OCA 2004

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

On consent, and in view of the disposition of related appeals, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in accordance with the consent terms set out in the filed draft order, without expressing any view on the correctness of the judgment appealed from.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against Mercedes-Benz Credit of Canada.

The appellant alleged that Mercedes improperly interfered with his negotiations with his insurer regarding a truck damaged by fire, causing a decrease in the truck's value.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence to support the appellant's claim that Mercedes improperly interfered, as Mercedes had a legitimate interest in the vehicle and the insurance proceeds.

The appellants appealed a judgment that ordered judgment in accordance with an offer to settle, permitted equitable set-off, and extinguished the remainder of the debt owing to the bank.

The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment regarding the offer to settle and equitable set-off, but found no evidentiary foundation or reasons for extinguishing the remainder of the debt.

The appeal was allowed in part to vary the judgment, directing that all monies paid pursuant to the offer to settle be used to set-off the indebtedness, without extinguishing the remaining debt.

The appellant appealed a jury's finding of negligence and apportionment of liability arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued the jury's finding conflicted with s. 50 of the Public Lands Act, which precludes civil suits for negligence in relation to road maintenance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury's finding referred to the appellant's failure to report safety concerns or take appropriate operational steps, which was not precluded by the Act.

The court also found the minimal apportionment of liability against the driver did not render the finding against the appellant unreasonable.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding that the fair market value of collateral was less than the debt owed to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's finding, as the receiver's efforts to sell the asset supported the respondent's position and the appellant offered no contrary evidence.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment, arguing the trial judge erred in his findings of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings were amply supported by the evidence and there was no palpable and overriding error.

As a result, the court did not need to address the submissions on damages.

No costs were sought by the respondent.

The appellant appealed from a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

At the hearing, counsel for the appellant advised the court that he was unable to reach his client.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully reviewed all appropriate factors and the sentence was not manifestly unfit nor did it reflect any error in principle.

The court noted that the appellant's rehabilitation efforts were a matter for parole authorities.

The parties were unable to agree on the form of the Order to implement the court's reasons for decision dated April 2, 2004.

The court resolved two issues of clarification regarding the interim receiver's protection from personal liability and the referral of the s. 215 BIA decision back to the bankruptcy judge.

The main issue in dispute was the status of paragraph 15 of the original ex parte order concerning the interim receiver's immunity and potential liability as a successor employer.

The court attached the form of order to be signed by the Registrar without providing further reasons.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal determined that the trial judge's order was for a single payment of not more than $25,000, exclusive of costs.

Consequently, the appeal fell within the monetary jurisdiction of the Divisional Court, and the Court of Appeal ordered the matter transferred there with no costs.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error in the trial judge's reasons, evidentiary rulings, or costs orders, including the Sanderson order.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $25,000.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding adjustments to a construction contract price for additional excavation and haulage costs.

The trial judge held that the adjustments were governed by a specific letter and unit prices in Schedule A, rather than the general work changes provision in Article 12 of the contract.

The Court of Appeal agreed with this interpretation, noting the parties' conduct was consistent with it.

The appellant's argument that compensation should be based on costs plus 10 percent under Article 12 was rejected, as it was not pleaded at trial.

The appeal was dismissed with costs of $10,000 to the respondent.

An employee of the respondent defrauded the company by preparing cheques payable to a variation of a legitimate supplier's name and depositing them into his own account at the appellant bank.

The trial judge found the appellant bank liable for conversion and ordered it to pay damages.

On appeal, the appellant argued that conversion requires blameworthy conduct, and raised defences under the Bills of Exchange Act, including the fictitious payee and holder in due course defences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that conversion is a tort of strict liability and that the statutory defences did not apply because the drawer intended to pay a legitimate debt and the cheques were not delivered by an authorized party.

The appellant was charged with robbery and using an imitation firearm.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant of robbery due to an error of law, but convicted him of the firearm offence.

A month later, at sentencing, the trial judge realized his error and changed the robbery acquittal to a conviction.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was functus officio on the robbery count and had no jurisdiction to change the verdict.

Furthermore, the firearm conviction could not stand without a conviction on the underlying robbery charge.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals entered on both counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for historical sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found the jury's verdict was not unreasonable despite inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, which were typical for historical sexual assaults.

The Crown conceded the trial judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's refusal to accept responsibility as an aggravating factor.

However, the Court held that the six-month custodial sentence was not unfit.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a young person.

The trial judge had excluded evidence based on the conduct of security guards.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under R. v. Buhay, the security guards were not police agents and therefore not subject to the Charter.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision striking a statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the only factual allegation pleaded, which was perjury, cannot in law support any of the civil claims advanced against the respondent.

The Crown appealed an order granting a stay of proceedings for charges arising from incidents in 1990 and 1991.

The complainant and police had initially decided not to pursue an investigation in 1992, and charges were not laid until 2000.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's discretionary decision to grant the stay.

The appellant was convicted of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in relation to a telemarketing scheme.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury that the mens rea for aiding the principal offender under s. 21(1)(b) of the Criminal Code could be satisfied by recklessness.

The Court of Appeal held that this was an error, as party liability requires purpose or intent, which can be established by actual knowledge or wilful blindness, but not mere recklessness.

The court also found a similar error in the conspiracy instruction.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent and recklessness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions, read as a whole, did not invite the jury to apply an objective standard nor did they place the onus of proof on the appellant.