Court of Justice

The defendant, a rental equipment company, was charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) following a workplace fatality at a General Motors plant in St. Catharines on November 18, 2011.

The deceased worker, an employee of a contracted company, was operating an articulating boom lift rented by the defendant when he was fatally injured.

The defendant alleged the equipment was mechanically defective.

The trial, which commenced in December 2014, experienced significant delays spanning over four years and seven months from the laying of the charge in June 2012.

The primary causes of delay were Crown disclosure failures and case management issues.

The court found the delay breached the defendant's Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) and stayed the charge.

The applicant brought a motion to strike the respondent's pleadings for failure to comply with multiple court orders for financial disclosure and to obtain costs on a full recovery basis.

The respondent opposed the motion, arguing he had provided adequate disclosure and was reluctant to provide further disclosure due to alleged identity theft and misuse of confidential information by the applicant.

The court declined to strike the pleadings, finding that while the disclosure was inadequate, the respondent had provided some disclosure, explained his reasons for non-compliance, and the child support order was in good standing.

The court gave the respondent one further opportunity to produce required disclosure with strict limits on its use and distribution.

The defendant was charged with failure to provide a breath sample contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

A police officer observed the defendant seated in the driver's seat of a vehicle in a bar parking lot, heard the engine running, and formed reasonable suspicion that the defendant had alcohol in his body and was in care or control of the vehicle.

The officer made a lawful approved screening device demand.

The defendant refused to comply, claiming he had an ignition interlock device installed in his vehicle and was waiting for a designated driver.

The court found the demand was lawful, the refusal was unequivocal and wilful, and the defendant had no reasonable excuse for non-compliance.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle "Over 80" following a police investigation on December 10, 2015.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the investigation by bringing a blended Charter application and trial, alleging breaches of Sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendant argued that the officer improperly delayed providing rights to counsel regarding a marijuana possession charge in order to prioritize the drinking and driving investigation.

The court dismissed the Charter application and found the defendant guilty, holding that the officer lawfully conducted the sobriety investigation within the parameters of Highway Traffic Act authority and that the officer was not obligated to immediately provide rights to counsel regarding the possession charge.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown alleged the defendant was driving with a blood alcohol level of 131 and 124 (legal limit 80).

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath test evidence on Charter grounds, arguing that police violated her right to counsel under section 10(b) by failing to advise her of this right during a five-minute delay between the approved screening device demand and the roadside breath sample.

The court rejected the Charter challenge, finding the demand was made "forthwith" as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, and that the brief delay was justified to ensure an accurate test result.

The court also rejected other defence arguments regarding identity, the intoxilyzer procedure, and the approval status of the screening device.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused pleaded guilty to sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching of a minor victim.

The Crown sought a three-year sentence while defence counsel sought two years less one day followed by probation.

The court imposed a three-year concurrent sentence, finding that denunciation and deterrence were paramount given the abuse of a child under eighteen years of age.

The court also imposed ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition, lifetime sex offender registration, a twenty-year section 161 order restricting contact with children, and a communication prohibition with the victim during incarceration.

Application for child support and contribution towards section 7 expenses under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act.

The applicant sought to impute income to the respondent and establish child support obligations.

The court found the respondent intentionally underemployed and imputed an annual income of $34,700, resulting in monthly child support of $300.

The court also ordered the respondent to contribute 43.8% of child care expenses ($121.76 monthly) but dismissed claims for babysitting and extended health/dental premiums due to insufficient evidence.

The accused was charged with four counts of assault, two counts of recruiting and holding a person offering sexual services, one count of obtaining financial benefit from sexual services, and two counts of human trafficking.

The Crown narrowed its case to seek conviction on one assault charge (October 31, 2014) and two human trafficking charges.

The trial involved significant credibility issues between the complainant's videotaped police statements (November 2014) and her trial testimony.

The court admitted the police statements under the KGB exception to the hearsay rule and found them ultimately reliable.

The court concluded that the complainant was assaulted on October 31, 2014, and that the accused committed human trafficking by exercising control over the complainant's movements and exploiting her through threats and violence to provide strip club services and surrender her earnings.

The court found the accused received material benefits from the trafficking offence.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of charges for delay.

The charges comprised two separate series: firearms and drug offences laid on January 21 and 26, 2015, and conspiracy charges laid on November 19, 2015.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 237, which introduced presumptive ceilings for trial delay.

The court found that the Crown's decision to consolidate the separate charges and defendants into a single proceeding, combined with inadequate disclosure management and lack of urgency, resulted in unreasonable delay for the initial charges.

The court stayed 32 charges related to the firearms and drug offences but dismissed the application regarding the conspiracy charge, which fell just below the presumptive ceiling.

Two defendants appealed convictions for driving while under suspension.

Both claimed they did not receive notice of suspension from the Ministry of Transportation.

The trial justices of the peace convicted both defendants despite not rejecting their testimony that they did not receive notice.

The appellate court held that where a defendant testifies credibly that they did not know of the suspension and did not receive notice, it will seldom be the case that they fail to meet the due diligence defence on a balance of probabilities unless the justice of the peace rejects their evidence or provides cogent reasons for doing so.

The court emphasized that administrative efficiency cannot override the protection of the morally innocent from conviction.

The defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of breaching a section 810.2 recognizance: failing to report to police, failing to report a change of address, failing to carry a copy of the recognizance, and failing to abstain from alcohol consumption.

The defendant had been released from a 15-year federal sentence for manslaughter, forcible confinement, and breaking and entering.

Psychological assessments indicated he posed a high to moderate-high risk for violent recidivism.

The defendant breached the recognizance by failing to report for 5.5 months, relocating to Ottawa without notification, and consuming alcohol while committing theft.

The court sentenced him to 20 months less 2 months and 1 week time served, resulting in 17 months and 3 weeks incarceration, followed by a 2-year probation order with conditions identical to the section 810.2 recognizance.

The accused was initially found unfit to stand trial on murder charges on January 4, 2017, and a sixty-day "make fit" order was issued.

At the March 10, 2017 hearing, the Crown conceded that it had not met its burden of proving fitness on the balance of probabilities.

The court found the accused remained unfit to stand trial, primarily due to cognitive impairments caused by major depressive episode and schizophrenia that prevented him from meaningfully participating in trial and instructing counsel.

The defendant was charged with operating a slow moving vehicle over 40 kilometres per hour contrary to Section 76(6.1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant was observed driving a pickup truck at 100 kilometres per hour while towing an implement of husbandry without a slow moving vehicle sign.

The defendant argued that the statutory language required a slow moving vehicle sign to be attached for the speed restriction to apply.

The court rejected this interpretation, finding that the legislation creates two types of offences: one for vehicles with a slow moving sign and one for vehicles towing an implement of husbandry regardless of signage.

The court convicted the defendant and imposed a fine of $85 plus costs and surcharge.

The defendant was charged with trespassing contrary to section 2(1)(a)(i) of the Trespass to Property Act after being served with a notice of trespass and subsequently travelling on a road that crossed the Bergen property to access his landlocked parcel.

The Crown proved the essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found that the defendant had a limited statutory right to use the road as an access road under the Road Access Act, which confers on users of access roads a temporary right to travel to and from their properties without being considered trespassers until a court order closing the road is obtained.

The defendant was acquitted.

A youth was charged with two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police entered a small apartment where several adults possessed large quantities of drugs.

Officers observed the accused subtly move a plastic bag containing nearly 90 grams of cocaine with his foot, while he personally carried a small quantity of crack cocaine sewn into his clothing.

Applying the Beaver test for possession and the Villaroman framework for circumstantial evidence, the court found the Crown proved personal possession of the crack cocaine but failed to prove possession or control over the larger quantity in the bag.

The court held that the accused’s movement of the bag was reasonably explained as an attempt to conceal drugs to avoid implication rather than evidence of possession or trafficking.

The Crown also failed to establish joint or constructive possession or party liability for the drugs possessed by others in the apartment.

A youth was charged with two counts of possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking following a police raid on an apartment.

The Crown alleged the accused moved a white plastic bag containing 89.76 grams of cocaine using his foot while police were present.

The accused conceded possession of 1.19 grams of crack cocaine found sewn into his pants.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused possessed the larger quantity of cocaine in the white bag for purposes of trafficking, or alternatively, whether he was in joint or constructive possession of drugs in the apartment or was a party to the offence.

The court found the accused guilty of simple possession of the crack cocaine on his person but acquitted him of possession for purposes of trafficking on both counts.