Court of Justice

The accused pleaded guilty to indecent assault on a male (1981-1982), sexual interference (2005-2006), and breach of recognizance (December 22, 2018).

Following sentencing on March 18, 2019, one of the victims requested that the publication ban imposed under section 486.4 of the Criminal Code be lifted with respect to himself and another victim.

The court granted the application, finding that the circumstances making the publication ban mandatory were no longer present, as both adult victims consented, the Crown consented, and the accused took no position.

The court confirmed that a judge other than the one who made the original order has jurisdiction to hear such applications.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle by a drug.

The defendant requested rolling logs as part of disclosure.

The Crown denied the request on two grounds: (1) new evidence demonstrated the rolling logs were not relevant, and (2) new legislation prohibited their disclosure.

The court considered whether it could revisit binding precedent from R. v. Stipo, which held that rolling logs are relevant and must be disclosed.

The court applied the doctrine of stare decisis and the exceptions to revisiting binding authority, finding that neither the new evidence nor the legislative changes met the high threshold required to depart from precedent.

The court granted disclosure of the rolling logs.

The accused brought a directed verdict motion arguing that the presumption of accuracy under s. 320.31 of the Criminal Code could not apply because there was no express evidence from an analyst regarding the target value of the alcohol standard used in the calibration check.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the breath technician's evidence of her expected target value based on her training, combined with the analyst's certificate stating the standard was suitable for use, was sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to apply the presumption.

The applicant sought an extension of time to pay five victim fine surcharges of $100 each that had been imposed following convictions for mischief, breach of probation, and breaches of judicial release orders.

Although the applicant had been granted one year to pay and had made no payments, the court declined to grant the extension.

Instead, the court struck out the original sentencing order imposing the surcharges, finding that the victim fine surcharge legislation had been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Boudreault, 2018 SCC 58.

Consequently, all five surcharges were set aside as null and void.

The accused brought an application to contest venue, seeking to transfer the proceedings from Newmarket (York Region) to Toronto (Toronto Region) for an alleged hand-to-hand drug transaction and related firearms offence.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear the application, whether a case management judge should hear it, and what test applies to contested venue applications.

The court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the application and that a case management judge was appropriately placed to do so.

Applying the test under s.599 of the Criminal Code, the court found that the Crown bore the burden of proving on the balance of probabilities that it was expedient to the ends of justice to keep the case in Newmarket.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the presumption of locality favoured York Region, where the offence occurred, and that all relevant witnesses and police were based in York Region.

This is a costs decision arising from the court's judgment of March 25, 2019, in a family law matter involving a motion to amend pleadings and a motion for summary judgment.

The respondent sought full indemnity costs, arguing he was the successful party and had made reasonable settlement offers.

The applicant argued there should be no costs order due to divided success.

The court found divided success existed because although the respondent was somewhat more successful overall, the applicant succeeded on her motion to amend her response to the motion to change.

The court awarded costs of $2,500 payable by the applicant to the respondent, declining to enforce the award through the Family Responsibility Office.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused occupied the driver's seat, triggering the statutory presumption of care or control.

The court found that the accused successfully rebutted the presumption.

The accused had driven to a park after a domestic argument, consumed alcohol only after arriving at the park, and then called her wife to pick her up rather than driving home.

The court found that the accused's actions demonstrated an intention to avoid driving and that the risk of danger necessary to establish culpable care or control was not present.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's case rested entirely on breath test results obtained following the accused's arrest.

The defence raised three Charter applications: (1) a section 8 breach based on the arresting officer's chemically impossible articulation of the legal BAC limit; (2) a section 8 breach for failure to "transfer grounds" to the breath technician; and (3) a section 10(b) breach regarding the implementation of the right to counsel of choice.

The court found a section 10(b) breach but admitted the evidence under section 24(2), finding the breach fell on the lower end of the seriousness spectrum despite its significant impact on the accused's protected interests.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with three counts of sexual assault and one count of interference.

The accused sought production of records held by Family and Children's Services pursuant to section 278.3 of the Criminal Code.

The records contained notes from a social worker indicating concerns about the complainant's credibility, including references to a history of false allegations and questions about whether the complainant had a concerning imagination or was genuinely being repeatedly harmed.

The court determined whether to order production of the records to itself for review under the two-stage Mills procedure.

Three young persons were charged with assault causing bodily harm in respect of the victim MG.

L.D. was additionally charged with assaulting MG with a weapon, assaulting ZG, and assaulting XG with a weapon.

The Crown alleged that the three defendants participated in a swarming attack on MG that resulted in serious injuries including lacerations requiring staples and stitches, and significant bruising.

The defendants argued self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code and disputed their involvement.

The court found that the three defendants were guilty of assault causing bodily harm as equal participants in a common enterprise, but acquitted them on the weapon and other assault charges due to insufficient identification evidence.

An applicant sought judicial review of a firearms officer's refusal to issue a Possession and Acquisition Licence (PAL) under the Firearms Act.

The officer based the refusal on twelve occurrence reports spanning 2004 to 2015, demonstrating a pattern of violent and unpredictable behaviour, despite only one criminal conviction.

The applicant argued the refusal was unreasonable, but the court found the officer's decision was based on a reasonable assessment of the applicant's propensity for violence and lack of judgment in escalating situations to violence.

The court upheld the refusal, finding it was desirable in the interests of public safety that the applicant not possess firearms.

The defendant was convicted of assault (2x), forcible confinement, and publishing intimate images following a trial.

At sentencing, the Crown sought nine months custody (six months for the intimate images offence and three months consecutive for the remaining charges) plus 18 months probation and ancillary orders.

The defence sought a conditional sentence of no more than five or six months, or alternatively, imprisonment not exceeding five months.

The court imposed a sentence of six months in jail less one day for the publishing intimate images offence, and a 90-day conditional sentence for the assault and forcible confinement offences to be served consecutively to the jail sentence, plus 18 months probation and ancillary orders.

The court found that denunciation and deterrence were paramount given the intimate relationship violence and deliberate, cruel sharing of intimate images as revenge.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control and over 80 care or control following a 911 call reporting an erratically driven black BMW on Highway 401.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(a).

The court found no detention occurred during the initial police encounter, no Charter breaches, and that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as unreliable and incredible, finding he was the driver of the vehicle based on witness observations, admissions, and circumstantial evidence.

The accused was convicted on both charges.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg% contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown relied on breath samples obtained via an approved instrument.

Three main legal issues emerged at trial: (1) whether the presumption of identity under s. 258 of the Criminal Code applied following the repeal of that section by Bill C-46; (2) whether the Crown satisfied the requirements of s. 320.31 regarding the presumption of accuracy without producing a certificate of analyst; and (3) whether the accused's rights under s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were violated when police failed to diligently pursue contact with her counsel of choice before offering duty counsel.

The court found that s. 258 remained applicable to legacy charges, that the presumption of accuracy was established through qualified technician testimony, and that while a Charter violation occurred, the breath evidence was admissible under s. 24(2) analysis.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with assaulting a peace officer lawfully engaged in the execution of his duty contrary to s. 270(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and attempting to disarm a peace officer contrary to s. 270.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

The charges arose from an incident on January 27, 2018, when police responded to two 911 calls regarding a domestic dispute at the accused's residence.

The trial judge found that the police were lawfully executing their duty when they entered the residence to investigate the welfare of the female occupant.

The judge found that the accused assaulted Sergeant Dick by pointing his finger in the sergeant's face and pushing his palm against the sergeant's chest, and that the accused attempted to grab the sergeant's taser during the ensuing struggle.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

Three appellants appealed dismissals of their Charter section 11(b) applications for stays of proceedings based on unreasonable delay in Part I Provincial Offences Act prosecutions.

The central issue was whether the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan applies to Part I offences or whether a lower ceiling should apply given the simplicity of such proceedings.

The court held that the 18-month ceiling applies to all provincial court matters, including Part I offences.

The court also addressed the test for demonstrating unreasonable delay below the ceiling, the requirement for meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, and the circumstances in which summary dismissal of frivolous applications is appropriate.