Court of Justice

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Two issues were raised at trial: (1) whether the defendant's Charter rights to counsel under section 10(b) were violated by police conduct, and if so, whether excluding breath test results was an appropriate remedy; and (2) whether the prosecution could rely on the presumption of identity under the now-repealed section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, or whether expert evidence of retrograde extrapolation was required.

The court found no breach of the defendant's right to counsel and held that the old presumption of identity continues to apply to outstanding Over 80 charges commenced after the new law came into force on December 18, 2018.

The defendant was convicted.

The accused was charged with theft of a custom-made anniversary ring valued at approximately $37,900 and possession of stolen property.

The ring went missing from a locked jewelry cabinet during a service call by the accused at the victim's residence.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence including the accused's presence at the residence, his subsequent visits to jewelry stores and pawnbrokers, and witness testimony identifying a ring matching the description of the stolen ring.

The accused testified he brought his father's sapphire ring for appraisal and denied taking the victim's ring.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding that while he was probably guilty, the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly due to concerns about the reliability of key witness testimony regarding identification of the ring.

The applicant brought a motion to strike the respondent's answer and dismiss all claims therein.

The respondent failed to comply with multiple court orders requiring financial disclosure, did not attend court proceedings, did not communicate with counsel, and left the jurisdiction.

The court found this to be an egregious and exceptional case warranting the striking of the respondent's pleadings.

The respondent's answer was struck and all claims dismissed, allowing the applicant to proceed on an uncontested basis with her amended application.

This is a summary judgment motion by the Children's Aid Society of Toronto seeking an order placing a child born in 2017 in extended society care.

The mother opposed the motion and sought either the return of the child to her care with supervision or placement with a friend.

The court found that the child continues to be in need of protection and that the only viable plan in the child's best interests is extended society care with no access.

The mother's inability to address her mental health issues, manage her finances, maintain a safe home, and consistently attend access visits over 17 months demonstrated that the protection concerns that led to the child's apprehension had not been resolved.

The defendant pleaded guilty to common assault after initially facing a sexual assault charge.

The assault occurred at the defendant's residence during a party where the defendant, then 20 years old, engaged in non-consensual sexual contact with the complainant, a 15-year-old friend of his younger sister.

The defendant partially inserted his penis into the complainant's vagina without consent on two separate occasions despite her explicit objections.

The court imposed a 90-day intermittent jail sentence (served on weekends) followed by two years of probation with strict conditions including no contact with the complainant or her family, a 200-metre exclusion zone, and mandatory counselling on relationships and consent.

A five-year weapons prohibition was also imposed.

The appellant appealed her conviction under the Building Code Act and sought to have her husband Denis Van Decker appear as her agent on appeal.

The trial Justice of the Peace had barred Van Decker from appearing as agent during the trial due to disruptive conduct and contempt of court.

The appeal court upheld the bar, finding that Van Decker was incompetent to represent the appellant and that his disruptive behavior over three days of trial warranted the exclusion.

The court noted that the appellant was capable of self-representation and that Van Decker had demonstrated a pattern of disruption across multiple proceedings.

The accused brought an application under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code seeking to adduce evidence of other sexual activity of the complainant.

The complainant sought to cross-examine the accused on his affidavit in support of the application.

The court determined whether the complainant's statutory right to "appear and make submissions" under s. 278.94(2) and (3) includes the right to cross-examine the accused.

The court held that the right to appear and make submissions must be meaningful and includes the right to cross-examine the accused on issues relevant to the application.

The accused was charged with 19 offences including sexual assault with a weapon, assault, uttering death threats, criminal harassment, unlawful confinement, and related offences.

During trial, the defence sought to introduce excerpts from the complainant's psychologist records under section 278.94 of the Criminal Code.

The court ruled on the admissibility of two excerpts: the first, a prior inconsistent statement regarding the timing of assaults, was admitted as it had significant probative value for impeaching credibility; the second, regarding the absence of mention of a specific assault, was excluded as the defence failed to establish a rational basis for the inference that the omission was relevant to whether the assault occurred.

In this motion to change child support, the father sought to modify the existing support order following a change in custody whereby the child moved to his home full-time in April 2018.

The parties disputed the father's income for 2018 and the mother's income, as well as which special expenses should be shared.

The court determined the father's income at $194,663.61 based on actual T4 income and the mother's income at $44,982.98 after accepting her business expense deductions with appropriate adjustments.

The court exercised discretion to defer the mother's contribution to special expenses until 2019 to avoid an unjustified windfall to the father, given the timing of the custody change relative to his increased income.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit (over 80).

The Crown relied on breath test results obtained using an approved Intoxilyzer 8000C device.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the evidence, arguing that the Crown failed to establish the pre-conditions required under the transitional provisions of Bill C-46 amendments to the Criminal Code, specifically that the alcohol standard used in calibration was certified by an analyst.

The court rejected the defendant's argument and found that the Crown had established the presumption of accuracy through the qualified technician's testimony regarding the Certificate of Analyst and the calibration results.

The accused applied for leave to cross-examine the affiant of an Information To Obtain (ITO) a search warrant at a preliminary inquiry.

The accused sought to examine areas relating to the corroboration of confidential informant (CI) information, the steps taken to corroborate such information, and whether police contaminated the information by reaching out to a CI.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed cross-examination did not meet the threshold test established in R. v. Garofoli and R. v. Dawson.

The court held that a preliminary inquiry is not the appropriate venue for such cross-examination, particularly given the risk of identifying confidential informers and the fact that the trial judge would be better positioned to address these issues through the Garofoli procedure.

The reasons for judgment in this criminal matter are not available at this time.

The case involves charges against Vashishat in the Ontario Court of Justice, with the judgment dated April 12, 2019.

A custody and access trial involving a high-conflict separation between parents of a young child.

The father sought sole custody and limited access for the mother, while the mother sought custody with equal time-sharing.

The court found both parents competent but determined the mother should have custody based on her demonstrated willingness to support the child's relationship with the father, contrasting with the father's initial proposal to relocate the child to New York with minimal maternal contact.

The court ordered alternate weekly time-sharing with the father paying child support and spousal support on a declining scale.

The applicant sought leave to amend his motion to change to include a request for custody of the child, with the respondent seeking to transfer the matter to Orillia and increase child support based on the applicant's higher disclosed income.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion to amend, finding no material change in circumstances warranting a custody claim.

The court granted the respondent's motion to transfer the matter to Orillia as the more convenient forum.

The court also increased child support from $446.83 to $540.13 per month based on the applicant's 2017 disclosed income of $58,430.00, effective November 1, 2018.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and "Over 80" following a police investigation on September 5, 2016.

The defendant applied for Charter relief alleging multiple breaches.

The court found breaches of section 10(b) of the Charter (right to counsel), arbitrary detention due to misapplication of reverse onus provisions, strip searches as a consequence of arbitrary detention, and non-consensual medical injection at a correctional facility.

The court granted a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter, finding that the cumulative effect of these breaches was so serious that proceeding with the trial would harm the integrity of the justice system.

The defendant was charged with driving with an excess blood alcohol concentration ("over 80").

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath sampling results under the Charter, claiming violations of sections 8 and 9.

The court found technical breaches but admitted the evidence.

The central issue was whether the prosecution could rely on the presumption of identity under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code after its repeal by An Act to amend the Criminal Code (offences relating to conveyances), which came into force on December 18, 2018.

The court followed R. v. Shaikh and held that the presumption of identity no longer applied to transitional cases.

Without the presumption, the Crown could not prove the defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving beyond a reasonable doubt, as the defendant had consumed alcohol approximately five minutes before driving.

The defendant was acquitted.