Court of Justice

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving and assault with a weapon (a motor vehicle) arising from an incident on December 15, 2010, in a Thornhill community centre parking lot.

During a physical altercation between two groups of youth, the defendant drove his red Mazda in a circular pattern toward the area where the fighting was occurring, allegedly to scare the combatants away from his employee who was being attacked.

While eyewitness accounts were inconsistent regarding whether the vehicle actually struck anyone, the court found the defendant guilty of dangerous driving based on his deliberate decision to drive toward the group despite having a direct exit available.

The court also found him guilty of assault with a weapon, as the defendant used his vehicle as a weapon by threatening force through his driving conduct.

One charge was stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The applicant sought a reduction and eventual termination of spousal support obligations under a 2004 separation agreement, requesting retroactive effect from January 1, 2010.

The respondent opposed the reduction and sought payment of amounts owing under a cost-of-living clause.

The court found the respondent was more successful on the key issue of whether the support obligation should be terminated, ordering ongoing spousal support in a step-down manner rather than termination.

The court awarded costs to the respondent, accounting for litigation conduct, tax deductibility of legal fees, and time reasonably spent.

The appellant appealed her conviction on four provincial offences: failing to surrender an insurance card, proceeding contrary to an intersection sign, driving without a current plate validation, and driving while under suspension.

The trial justice found all charges proven beyond a reasonable doubt and imposed fines totalling $1,270.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the Crown failed to prove the location of the offences was in Toronto, an essential element; and second, that the trial justice provided excessive assistance to the prosecution, creating a reasonable perception of bias.

The appellate court dismissed both grounds, finding that the well-known intersection of Queen Street West and Bathurst could be judicially noticed, and that while the trial justice's interventions were unfortunate, they did not compromise the overall fairness of the trial when assessed in their totality.

The defendant was charged with care and control of an automobile while having excess alcohol in his blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the officer complied with the requirement that an approved screening device (ASD) test be administered "forthwith." The defendant was detained for approximately 19 to 21 minutes after the officer formed reasonable suspicion before being given an opportunity to comply with the ASD demand.

During this period, the defendant was not informed of the reasons for detention or provided with his Charter rights to counsel.

The court found multiple Charter breaches and excluded the breath test results, leading to dismissal of the charge.

The Ministry of Labour charged the City of Guelph with failing to ensure a workplace wall was safe under section 25(1)(e) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, and charged an architect and engineer with providing negligent or incompetent advice under section 31(2) of the Act.

The charges arose from a concrete wall collapse in 2009 that killed a student, five years after the project's completion in 2004.

All defendants moved to dismiss the charges as statute-barred under section 69 of the Act, which provides a one-year limitation period from the last act or default.

The court distinguished between the charges: the architect and engineer's charges were dismissed as statute-barred because their negligent advice was provided years before the collapse, while the City's charge was permitted to proceed because the employer's duty to maintain a safe workplace is a continuing obligation that extends beyond the construction phase.

The accused was convicted of production of marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following trial.

At sentencing, the Crown sought imprisonment of 18 months to two years less a day followed by probation, along with ancillary orders including a firearms prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture.

The defence sought a blended sentence combining intermittent and conditional components.

The court rejected the conditional sentence option, finding that while the statutory prerequisites were met, a conditional sentence would not be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing.

The court imposed one year imprisonment on each charge concurrently, followed by three years probation, along with the requested ancillary orders.

A costs decision following settlement of a family law dispute concerning child support, spousal support, and parenting arrangements.

The applicant sought costs of $5,000.00, arguing that the respondent's unreasonable conduct, including refusal to provide financial disclosure and rejection of mediation proposals, forced her to commence litigation.

The respondent argued both parties should bear their own costs as he was substantially successful.

The court found the applicant was the successful party and awarded costs based on her reasonable pre-litigation settlement offers and the respondent's unreasonable conduct in refusing financial disclosure and rejecting alternative dispute resolution.

A 20-year-old offender pleaded guilty to robbery, possession of a weapon, wearing a disguise, and failing to comply with probation.

The offender robbed a convenience store armed with a knife while masked, physically assaulting the store owner and causing minor injuries.

The offender had an extensive criminal history including six prior robbery convictions and numerous breaches of court orders.

The Crown sought four years imprisonment; the defence sought a reformatory sentence.

The court imposed a sentence of three years and four months in jail (less eight months pre-sentence custody credit), finding that specific and general deterrence were paramount, particularly given the vulnerability of store owners and the offender's pattern of disregarding court orders.

The Children's Aid Society sought a temporary supervision order for a child with high-functioning autism who remained in the care of his mother pending a full protection hearing.

The society alleged the child was at risk of physical and emotional harm based on reports of inappropriate physical discipline, the mother's aggressive and confrontational behaviour toward service providers, her refusal to cooperate with the society, and her lack of understanding of the child's special needs.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the child was at risk and granted a temporary supervision order with specific terms and conditions, including prohibitions on physical discipline and requirements that the mother sign consents for information sharing with service providers.

Two aboriginal offenders were sentenced following guilty pleas to serious offences.

The first offender pleaded guilty to possession of stolen motor vehicles, operating vehicles while disqualified, robbery, and use of an imitation firearm in commission of an indictable offence.

The second offender pleaded guilty to dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm and failing to stop for police pursuit causing bodily harm.

The court applied Gladue principles regarding sentencing of aboriginal offenders while emphasizing denunciation and deterrence given the seriousness of the offences and prior criminal records.

The paternal grandmother sought to be added as a party to child protection proceedings brought by the Children's Aid Society.

The mother and stepfather opposed the motion.

The court applied the test from Children's Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. S.H., S.W. and D.R. and granted the motion, finding that adding the grandmother as a party served the child's best interests, would not unduly delay proceedings, was necessary to determine the issues, and that the grandmother was capable of putting forward a viable plan.

The grandmother was granted leave to file her answer and plan of care and to bring a motion for access.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm and failing to stop at the scene of an accident knowing that bodily harm had been caused.

The incident occurred when the accused operated an ATV in a public park in a dangerous manner, performing donuts and driving at high speed through a skateboard park where members of the public were present.

The accused struck a person, causing a fractured femur.

The court found the accused guilty of dangerous driving causing bodily harm but not guilty of the aggravated failure to stop charge, instead finding him guilty of the lesser included offence of simple failure to stop.

The accused was convicted of assault causing bodily harm against his sister following a confrontation at a parking lot.

The accused punched his sister in the face after she struck him multiple times during an altercation over her purse, causing her to lose consciousness and suffer facial fractures.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of six to nine months, later adjusted to ninety days intermittent.

The defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court imposed a monetary fine of $500 plus victim surcharge and eighteen months probation with conditions, finding that incarceration was unnecessary given the accused's background, remorse, and unlikelihood to reoffend, but that a discharge would be contrary to public interest given the severity of the assault.

A young person was charged with assault arising from an altercation following a motor vehicle accident.

The Crown alleged the defendant used force without consent.

The defence claimed the force was consensual.

The court found the defendant guilty of assault, rejecting the defendant's credibility in favour of the complainant's account, which was corroborated by an independent witness.

The court applied the R. v. W. (D) framework and determined the defendant initiated an unprovoked attack and participated in kicking and punching the complainant while on the ground.

The applicant mother sought costs following successful motions regarding custody, access, and child support.

The respondent father opposed the costs award and argued for a substantially reduced amount.

The court awarded costs to the successful applicant but declined to award costs on a full indemnity basis, citing the failure of both parties to serve offers to settle.

The court fixed costs at $10,000.00 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, payable at $250 per month commencing May 1, 2012.

The accused was charged with eleven counts of assault, sexual assault, pointing a firearm, and unlawful confinement spanning from 1986 to 1994, all allegedly committed against the same victim.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant, with limited corroborating medical evidence.

The accused denied all allegations.

The court applied the R. v. W(D) test and found that while the complainant's evidence was presented, the Crown failed to prove each charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the accused's testimony equally believable and noted significant gaps in corroborating evidence, including incomplete medical records and the passage of time affecting memory.

All charges resulted in acquittals.

The applicants brought a motion to quash a search warrant and exclude evidence seized from their residence at 39 Patricia Avenue, North York, on the grounds that their Charter rights under section 8 were violated.

The applicants challenged both the sufficiency of the Information to Obtain (ITO) and the use of a telewarrant procedure.

The court found that the ITO was carelessly drafted, materially misleading, and factually inaccurate.

The court also found that the telewarrant process was not justified under section 487.1 of the Criminal Code, as it was not impracticable for the officer to appear in person.

Additionally, the court found that a supervisory officer had made an undisclosed telephone call to the Justice of the Peace that influenced the issuance of the warrant.

The court concluded that the evidence should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter as the search warrant application fell far below constitutional standards.