Court of Justice

The Crown applied under section 117.05 of the Criminal Code for an order forfeiting firearms and ammunition seized from the respondent and prohibiting him from possessing firearms.

The respondent, who had been apprehended under a Form 1 psychiatric assessment in September 2008 following concerning behaviour at a functional restoration program, opposed the application.

The court found that while the respondent's conduct on September 11, 2008 raised clinical concerns, the assessment must be made at the time of the hearing.

Considering the respondent's lack of criminal record, absence of violence, proper storage of weapons, and his family physician's opinion that he poses no danger to himself or others, the court declined the Crown's application for forfeiture and prohibition orders.

An application by a seventeen-year-old transgender youth to change her name from her birth name to a female name.

The applicant sought an order dispensing with parental consent under the Change of Name Act, arguing that her mother did not have lawful custody of her.

The court found that the applicant's mother did not exercise physical care or control, nor did she make decisions regarding the applicant's residence, education, or medical care.

The court determined that no person had lawful custody of the applicant for purposes of the Change of Name Act, and therefore no parental consent was required.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a child protection application seeking temporary care and custody of a 12-year-old child (K.A.) with placement with the child's paternal grandparents, subject to a supervision order.

The mother opposed the application and sought return of the child to her care.

The court found that the society met the two-part test under section 51(3) of the Child and Family Services Act, establishing reasonable grounds to believe the child was likely to suffer harm if returned to the mother's care and that the child could not be adequately protected by a non-removal order.

The court granted temporary care and custody to the paternal grandparents.

The appellant appealed his conviction under the Safe Streets Act, section 3(2)(c) for soliciting at a public transit stop, and his sentence of 90 days imprisonment imposed on an ex parte trial.

The trial justice mischaracterized the evidence regarding the appellant's hand gestures (praying motion versus cupping motion) and failed to properly establish that the conduct occurred at a "public transit stop" as required by the statute.

The court found the evidence insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and allowed the appeal, entering an acquittal.

The court also addressed sentencing principles applicable to ex parte trials, noting that the trial justice imposed a custodial sentence without justification beyond the prosecutor's position.

A corporate defendant, JF Industrial Systems (Windsor) Inc., was charged with two offences under the Electricity Act: failing to apply for inspection of electrical work and operating an electrical contracting business without a licence.

The trial proceeded with evidence from an injured apprentice worker and the company's manager.

The defendant changed its plea to guilty on count two, and the prosecution withdrew count one.

The court found the defendant guilty of operating as an unlicensed electrical contractor.

The defendant was sentenced to a fine of $25,000, payable within 30 days.

The case involved a serious workplace injury to an apprentice who was electrocuted while working on electrical installations at an industrial facility.

A status review application under the Child and Family Services Act concerning a child who had been in the care of the Children's Aid Society.

The society sought a Crown wardship order with no access, while the respondent mother sought the return of the child to her care.

The court determined that a further order was necessary to protect the child and that the society had met its onus on a summary judgment motion to demonstrate there was no genuine issue for trial.

The court found that the mother had failed to address the risks to the child, had not consistently engaged with counselling services despite court orders, and had demonstrated significant ambivalence toward parenting through inconsistent access patterns.

The court granted the Crown wardship order with no access, finding that the mother had not satisfied the statutory test for access to a Crown ward.

Following a preliminary inquiry into drug trafficking charges, the court determined whether the accused possessed cocaine, crack cocaine, and heroin found at two residences during the execution of search warrants.

The Crown conceded committal on assault charges and two drug counts.

The central issue was whether there was sufficient evidence of knowledge and control for the remaining drug possession charges.

The court applied the legal test for possession in the context of drugs found in residences and considered the inferences available from the evidence regarding residency, control of premises, and the value of the drugs found.

The accused was charged with mischief, assault on police, obstruction of police, and assault with intent to resist arrest arising from his conduct during a protest at Toronto City Hall against budget cuts.

The Crown called seven police officers; the defence called the accused and two witnesses.

The court found the accused guilty of assault on police (pushing PC Hopkinson) and obstruction of police, but acquitted him of mischief and assault with intent to resist arrest.

The court also dismissed Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, finding no unlawful detention, no unreasonable search, and no lost evidence constituting a Charter breach.

The defendant was charged with three Highway Traffic Act offences: driving under a licence of another jurisdiction while suspended in Ontario (s. 36), driving while under suspended licence (s. 53(1)), and improper number plate light (s. 62(19)).

The prosecution established that the defendant's Ontario driver's licence had been suspended since March 17, 1994 for unpaid fines, and that he was operating a vehicle with an Alberta licence plate and defective rear licence plate light on August 10, 2010.

The defendant claimed no knowledge of the suspension and maintained he had obtained an Alberta licence in good faith.

The court found the defendant's testimony not credible and contradicted by prosecution evidence, including testimony from an officer who personally served the suspension notice in 1994.

The defendant was found guilty of all three offences.

The applicant, owner and operator of a licensed body rub parlour in Vaughan, sought a declaration that sections of the City of Vaughan By-law 315-2005 regulating hours of operation and dress code requirements for body rub parlours were ultra vires the municipality.

The court found that the impugned provisions, which restricted hours of operation and mandated specific clothing requirements, were in pith and substance criminal legislation regulating prostitution and nudity, matters within exclusive federal jurisdiction.

The court quashed sections 13.0(1)(h), 13.4, 13.0(1)(o), and 13.0(1)(p) of the by-law as ultra vires.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle, failure to stop at the scene of an accident, and failing or refusing to comply with a breath sample demand.

The Crown relied on evidence of the accused striking a parked car with considerable force, post-accident physical characteristics, and the accused's failure to provide suitable breath samples.

The accused's defence was that the accident resulted from being blinded by oncoming high-beam headlights, that she did not leave the scene with requisite intent, and that she was unable to provide suitable samples due to respiratory problems.

The court found reasonable doubt on all three charges and dismissed them.

The appellant was convicted at trial of speeding contrary to s. 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

On appeal, the appellant raised seven grounds of error, including allegations that the Justice of the Peace erred in proceeding without counsel, failed to inform the appellant of his right to an adjournment, erred in granting an amendment to the charge, applied the wrong legal standard, and failed to adequately explain the rejection of the appellant's evidence.

The appeal court found that while the Justice of the Peace applied an incorrect legal standard (strict liability instead of absolute liability), this error benefited the appellant and did not affect the verdict.

The court upheld the conviction, finding no reversible error.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple serious drug trafficking and production offences, including six counts of trafficking in cocaine, one count of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, seven counts of possession of proceeds of crime, two counts of production of cannabis marihuana, and one count of possession of cannabis marihuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The offences occurred between July and November 2011 and involved significant quantities of controlled substances.

The accused was a mid to high-level dealer operating as a commercial enterprise.

The court imposed a sentence of eight years and two months imprisonment after crediting pre-trial custody and strict bail compliance, balancing principles of general deterrence and denunciation with rehabilitation and restraint.

The accused was retried and convicted of impaired driving relating to an accident from 2010.

At the first trial, the accused was sentenced to a 15-month driving prohibition, which was served in full before the conviction was successfully appealed and set aside.

The Crown sought a new driving prohibition upon retrial and conviction.

The court held that imposing a new mandatory driving prohibition would constitute double punishment and violate principles of sentencing and the integrity of the criminal justice system.

The court interpreted section 259(1) of the Criminal Code to permit credit for time already served under the prior prohibition, and imposed a one-day driving prohibition with notation that 15 months had already been served.

Multiple accused charged with operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 mL brought disclosure applications seeking approximately 75 items related to breath testing devices and procedures.

The Crown resisted disclosure, arguing the requested items were either third-party records or clearly irrelevant.

The court determined that the requested maintenance logs, calibration records, and other technical documentation not already provided constituted third-party records under the O'Connor regime rather than first-party records under Stinchcombe.

The applicants failed to establish that the requested items were likely relevant to their cases, as they provided no evidentiary foundation linking the requested materials to potential malfunctioning or improper operation of the specific instruments used in their breath tests.

All disclosure applications were dismissed.

A worker employed by a small roofing company fell from a ladder while working on a residential roofing project and died from his injuries.

The company was convicted of failing to ensure a fall arrest system was in place and failing to notify the Ministry within 48 hours of the death.

The owner and operator was convicted of failing to ensure workers used fall arrest systems as a supervisor and furnishing false information to an inspector.

The court imposed jail sentences on the individual defendant and substantial fines on the corporate defendant, emphasizing the need for general deterrence in an industry with persistent fall-related injuries and fatalities.