Mohammed M. Rahman

The applicant sought to exclude his statements to police on the grounds that his Charter rights were violated.

Police executed a search warrant at the applicant's home and questioned him in the kitchen without informing him of his right to counsel or the reasons for his detention.

The applicant was arrested and later provided a video-recorded statement at the police station after speaking with duty counsel.

The court found that the applicant was subjected to a psychological detention and that his rights under sections 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter were breached.

Although the statements were found to be voluntary under common law, they were excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter as the admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was charged with having care and control of a vehicle with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg/100 mL).

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test results on two grounds: first, that a breach of section 10(b) of the Charter (right to counsel) warranted exclusion of evidence under section 24(2); and second, that the Crown failed to prove the breath tests were administered as soon as practicable as required by section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while a section 10(b) breach occurred (a nine-minute delay in informing the defendant of his right to counsel), the breach was not serious enough to warrant exclusion under the Grant test.

The court also found that the breath tests were administered as soon as practicable within the statutory two-hour window.

The defendant was convicted.

The Crown charged the defendant with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80) following a 911 call reporting erratic driving.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test results and statements to police, alleging violations of Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found reasonable grounds for arrest and breath demand under sections 8 and 9, but found a breach of section 10(b) when police made only a token effort to facilitate contact with the defendant's counsel of choice.

Under section 24(2), the court excluded the defendant's statements but admitted the breath test results.

The defendant was found guilty of both impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg/100 ml) following a traffic stop on Highway 401.

The Crown relied on Intoxilyzer breath test results showing readings of 104 and 99 mg/100 ml.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breath test results on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that while the accused's right to silence under section 7 was breached when the breath technician misinformed him about the scope of that right, the breach did not warrant exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2).

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds to make the breath demand based on the accused's erratic driving and physical signs of impairment.

The court rejected arguments regarding the reliability of the Intoxilyzer machine and the alcohol standard solution used for calibration.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The applicant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol.

He applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging his right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

The total delay was seventeen months, below the presumptive ceiling of eighteen months.

The critical issue was whether a five-month period of delay, during which the applicant pursued resolution discussions rather than setting a trial date, constituted unreasonable delay.

The court found that the applicant's decision to adjourn the matter repeatedly while awaiting a Crown resolution position, rather than setting a trial date, constituted defence delay or an implicit waiver of Charter rights.

The court also found the applicant failed to demonstrate the defence initiative required under the Jordan framework for transitional cases below the presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The offender was convicted of sexual assault for forcing the victim to perform oral sex in an apartment building stairwell.

The Crown sought a sentence of 20-26 months, while the defence sought time served (12 months).

The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day, exceeding the Crown's recommendation due to the gravity of the offence, the violent nature of the assault, the offender's prior sexual assault conviction, and the need for denunciation and specific deterrence.

The court rejected the distinction between oral and vaginal penetration as a determinative sentencing factor.

The offender pleaded guilty to sharing intimate images under section 162.1 of the Criminal Code.

The offender, in a state of depression following the breakdown of his relationship, uploaded five videos and seventeen nude photographs of his former partner to various websites without her consent, attaching her name, age, ethnicity, and place of birth to the images.

The victim discovered the images online and suffered severe psychological harm, depression, and ongoing harassment from strangers.

The court rejected the offender's request for a conditional discharge and imposed a custodial sentence of five months imprisonment followed by twelve months probation, finding that general deterrence and denunciation were paramount sentencing principles for this offence.