reputational harm if the hearing proceeded, and the balance of convenience favoured a short stay given the imminent judicial review hearing.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint of discrimination, harassment, and reprisal against her former employer, a law firm where she articled.

The applicant alleged she was terminated due to her disability after the firm discovered she had failed her first year of law school and requested her official transcript.

The Divisional Court found the HRTO's decision to be reasonable, upholding findings that the request for the transcript was not discriminatory, disability was not a factor in her dismissal, and there was no harassment or reprisal.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint of discrimination against a university.

The adjudicator had dismissed the complaint under s. 34(11) of the Human Rights Code because the applicant had an outstanding civil action against the university regarding the same essential factual content—the inclusion of a failed academic year on her official transcript.

The Divisional Court found the adjudicator's interpretation of s. 34(11) to be reasonable, confirming that the provision requires an applicant to choose between the Tribunal and a concurrent civil action at the time the application is filed.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that dismissed her request to add the University of Windsor as a party to her complaint against the Law Society, dismissed her complaint against the Law Society, and declared her a vexatious litigant regarding her attempts to pursue allegations against the University over her official transcript.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness and found that the HRTO had ample authority to control its processes and prevent abuse.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a final order regarding spousal support, arguing the trial judge erred in imputing income to her, setting the commencement date for support, fixing the quantum within the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, and calculating the respondent's income.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or significant misapprehension of evidence.

The court upheld the trial judge's discretionary decisions, including the imputation of income based on the appellant's capacity and the selection of a post-application commencement date due to the appellant's delay in pursuing the claim.

The tenant appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board dismissing his applications as vexatious and finding he had abandoned the rental unit before the landlord changed the locks.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that its jurisdiction is limited to questions of law under s. 210(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, and the tenant failed to identify any error of law.

The Board had ample evidence to conclude the applications were vexatious and to reject the tenant's credibility regarding alleged rent payments.

The appellant brought a motion to extend the time to appeal two Small Claims Court judgments, citing severe health issues and medical treatments as the reason for the delay.

The respondent opposed the motion, highlighting the appellant's history of non-compliance with court orders and multiple adjournments.

The Divisional Court applied the test for extending time to appeal and found that the appellant failed to demonstrate a bona fide intention to appeal within the time limit or any merit to the proposed appeals.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration award that determined two policy grievances regarding the employer's Nuclear Resourcing Policy.

The arbitrator had found that the employer's reassignment of employees to available work within their job classification did not violate the job posting provisions of the collective agreement.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and held that the arbitrator's interpretation fell within a range of reasonable outcomes, as it followed established arbitral jurisprudence and considered the collective agreement as a whole.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant, a Chartered Professional Accountant, sought judicial review to quash the respondent's decisions to investigate him and issue allegations of professional misconduct for failing to cooperate.

The applicant argued the respondent exceeded its jurisdiction and breached natural justice by refusing to identify the complainant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it premature to intervene before the administrative process concluded and holding that the applicant had a duty to cooperate with the investigation.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing her appeal from a Master's decision.

The Master had set aside a registrar's order dismissing the plaintiff's fraudulent conveyance action for delay.

The Divisional Court found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the lower courts' decisions, which held that the plaintiff provided a reasonable explanation for the delay due to inadvertent error and that the defendant suffered no non-compensable prejudice.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The responding party (applicant in the main proceeding) sought judicial review of a FSCO arbitrator's decision denying certain statutory accident benefits, alleging bias and misapprehension of evidence.

The moving party (respondent insurer) brought a motion to stay the application on the basis that the responding party had not exhausted his administrative remedies by first appealing to the Director of Arbitrations under s. 283(1) of the Insurance Act.

The Divisional Court granted the motion and stayed the application, holding that absent exceptional circumstances, administrative proceedings should run their full course before judicial intervention is sought, and the responding party had an adequate alternative remedy through the statutory appeal process.

The landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board dismissing its application to evict a tenant who had smoked in his unit for 22 years.

A neighbouring tenant had vacated due to the cigarette smoke and odour, which the landlord was unable to remedy despite various efforts.

The Divisional Court found that the Board erred in law by failing to consider the landlord's ongoing statutory obligation under s. 20 of the Residential Tenancies Act to maintain the complex fit for habitation for future tenants.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a re-hearing before a differently constituted Board.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Tribunal denying Ontario Disability Support Program benefits on the basis that the appellant did not have a substantial impairment.

The appellant argued that the Tribunal erred in law by incorrectly applying the governing legal principles to the medical evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal correctly stated the law and that the appellant's arguments merely challenged the Tribunal's weighing of the evidence, which does not constitute an error of law.

The tenants brought an application for judicial review of a Landlord and Tenant Board consent order.

The tenants had previously agreed to vacate the premises by a specified date in exchange for the landlords waiving $3,500 in rent arrears.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the record inadequate to understand the tribunal proceedings and noting that judicial review is a discretionary, equitable remedy.

The court held it would be inequitable to grant relief because the consent order substantially reflected the tenants' agreement.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion for an interlocutory injunction to stay a decision lifting a stop work order, the court determined costs.

The applicant argued it was a public interest litigant and should not pay costs.

The court found the applicant's strategy of narrowing issues to natural justice lacked evidentiary support on the merits and that it was irresponsible to hide behind a lack of funds after asserting it could meet undertaking requirements.

Costs were fixed at $27,000 payable to the developer on a substantial indemnity basis and $5,000 payable to the municipality.

The appellant airline appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim for defence costs against the respondent ground services provider.

The claim arose after a passenger sued both parties for injuries sustained in a wheelchair accident at the airport.

The trial judge found that the airline's employee was pushing the wheelchair at the time of the accident and that the commercial contract's indemnity provision did not cover the airline's own negligence.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's interpretation of the commercial contract, finding no palpable and overriding error in the factual conclusions.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court costs order of $7,500, arguing it exceeded the 15% limit prescribed by section 29 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The total claims against the remaining respondents at trial were $20,319.

The Divisional Court found that the trial judge erred by exceeding the statutory limit without making a finding of unreasonable behaviour to trigger the exception.

The costs award was amended to $3,000.

The court declined to interfere with the trial judge's discretion regarding previous costs orders.