Meaghan Elizabeth Cunningham

The accused brought an application under s. 278.93 (formerly s. 276.1) for a hearing under s. 278.94 (formerly s. 276.2) to determine whether evidence of the complainant's sexual activity other than that forming the subject matter of the sexual assault charges would be admissible under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the accused's application record must be provided to the complainant before the s. 278.94 hearing.

The court held that the complainant is entitled to receive the application record sufficiently in advance of the hearing to allow her to prepare and make meaningful submissions.

Gino Langevin pleaded guilty to manslaughter for killing his partner during a cocaine-induced psychotic episode.

The court considered sentencing principles, mitigating factors (pro-social life, remorse, guilty plea, limited impact of self-induced psychosis), and aggravating factors (deliberate long-term cocaine use, domestic context, use of a weapon against two people, limited insight).

The court rejected characterizing the offence as "near murder" or "near accident" and imposed an 8-year incarceration sentence, less 1787 days for presentence custody, along with a mandatory DNA order and a lifetime firearms prohibition.

Jeffrey Wills was found guilty of four sexual offenses involving two young girls in his home daycare.

This decision addresses his sentencing.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, while the defense proposed 12-24 months and a conditional stay for two counts related to one victim based on the Kienapple principle.

The court denied the Kienapple stay, finding the offenses distinct.

Aggravating factors included the high position of trust as a daycare operator, the young age of the victims, and the egregious breach of trust.

Mitigating factors were the offender's education and family support, though media coverage impact was not accepted as mitigating without evidence.

The court considered the prior 60-month sentence from the first trial, noting the increased impact on victims due to testifying in the second trial.

The court imposed a total sentence of 60 months, with specific concurrent and consecutive terms for each count, and ancillary orders including DNA submission, communication prohibitions, Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance, and s. 161 prohibitions.

In this criminal proceeding, the court issued an addendum to an earlier hearsay ruling concerning statements made by two child witnesses in a daycare sexual abuse prosecution.

Applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule, the court identified which portions of each witness's later statements added materially to earlier statements and were therefore admissible for their truth, while confirming that overlapping portions were admissible only as circumstantial narrative relevant to reliability.

The addendum was to be read together with the earlier ruling on hearsay and a separate ruling on count-to-count similar fact evidence.

On a Crown application in a judge-alone criminal proceeding, the court admitted count-to-count similar fact evidence arising from allegations by two very young complainants who attended the accused's home daycare.

Applying the similar fact evidence framework, the court found substantial similarities in the surrounding circumstances and conduct, including the accused's role as daycare provider, the complainants' ages, the isolation of each child during nap, quiet, or movie time, and the sexualized conduct directed at each child.

The court rejected the defence contention that possible collusion undermined admissibility, finding no evidence of communication capable of supporting collusion and relying on the chronology of disclosure.

The probative value, particularly on reliability and credibility, outweighed the risk of prejudice.

The Crown brought an application during a trial for sexual offences to admit evidence of the accused's subsequent discreditable conduct as similar fact evidence.

The accused operated a home daycare where the offences allegedly occurred against two young children.

Three years later, neighbours observed the accused masturbating naked in his living room window.

The court applied the four-part test for discreditable conduct and found the evidence admissible regarding one complainant due to striking similarities in the location and nature of the act.

The application was dismissed regarding the second complainant as the conduct lacked sufficient similarity.

During a trial for sexual offences alleged to have occurred at a home daycare, the Crown applied to admit the out-of-court statements of two young complainants under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The complainants, who were 3.5 and 5 years old at the time of the alleged offences, were unable to adopt their video-recorded police statements under section 715.1 of the Criminal Code due to a lack of present memory.

The court found that the necessity criterion was met because the children's direct evidence was unavailable despite reasonable efforts.

The court also found that the statements met the threshold reliability criterion based on substantive reliability, noting the children's lack of motive to lie, the absence of leading questions, and the fact that the sexual acts described were outside the expected knowledge of children their age.

The court declined to exercise its residual discretion to exclude the statements, finding their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

Following a judge-alone trial on a 45-count indictment, the court found that the accused engaged in a sustained pattern of drugging women with GHB or Ketamine and sexually assaulting them while they were unconscious or otherwise incapable of consenting.

The court applied the law of conscious consent, incapacity, and administering a stupefying substance under s. 246(b) of the Criminal Code, and admitted count-to-count similar fact evidence to assess intent, absence of consent, and the lack of any air of reality to mistaken belief in consent.

The court also relied on expert evidence concerning the pharmacological effects of GHB and Ketamine and on disturbing cellphone images and videos created by the accused.

Convictions were entered on most assault, sexual assault, stupefying substance, and drug trafficking counts, with acquittals on a limited number of counts where the evidence left a reasonable doubt.

Because of the publication ban, this summary avoids identifying protected persons.

The Crown sought a pre-trial ruling on the voluntariness and admissibility of a video statement provided by the accused to police.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to alleged excessive force during arrest.

The court found that the brief and reasonable force used by police during the arrest, which occurred ten hours prior, did not impact the accused's state of mind when giving the statement to an officer not involved in the arrest.

No threats or inducements were found.

The statement was deemed voluntary and admissible.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter and, during the sentencing hearing, sought to bring a Charter application for declaratory relief and damages under s. 24(1) due to his treatment in pre-trial solitary confinement.

The court declined to hear the application, ruling that a criminal sentencing hearing is not the appropriate forum for a complex civil damages claim, which should instead be pursued in the civil courts.

The Crown applied to have the offender designated as a dangerous offender following his convictions for attempted murder, aggravated assault, forcible confinement, and robbery.

The offender broke into the victims' home, stabbed one victim 18 times, and slashed the other victim's throat three times while she was tied to a chair.

The court found that the offender's behaviour was of an extremely brutal nature and that he constitutes a threat to the life and safety of others.

The court designated the offender as a dangerous offender and imposed a sentence of detention in a penitentiary for an indeterminate period.

The offender was convicted of attempted murder, aggravated sexual assault, and administering a noxious thing after intentionally attempting to infect multiple sexual partners with HIV.

The court found that the offender acted deliberately and maliciously, lying about his HIV status and seeking out vulnerable young men.

The court sentenced the offender to a global sentence of 14 years imprisonment, reduced by pre-sentence custody.

The court also designated the offender as a long-term offender and imposed a 5-year supervision order, finding a substantial risk of reoffending based on his pattern of reckless and predatory conduct.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual touching of a child under sixteen years of age.

The Crown's case rested primarily on the testimony of the eight-year-old complainant, who alleged that his grandfather had licked his fingers and inserted them into his anus.

The accused denied all allegations.

The trial judge assessed the credibility and reliability of both the child witness and the accused, applying the framework from R. v. W(D) and contemporary jurisprudence regarding child testimony.

The court found the child to be a credible and reliable witness and rejected the accused's denial, finding him guilty of both charges.

The applicant, an inmate awaiting sentencing for attempted murder and aggravated sexual assault related to HIV transmission, applied for habeas corpus to be removed from administrative segregation and placed in the general prison population with a cellmate.

The applicant argued a denial of procedural fairness and failure to conduct mandated five-day reviews.

The court found that while there was a denial of procedural fairness in how the reviews were documented, the applicant was aware of the reasons for his segregation.

Due to the high risk the applicant posed to other inmates, the court held that administrative segregation was lawful and necessary for safety.

The application was dismissed, but the institution was ordered to continue offering alternative accommodation proposals.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder in the death of his wife, who died from severe burn injuries and had suffered extensive prior abuse.

During pre-trial motions, the court ruled on the admissibility of two statements the accused made to police and the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct evidence.

The court found both the December 6 and December 11 statements were voluntary and that the accused's Charter rights were not violated.

The court also ruled that evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct, including evidence that he had shot the victim with a pellet gun 29 times, was highly probative of his animus, motive, and state of mind, and its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, attempted aggravated sexual assault, attempt to administer a noxious thing, and sexual assault against a developmentally delayed complainant, alleging he attempted to infect the complainant with HIV.

The trial was severed from counts involving other complainants.

The court found the accused intended to infect others with HIV, but the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused attempted to anally penetrate the complainant without consent, due to inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The accused was acquitted of the main charges but found guilty of a conceded breach of probation charge.

The Crown brought an application to admit a videotaped statement made by the accused to police.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to a missing minute of the video recording, an unrecorded cell block visit, and a failure to comply with a remand warrant.

The accused also argued that a previous ruling in a separate proceeding excluding the same statement should bar its admission based on issue estoppel.

The court held that issue estoppel does not apply to voluntariness rulings.

The court further found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary, as the missing recording and technical warrant violation did not overbear the accused's will.

The accused applied under s. 591(3)(a) of the Criminal Code to sever counts relating to one complainant from a multi-count indictment involving seven complainants alleging sexual offences and attempted murder arising from nondisclosure of HIV-positive status.

The accused argued he intended to testify regarding the severed complainant’s allegations, which included disputed non-consensual conduct, but not regarding the other complainants whose sexual encounters were admitted to be consensual at the time.

The Crown opposed severance, asserting a strong factual nexus among the counts and a viable similar fact evidence application based on an alleged pattern of behaviour and extensive chat log evidence demonstrating intent.

The court held that the accused established an objectively justifiable basis for testifying on the severed counts but not the others, and that forcing a joint trial would prejudice the accused’s right to choose whether to testify.

Severance of the counts relating to the particular complainant was therefore granted in the interests of justice.