Norm Stanford

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the test for impairment and failed to consider evidence consistent with non-impairment.

The appellant had been pulled over for driving 138 km/h in a 90 km/h zone, had bloodshot eyes, and smelled of alcohol.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no errors in assessing the evidence and that any degree of impairment is sufficient for a conviction.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, and with operating a motor vehicle as a novice driver with a blood alcohol content above zero contrary to section 44.1(3) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant was found putting gasoline into a vehicle parked on the bullnose of a highway ramp at approximately 2:52 AM.

The Crown established that the defendant's blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit and that he had engaged in conduct constituting care or control of the vehicle.

The defendant was convicted on both charges.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The defence sought exclusion of Intoxilyzer readings under Charter section 24(2) based on alleged violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the accused was denied a reasonable opportunity to speak with her counsel of choice before providing breath samples, constituting a Charter section 10(b) breach.

The court rejected other Charter arguments regarding the timeliness of the approved screening device demand and the reasonableness of grounds for the Intoxilyzer demand.

However, applying the Grant test for section 24(2) exclusion, the court found that the seriousness of the breach and its impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits, resulting in exclusion of the breath samples and dismissal of the charge.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired operation and care or control of a motor vehicle while over the legal limit following a collision.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant had been the driver or merely a passenger, with the defence asserting that another individual had been driving and raising non-insane automatism based on a head injury.

The appeal court held that the trial judge’s reasons were inadequate because they failed to analyze key potentially exculpatory evidence, including seatbelt markings on the appellant’s shirt consistent with the passenger position, and failed to sufficiently address discrepancies in eyewitness testimony.

The appellate court found that the deficiencies prevented meaningful appellate review of whether the evidence had been properly considered.

The convictions and conditional stay were therefore set aside and a new trial ordered.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on grounds of unreasonable trial delay.

The charge was for failing or refusing to provide a breath sample at a roadside screening device on March 8, 2012.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the trial date was approximately 15 months.

The court conducted a detailed attribution analysis of the delay periods and found that the Crown was responsible for approximately 12 months of delay, primarily due to failure to provide crucial in-car video disclosure in a timely manner and failure to arrange a Crown pre-trial meeting.

The court found that the delay exceeded constitutional limits and that the applicant's interests in a prompt trial outweighed society's interest in a trial on the merits, resulting in a stay of proceedings.

Four defendants charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking marijuana and related offences arising from a grow operation investigation applied for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on grounds of unreasonable trial delay.

The defendants had been before the court for approximately 21.5 months.

The court conducted a detailed analysis of the delay, allocating it among inherent delay, actions of the accused, actions of the Crown, and institutional resource limitations.

The court found that the total delay attributable to the Crown or systemic factors was 8 months and 19 days, which fell within the Askov/Morin guidelines of 8 to 10 months.

The court determined that the prejudice suffered by the defendants was modest and that society's interest in a trial on the merits outweighed the defendants' interest in prompt adjudication.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

He argued that the trial judge erred in concluding that breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable”, in admitting a certificate of a qualified breath technician without providing adequate reasons, and in declining to exclude breathalyzer evidence after finding a breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly assessed the total time between arrest and testing and reasonably concluded the police acted within a prompt and reasonable timeframe.

The court also found no reversible error in admitting the certificate and determined that the trial judge appropriately applied the s. 24(2) Charter analysis in admitting the breath test evidence despite the breach.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing an adjournment to secure the attendance of a police supervisor whose evidence was said to relate to an alleged “over-holding” Charter breach.

The court held that trial judges possess broad discretion in trial management decisions such as adjournments and that the appellant failed to demonstrate what relevant evidence the missing witness could have provided.

The court further rejected the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding no evidence that counsel’s failure to subpoena the officer resulted in prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.

Even if over-holding had occurred, the stringent standard for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter was not met.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.