Nicolas de Montigny

The appellant was convicted of sexual contact with a child under 16 years of age contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code and sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence of 15 months imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment of the complainant's testimony, which was corroborated by contemporaneous text messages and video evidence.

The Court also upheld the sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's application of sentencing principles and rejecting the appellant's argument that a conditional sentence was appropriate given the gravity of the offences and the breach of trust involved.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and uttering threats, raising grounds of inadequate trial interpretation and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that while interpretation issues were minor, trial counsel's failure to investigate and utilize a surreptitious audio recording of the complainant's conversation, which contradicted her testimony on a key credibility point, constituted ineffective assistance.

This failure, combined with the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence, rendered the verdict unreliable.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

Paramedics Christopher Marchant and Steven Snively were convicted of failing to provide the necessaries of life to a shooting victim.

They appealed their convictions, arguing a flawed analytical approach, insufficient/contradictory reasons, and misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The Crown sought leave to appeal their 18-month conditional sentences, requesting custodial terms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeals and the Crown's sentence appeals, upholding the trial judge's findings that the paramedics' actions constituted a marked departure from the standard of care and that the conditional sentences were fit.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual touching, and gross indecency against three nephews.

The appeal raised issues of territorial jurisdiction, the application of R. v. W.(D.) principles, alleged errors in conviction for a specific charge, and infringement of linguistic rights.

The appellant also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's decisions regarding jurisdiction (applying a "real and substantial connection" test), the assessment of evidence, or the specific charge.

It also found no infringement of linguistic rights (clarifying that "transcription" in the Criminal Code refers to sound recordings, not written transcripts, during trial) and no ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant, Kevin Nguyen, appealed his convictions for various firearm-related offences.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's Charter ruling regarding an unlawful arrest, an illegal apartment freeze, and the validity of a subsequent search warrant.

The application judge had excluded drugs found on the appellant but admitted a handgun and cash found in his apartment.

The appellant argued errors in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis (failure to consider overall police conduct and D.C. Worth's lack of good faith), and errors in the Garofoli ruling (permitting amplification of the Information to Obtain a search warrant and failing to exercise residual discretion to set aside the warrant).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's decisions on all grounds.

The appellant, Chance Kabasele, appealed his conviction for sexual assault and forcible confinement, and his sentence.

He raised three grounds: inconsistent verdicts and insufficient evidence, violation of his Charter s. 11(b) right to a timely trial, and an unfit sentence due to immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding the verdicts were not inconsistent as they related to distinct acts, the Charter delay was primarily attributable to the appellant, and the sentence was fit, with immigration consequences not justifying an artificial reduction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction to the jury on the permissible use of extensive evidence of the appellant's prior discreditable conduct, which carried a significant risk of propensity reasoning.

The court also noted that Crown counsel engaged in impermissible oath-helping during the complainant's examination-in-chief and that the handling of a purported "admission" under s. 655 of the Criminal Code was problematic.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of communicating with a person believed to be under 16 for the purpose of facilitating a sexual assault, and one count of making child pornography.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, confirming that an intention to meet in person is not required for the "purpose of facilitating" a sexual assault under s. 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, and that the trial judge correctly applied the mens rea standard of knowledge or wilful blindness regarding the complainant's age.

The court also found no error in the "making" child pornography conviction, despite a slip in the sentencing reasons, as the appellant directed the complainant to create new sexual images.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, O.F., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his 15-month sentence.

The appeal raised issues regarding the admissibility of fresh evidence (social media chats/postings), the trial judge's dismissal of a s. 276 application to admit prior sexual activity evidence, and the finding that consent was vitiated by abuse of a position of trust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application due to lack of cogency and credibility.

It upheld the trial judge's s. 276 ruling, finding the prior sexual activity irrelevant to consent or honest but mistaken belief in consent, and that the defence's argument invoked prohibited twin-myth reasoning.

The court found it unnecessary to rule on the vitiated consent issue, as the trial judge's finding of no factual consent was dispositive.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the appeal was dismissed, as the 15-month sentence for a sexual assault on a vulnerable victim was deemed fit.

The appellant appealed convictions for historical sexual offences involving his adopted sister and sisters-in-law.

The appeal primarily challenged the trial judge's assessment of similar fact evidence, including its probative value, alleged misapprehension of evidence, and consideration of collusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no grounds to interfere with the trial judge's rulings on similar fact evidence or credibility assessments.

The court affirmed that the trial judge properly considered the probative value of similar fact evidence holistically, including the context of the alleged acts and the absence of collusion, and that credibility assessments are within the purview of the trial judge.

The Crown applied under s. 683(5) of the Criminal Code to suspend two conditional sentence orders (CSOs) imposed on the respondents, who were convicted of failing to provide necessaries of life.

The Crown argued that serving the CSOs before the appeal hearing would prejudice its sentence appeal, which sought penitentiary sentences.

The respondents opposed, arguing the Crown had not shown merit and that suspension was not in the interests of justice.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that the "interests of justice" did not favour suspending the CSOs, noting that re-incarceration after a sentence is served is not inevitable and that the impact of served house arrest conditions could be considered on appeal.

The appellant, G.R., appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting a nine-year-old victim and his 5.5-year sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that new evidence from the complainant during re-examination rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal found that most of the "new" evidence was already known from the preliminary inquiry, trial counsel did not seek an adjournment or re-open cross-examination, the trial judge did not rely on the new detail to support the Crown's case, and the evidence concerned the least serious of the allegations.

The sentence appeal argued the sentence was at the high end of the range.

The court found no error in law or principle by the trial judge and upheld the sentence, noting the appellant's breach of trust.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of child luring and making child pornography, sought judicial interim release pending his appeal of conviction and leave to appeal sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the application for bail pending appeal.

The court found that while the appeal was not frivolous, the public interest in enforceability of judgments for serious crimes outweighed the reviewability interest, especially given the weak grounds of appeal.

The court ordered the appeal to be expedited.

Martin Hall, found not criminally responsible in 2006 due to mental disorder, appealed the Ontario Review Board's 2021 disposition ordering his continued detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH) with hospital and community privileges, including approved community accommodation.

Hall argued the Board's finding of significant public safety threat was unjustified and that it erred by not seeking further evidence on the sufficiency of the Mental Health Act for committal if a conditional discharge was granted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and supported by evidence, particularly Dr. Ali's opinion that supervision was necessary to prevent decompensation and risk to public safety.

The court also found the Board had sufficient evidence regarding the Mental Health Act's adequacy.

The applicant, Shaun Rootenberg, sought an order for the appointment of counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code for his appeal, having exhausted legal aid options.

The Crown opposed, arguing the appeal lacked arguable merit and counsel was not necessary.

The court found that while the proposed grounds of appeal were weak, they were arguable for the purpose of the application.

Specifically, the second and third grounds, concerning the legal implications of strip searches during pre-trial custody and sentencing credits, involved significant and novel legal components, making the appointment of counsel necessary for a fair and effective appellate review.

The application for the appointment of counsel to advance all three grounds of appeal was granted.

This appeal concerned the applicability of the third-party records regime under sections 278.1-278.9 of the Criminal Code to a former police officer's anticipated testimony and a draft statement of claim in a criminal trial.

The appellants, J.R. (the former officer) and Toronto Police Service, sought to overturn a subpoena requiring J.R. to testify and to prevent the use of the draft statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts' findings that the third-party records regime did not apply to oral statements made by J.R. and, in the specific circumstances, did not apply to the draft statement of claim.

Furthermore, even if the regime applied to the draft statement, its production was deemed necessary in the interests of justice.

The appeal was dismissed, and an interim stay was set aside, making the lower court's unsealing and set aside orders effective.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for murder, appealed a continued Detention Order issued by the Ontario Review Board.

The appeal was based on two grounds: an alleged breach of procedural fairness due to time restrictions during the Board hearing, and an error in denying a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board met the high degree of procedural fairness required and that the Detention Order was a reasonable disposition given the appellant's lack of insight, behavioural issues, and continued risk to public safety.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

He argued the trial judge erred in inferring from circumstantial evidence that he was the driver of the vehicle and that he was impaired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Villaroman test for circumstantial evidence and concluding that the totality of the evidence supported the findings that the appellant was the driver and was impaired.

C.C. appealed his 6-year global sentence for human trafficking, assault, and child pornography, arguing for a reduction based on harsh pre-trial bail conditions (Downes credit) and fresh evidence of rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised discretion regarding bail conditions and that the fresh evidence, while commendable, did not warrant a sentence reduction given the gravity of the offences.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offenses including assault, pimping, and material benefit from sexual services.

He sought leave to appeal his 55-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's interpretation of evidence regarding the appellant's strategy to induce the complainant back into sex work as an aggravating factor.

The Court also found the sentence was not demonstrably unreasonable, considering both aggravating factors (domestic violence, significant injuries) and mitigating factors (limited duration of events, complainant's prior involvement in sex work, low financial gain), and the appellant's extensive criminal record indicating a high risk of recidivism.