Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The Court of Appeal fixed the respondents' costs of the appeal at $90,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

Following the release of the court's decision on the appeal, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The respondent was awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $12,000, inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claims for trespass and intentional infliction of mental anguish against a security company and its principal.

The respondents had installed a security system at a home owned by the appellant, at the request of his estranged common-law partner who had exclusive possession of the home while the appellant was subject to bail conditions prohibiting his attendance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the estranged partner had the authority to permit access, precluding both the trespass and mental suffering claims.

The appellant appealed a decision allowing her long-term disability (LTD) insurer to deduct the amount of a Non-Earner Benefit (NEB) she received from her auto insurer following a second accident.

The appellant argued that based on the 'apples to apples' principle, the NEB (a non-income benefit) should not be deducted from LTD payments (an income benefit).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the 'apples to apples' principle applies to statutorily-mandated deductions from tort awards, whereas this deduction was governed by the clear and unambiguous language of the LTD insurance policy, which permitted the deduction of 'any disability benefit'.

The appellant appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

He argued the application judge erred by denying his request for an adjournment due to illness and by failing to consider his self-represented status, language barriers, and alleged brain injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge reasonably exercised his discretion to deny the adjournment given the appellant's history of unpaid costs and lack of proper medical evidence.

The Court also found no error in the application judge's decision to declare the appellant a vexatious litigant based on his repeated, meritless litigation against his former lawyers.

The appellant buyer appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action for specific performance and damages arising from an aborted real estate transaction.

The respondent sellers relied on an annulment clause to terminate the agreement after a third party registered a Certificate of Pending Litigation on the property just prior to closing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant's correspondence on the closing date amounted to a demand for clear title rather than a request to extend closing, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants sought to amend their statement of claim to add a claim in nuisance against the respondent for failing to properly remediate contaminated land before selling it.

The motion judge denied the amendment, finding that a nuisance claim requires the interference to originate from outside the plaintiff's land.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming that an essential characteristic of the tort of nuisance is that the alleged nuisance must emanate from somewhere other than the plaintiff's own land.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent purchased a residential property from the appellant and later discovered it had previously been used as a marijuana grow-op and contained mould.

The respondent successfully obtained partial summary judgment on liability.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the judgment, finding that the motion judge's brief endorsement failed to provide any legal analysis or findings of fact regarding the existence of mould at the time of closing, thereby preventing meaningful appellate review.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order, arguing the motion judge lacked jurisdiction due to the absence of pleadings in the motion record and issues with the style of cause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the pleadings were before the motion judge and the style of cause challenge could not be raised for the first time on appeal.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding the individual appellant personally bound by a contract and denying credit for the residual value of used equipment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly relied on handwritten entries and signatures rather than pre-printed clauses, making the doctrine of contra proferentem inapplicable.

The Court also found no error in denying credit for the equipment, as unchallenged evidence indicated it had no market value.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action on a summary judgment motion, which he did not attend.

The motion judge had dismissed the action on the basis that a claim for negligent investigation could not possibly succeed.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in law, as the viability of a negligent investigation claim remains an open question in Ontario.

The Court set aside the dismissal of the action, allowing it to proceed.

The moving party brought a motion for an extension of time to perfect its appeal from an order dismissing its motion to set aside a noting of default.

The responding party had previously obtained default judgments discharging mortgages and awarding possession of the property.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension of time, noting that the moving party had formed a timely intention to appeal and the deficiencies in its initial filing were minor.

The vendor and purchaser of certain businesses disagreed on the method of calculating working capital adjustments under an asset purchase agreement.

An accounting firm, KPMG, was directed to calculate the adjustments according to approaches advocated by both parties.

The purchaser sought leave to appeal an order requiring it to make a payment based on KPMG's calculation, arguing KPMG exceeded its jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding that KPMG stayed within its mandate and its determination was final and binding.

The appellant appealed an order of the motion judge dismissing his action as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's conclusion and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order finding that their debt to the respondents survived bankruptcy due to fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant physician breached his fiduciary duty to the respondent patients by falsely assuring them their investment was safe.

The appeal was dismissed on the merits, but the costs awarded by the motion judge were reduced to exclude costs from related proceedings.

The appellants, previously found to be vexatious litigants, sought leave to bring an application under s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge dismissed their requests.

The appellants attempted to appeal these dismissals.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeals, holding that s. 140(4)(e) of the Courts of Justice Act clearly and unambiguously precludes any appeal from a refusal to grant leave under s. 140(3).

The appellants, parents of a child apprehended by the Children's Aid Society, brought a negligence action against a secure treatment centre and its social worker.

The appellants alleged the defendants negligently treated the child as a victim of sexual abuse and failed to reintegrate her with her family.

The motion judge struck the claim, finding the defendants owed a duty of care only to the child.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that it was not plain and obvious that the defendants did not owe a duty of care to the parents under the Anns test, given the statutory framework of the Child and Family Services Act and the specific court orders involved.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him personally liable on a contract for the provision of farm produce.

The contract was originally drafted between the respondent and a corporation, but the name of the appellant's partnership was added by hand and initialled by his partner.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the handwritten addition was sufficient to make the partnership and its individual partners parties to the contract.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants, practitioners of Falun Gong, appealed an order striking out their claims for libel, incitement of hatred, crimes against humanity, and negligent research against a newspaper publisher.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the allegedly defamatory article about Falun Gong did not identify the appellants individually, and therefore the words were not published 'of and concerning' them.

The court also upheld the striking of the other claims, finding they were essentially subsidiary torts that could only be addressed under the law of defamation.

The appellant was injured in two motor vehicle accidents and received weekly income benefits from her insurer.

The insurer terminated her benefits after 156 weeks, and she subsequently lost her job due to accident-related injuries.

She reapplied for benefits and commenced an action more than two years after the initial termination, arguing that section 26(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule creates a second limitation period that begins when an insurer refuses a reapplication for further benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 26(1) contemplates only one limitation period which begins to run from the insurer's initial refusal to pay the benefits claimed.