Norm Stanford

The accused was charged with defrauding No Panic Computing over $5,000, using a forged document, obtaining merchandise by false pretence, and making a false statement in writing.

The Crown's case involved a fraudulent scheme whereby the accused, posing as a sales agent, fabricated a contract with Encana Corporation using a fictitious representative and fake email addresses.

The accused obtained over $91,000 in commissions from the victim company based on this fraudulent transaction.

The trial court found the evidence overwhelming and convicted the accused on all counts.

The accused brought a Charter Application alleging Crown impropriety in obtaining a third production order after the defence filed a Charter Application challenging the validity of the first two production orders.

The accused alleged that the Crown directed police to obtain the third production order to circumvent the defence Charter Application and that the affiant failed to make full, fair and frank disclosure.

The court dismissed the threshold portion of the application alleging Crown misconduct, finding that the allegations were frivolous and that the Crown was entitled to act on the defence Charter Application as a public court document to re-calibrate its case.

The accused was charged with over 80 (impaired driving).

He brought a motion to stay proceedings on the grounds that his right to be tried within a constitutionally tolerable time under section 11(b) of the Charter had been breached.

The matter was arrested on July 2, 2015, with trial initially scheduled for June 16, 2016, but rescheduled to May 15, 2017 due to the defence's decision to call expert evidence regarding the approved instrument.

The total delay was 22 months and 10 days.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan and found that even after deducting periods of defence delay, the total time to trial exceeded the presumptive 18-month ceiling.

The court determined that the rescheduling was not caused solely by defence conduct and that the Crown's delayed disclosure of maintenance records contributed to the delay.

The court found a breach of section 11(b) and stayed the proceedings.

The defendant was charged with alcohol-impaired driving and driving with an excessive blood alcohol concentration following a motor vehicle collision on Highway 401 in Toronto.

The Crown dismissed the impaired driving charge at the close of its case.

The court found that the defendant's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 were breached by an unreasonable arrest and an unlawful breath demand made without reasonable grounds to believe.

The court applied the three-part test from R. v. Grant to determine whether evidence obtained through the Charter breach should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court excluded the toxicology report and Intoxilyzer readings, resulting in acquittal on the excessive BAC charge.

The defendant was charged with alcohol-impaired driving and driving with an excessive blood alcohol concentration following a two-vehicle collision on the 401 highway in Toronto.

The Crown closed its case on the impaired driving charge.

The defendant sought to exclude the breath alcohol concentration readings and toxicology evidence on the grounds that her arrest violated her Charter rights against arbitrary detention (s. 9) and that the breath demand violated her right against unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8).

The court found that while the officer detected an odour of alcohol and the defendant admitted to consuming alcohol and marijuana earlier in the day, the totality of circumstances did not objectively establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe the defendant had committed an impaired driving offence.

The court determined that the evidence supported only a lower standard of reasonable suspicion, sufficient for a roadside screening demand but not for arrest or an Intoxilyzer demand.

Accordingly, the defendant's Charter rights were violated.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg).

She brought three Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of her detention and access to counsel.

The court found no breach of section 10(b) regarding delayed access to duty counsel, as the delay was explained by technical difficulties with a newly installed telephone system and the officers made diligent efforts to contact counsel.

The court found no breach of section 8 regarding the timing of breath samples, holding that the "as soon as practicable" requirement is not a precondition to admissibility when the Crown does not rely on the statutory presumption of identity and instead calls expert evidence to establish the readings at the time of driving.

The court found a breach of section 9 regarding arbitrary detention, specifically a three-hour period of overholding after 11:30 AM when the defendant should have been released, but declined to exclude the breath evidence under section 24(2), finding the breach was not sufficiently serious and that society's interest in adjudication on the merits favoured inclusion.

On the merits, the court found the defendant guilty of both impaired driving and over 80, rejecting her evidence regarding her pattern of alcohol consumption and her bolus drinking defence as lacking credibility and defying common sense.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the test for impairment and failed to consider evidence consistent with non-impairment.

The appellant had been pulled over for driving 138 km/h in a 90 km/h zone, had bloodshot eyes, and smelled of alcohol.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no errors in assessing the evidence and that any degree of impairment is sufficient for a conviction.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, and with operating a motor vehicle as a novice driver with a blood alcohol content above zero contrary to section 44.1(3) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant was found putting gasoline into a vehicle parked on the bullnose of a highway ramp at approximately 2:52 AM.

The Crown established that the defendant's blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit and that he had engaged in conduct constituting care or control of the vehicle.

The defendant was convicted on both charges.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on an excess blood alcohol charge, arguing the trial judge misapplied the legal test governing whether breath samples were taken as soon as practicable and misapprehended the evidence about the booking process.

The appeal court held that the trial judge correctly stated and applied the governing principles requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the police acted reasonably throughout and obtained the samples within a reasonably prompt time.

On the evidentiary record, including ambiguity surrounding a 22-minute period before the first test, it was open to the trial judge to find the presumption of identity unavailable.

The acquittal was upheld and the appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The defence sought exclusion of Intoxilyzer readings under Charter section 24(2) based on alleged violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the accused was denied a reasonable opportunity to speak with her counsel of choice before providing breath samples, constituting a Charter section 10(b) breach.

The court rejected other Charter arguments regarding the timeliness of the approved screening device demand and the reasonableness of grounds for the Intoxilyzer demand.

However, applying the Grant test for section 24(2) exclusion, the court found that the seriousness of the breach and its impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits, resulting in exclusion of the breath samples and dismissal of the charge.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired operation and care or control of a motor vehicle while over the legal limit following a collision.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant had been the driver or merely a passenger, with the defence asserting that another individual had been driving and raising non-insane automatism based on a head injury.

The appeal court held that the trial judge’s reasons were inadequate because they failed to analyze key potentially exculpatory evidence, including seatbelt markings on the appellant’s shirt consistent with the passenger position, and failed to sufficiently address discrepancies in eyewitness testimony.

The appellate court found that the deficiencies prevented meaningful appellate review of whether the evidence had been properly considered.

The convictions and conditional stay were therefore set aside and a new trial ordered.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on grounds of unreasonable trial delay.

The charge was for failing or refusing to provide a breath sample at a roadside screening device on March 8, 2012.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the trial date was approximately 15 months.

The court conducted a detailed attribution analysis of the delay periods and found that the Crown was responsible for approximately 12 months of delay, primarily due to failure to provide crucial in-car video disclosure in a timely manner and failure to arrange a Crown pre-trial meeting.

The court found that the delay exceeded constitutional limits and that the applicant's interests in a prompt trial outweighed society's interest in a trial on the merits, resulting in a stay of proceedings.

Four defendants charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking marijuana and related offences arising from a grow operation investigation applied for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on grounds of unreasonable trial delay.

The defendants had been before the court for approximately 21.5 months.

The court conducted a detailed analysis of the delay, allocating it among inherent delay, actions of the accused, actions of the Crown, and institutional resource limitations.

The court found that the total delay attributable to the Crown or systemic factors was 8 months and 19 days, which fell within the Askov/Morin guidelines of 8 to 10 months.

The court determined that the prejudice suffered by the defendants was modest and that society's interest in a trial on the merits outweighed the defendants' interest in prompt adjudication.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

He argued that the trial judge erred in concluding that breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable”, in admitting a certificate of a qualified breath technician without providing adequate reasons, and in declining to exclude breathalyzer evidence after finding a breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly assessed the total time between arrest and testing and reasonably concluded the police acted within a prompt and reasonable timeframe.

The court also found no reversible error in admitting the certificate and determined that the trial judge appropriately applied the s. 24(2) Charter analysis in admitting the breath test evidence despite the breach.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing an adjournment to secure the attendance of a police supervisor whose evidence was said to relate to an alleged “over-holding” Charter breach.

The court held that trial judges possess broad discretion in trial management decisions such as adjournments and that the appellant failed to demonstrate what relevant evidence the missing witness could have provided.

The court further rejected the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding no evidence that counsel’s failure to subpoena the officer resulted in prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.

Even if over-holding had occurred, the stringent standard for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter was not met.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.