Norm Stanford

The offender was found guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and two counts of failing to comply with release conditions.

The court considered the offender's difficult upbringing, the impact of anti-Black racism, and his strict bail conditions as mitigating factors.

The court also found a breach of the offender's s. 11(b) Charter rights due to a 27-day post-verdict delay, reducing the sentence by two months.

The offender was sentenced to a total of 26 months' imprisonment.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of cannabis for distribution, and failure to comply with release conditions.

Following a surveillance operation, police conducted a high-risk takedown and arrested the accused for breaching his recognizance.

A subsequent search of his vehicle revealed a kilogram of cocaine and a pound of cannabis.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his ss. 8 and 10(a) rights.

The court found a technical s. 10(a) breach but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The court found the accused guilty of the cocaine and breach charges, relying on constructive possession, but acquitted him of the cannabis charge due to insufficient evidence of a purpose of distribution.

The accused, Daniel Bogdanic, was charged with "Over 80" under the Criminal Code.

He alleged two breaches of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel: first, that the arresting officer, Sgt. Brett Moore, failed to advise him of his rights "without delay" by prioritizing note-taking and other non-urgent matters; and second, that Sgt. Moore failed to ensure he understood his right to counsel of choice.

The court found that the "without delay" requirement was breached due to the officer's erroneous understanding and prioritization of other tasks, which was deemed a serious and potentially systemic violation.

However, the court found no breach regarding the understanding of the right to counsel, as the accused had understood his options but chose to defer.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant test, the court concluded that admitting the breath samples, despite their reliability and importance to the Crown's case, would bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the seriousness and systemic nature of the Charter breach and its moderate impact on the accused's interests.

Consequently, the breath samples were excluded, leading to a finding of not guilty.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a breath demand.

The defense argued for Charter breaches and that the Crown failed to prove an unequivocal refusal.

The court found that the police provided misleading information regarding the consequences of refusal, leading the accused to believe he would have another opportunity to provide a sample at the station.

The court also criticized the lack of detailed notes by the officer regarding the alleged refusal.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove the mens rea element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was found not guilty.

Krsna Singh was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample.

Police responded to a Crimestoppers tip about an impaired driver, located the vehicle at Singh's residence, and made an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand, which Singh refused.

Singh challenged the lawfulness of his detention and the ASD demand, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 9 (arbitrary detention), 10(a) (right to be informed of reasons for detention), and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found no Charter violations, distinguishing the case from R. v. McColman by noting the police had reasonable grounds to suspect impaired driving based on the specific tip.

The court also found the police acted within their ancillary powers and that Singh was promptly informed of his detention reasons and that his right to counsel was not violated, as he was released as soon as practicable.

Consequently, the court found Singh guilty of the offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired operation of a conveyance, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred in considering an involuntary statement but applied the curative proviso, deeming the error harmless given overwhelming evidence of impairment and realistic risk of danger.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction.

In this criminal trial, the accused, Maggie Hallikainen, faced charges of impaired operation and over 80 blood-alcohol concentration.

The impaired charge was dismissed earlier.

The accused brought a Charter application, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking exclusion of evidence.

The court found a serious breach of the applicant's section 8 Charter rights due to the arresting officer's unreliable and inconsistent evidence, particularly concerning the Approved Screening Device (ASD) test administration and note-taking.

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Additionally, the Crown failed to prove the over 80 charge beyond a reasonable doubt due to unresolved discrepancies between two Certificates of a Qualified Technician.

Consequently, the remaining charge was dismissed.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter after shooting his friend with an illegal, homemade 'slap-gun' during a dispute over a vehicle.

The court found the offender's moral blameworthiness to be high, given his possession of the prohibited firearm to protect his drug dealing business and his failure to disengage when he recognized the victim.

The court sentenced the offender to 10.5 years in prison and, finding exceptional circumstances demonstrating a need for specific deterrence and rehabilitation, ordered that he serve half of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole.

The defendant brought an application for particulars in response to the Crown's brief response to a Charter application alleging violations of sections 7, 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendant argued that the Crown's response was deficient in form and substance, being silent on some grounds and lacking precision on others.

The court dismissed the application for particulars without prejudice, finding that the defendant was not prejudiced in establishing the alleged Charter violations given that counsel had been retained for over two months, disclosure had been provided, and the parties had agreed to a blended voir dire procedure.

The defendant brought a third-party records application seeking use of force reports, training materials, and policy documents from the Ontario Provincial Police regarding the use of force and conducted energy weapons.

The Crown and police opposed the application on different grounds.

The court found that the policies governing use of force and conducted energy weapons were likely relevant to the issue of whether the arresting officer's conduct was reasonable, but training materials were not likely relevant as the officer's actions must be evaluated on their own merits.

The court ordered production of the policies to the court for determination of whether they should be disclosed to the defendant.

The applicants challenged the constitutional validity of step six of the Garofoli procedure, arguing it violates section 7 of the Charter by preventing them from making full answer and defence.

The applicants contended that judicial summaries of redacted information in an Information to Obtain (ITO) do not provide sufficient disclosure to know the case they must meet.

The court rejected the constitutional challenge, finding that step six does not breach section 7 rights because it is a pre-trial evidentiary hearing on admissibility, not a trial on guilt or innocence, and the procedure appropriately balances the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the near-absolute privilege of confidential informants.

The accused was convicted of defrauding No Panic Computing of over $91,000 through a sophisticated scheme involving forged documents and false pretences.

The scheme involved creating fake email accounts and impersonating employees of Encana to convince the victim company that a large computer sale had been made.

The accused was sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment, ordered to pay restitution of $342,447.59, and placed on three years probation with strict conditions including a monthly restitution payment of $3,000 and no contact with the victims.

The defendants brought a preliminary motion seeking to excise from an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant references to the unlawful search of a third party's vehicle in which cocaine was found.

The search had been previously determined to be unlawful by another justice.

The Crown opposed the excision, arguing the defendants lacked standing to challenge a third party's search.

The court held that while the defendants could not challenge the lawfulness of the third party search itself, they could seek excision of evidence obtained through a judicially determined Charter breach to prevent the state from benefiting from illegal police conduct.

The court granted the motion and excised all references to the stop, arrest, and seizure from the third party's vehicle.

The accused was tried on an 11-count information alleging various fraud offences.

The Crown stayed counts 6-11 at the conclusion of its case, and a directed verdict was granted on count 5, leaving counts 1-4 to proceed.

The accused filed two Charter applications challenging the validity of three production orders obtained by police to seize bank records.

The first application alleged that the first two production orders were obtained under the wrong section of the Criminal Code.

The second application alleged abuse of process, arguing that police and Crown used the accused's Charter application to discover a flaw in their case and obtain a third production order.

The court dismissed both Charter applications, finding no jurisdiction to entertain a leave to cross-examine application not grounded in a section 8 Charter violation, and finding no abuse of process where the police acted in good faith and disclosed the true purpose of the third production order.

The accused was charged with defrauding No Panic Computing over $5,000, using a forged document, obtaining merchandise by false pretence, and making a false statement in writing.

The Crown's case involved a fraudulent scheme whereby the accused, posing as a sales agent, fabricated a contract with Encana Corporation using a fictitious representative and fake email addresses.

The accused obtained over $91,000 in commissions from the victim company based on this fraudulent transaction.

The trial court found the evidence overwhelming and convicted the accused on all counts.

The accused brought a Charter Application alleging Crown impropriety in obtaining a third production order after the defence filed a Charter Application challenging the validity of the first two production orders.

The accused alleged that the Crown directed police to obtain the third production order to circumvent the defence Charter Application and that the affiant failed to make full, fair and frank disclosure.

The court dismissed the threshold portion of the application alleging Crown misconduct, finding that the allegations were frivolous and that the Crown was entitled to act on the defence Charter Application as a public court document to re-calibrate its case.

The accused was charged with over 80 (impaired driving).

He brought a motion to stay proceedings on the grounds that his right to be tried within a constitutionally tolerable time under section 11(b) of the Charter had been breached.

The matter was arrested on July 2, 2015, with trial initially scheduled for June 16, 2016, but rescheduled to May 15, 2017 due to the defence's decision to call expert evidence regarding the approved instrument.

The total delay was 22 months and 10 days.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan and found that even after deducting periods of defence delay, the total time to trial exceeded the presumptive 18-month ceiling.

The court determined that the rescheduling was not caused solely by defence conduct and that the Crown's delayed disclosure of maintenance records contributed to the delay.

The court found a breach of section 11(b) and stayed the proceedings.

The defendant was charged with alcohol-impaired driving and driving with an excessive blood alcohol concentration following a motor vehicle collision on Highway 401 in Toronto.

The Crown dismissed the impaired driving charge at the close of its case.

The court found that the defendant's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 were breached by an unreasonable arrest and an unlawful breath demand made without reasonable grounds to believe.

The court applied the three-part test from R. v. Grant to determine whether evidence obtained through the Charter breach should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court excluded the toxicology report and Intoxilyzer readings, resulting in acquittal on the excessive BAC charge.

The defendant was charged with alcohol-impaired driving and driving with an excessive blood alcohol concentration following a two-vehicle collision on the 401 highway in Toronto.

The Crown closed its case on the impaired driving charge.

The defendant sought to exclude the breath alcohol concentration readings and toxicology evidence on the grounds that her arrest violated her Charter rights against arbitrary detention (s. 9) and that the breath demand violated her right against unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8).

The court found that while the officer detected an odour of alcohol and the defendant admitted to consuming alcohol and marijuana earlier in the day, the totality of circumstances did not objectively establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe the defendant had committed an impaired driving offence.

The court determined that the evidence supported only a lower standard of reasonable suspicion, sufficient for a roadside screening demand but not for arrest or an Intoxilyzer demand.

Accordingly, the defendant's Charter rights were violated.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg).

She brought three Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of her detention and access to counsel.

The court found no breach of section 10(b) regarding delayed access to duty counsel, as the delay was explained by technical difficulties with a newly installed telephone system and the officers made diligent efforts to contact counsel.

The court found no breach of section 8 regarding the timing of breath samples, holding that the "as soon as practicable" requirement is not a precondition to admissibility when the Crown does not rely on the statutory presumption of identity and instead calls expert evidence to establish the readings at the time of driving.

The court found a breach of section 9 regarding arbitrary detention, specifically a three-hour period of overholding after 11:30 AM when the defendant should have been released, but declined to exclude the breath evidence under section 24(2), finding the breach was not sufficiently serious and that society's interest in adjudication on the merits favoured inclusion.

On the merits, the court found the defendant guilty of both impaired driving and over 80, rejecting her evidence regarding her pattern of alcohol consumption and her bolus drinking defence as lacking credibility and defying common sense.