Matthew Asma

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board denying him an absolute discharge.

The Board concluded he remained a significant threat because there was a significant risk he would stop taking his medication if discharged.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis of inadequate reasons by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to consider exculpatory witness evidence, the physical unlikelihood of the appellant's alleged actions, a non-hearsay statement showing another person's knowledge of the gun, and the impact of the destruction of a TTC video.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking a person and receiving a financial benefit, arguing the trial judge failed to give an appropriate Vetrovec warning regarding the complainant and failed to adequately identify the defence's position in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's Vetrovec warning functionally sufficient and noting that the trial judge had properly incorporated the defence's written position into the charge.

Appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing detention subject to conditions permitting community living.

The appellant argued that the Board’s finding of significant risk to the safety of the community was unsupported by the evidence and therefore unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the case was close, the evidence of the treating psychiatrist concerning the risk of a return to fire-setting and threatening behaviour supported the Board’s conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon arising from a knife attack on one complainant, and also appealed sentence.

He argued that the trial judge failed to properly consider prior inconsistent police statements, unevenly scrutinized defence and complainant evidence, and neglected a self-defence theory.

He further contended that the sentencing judge failed to meaningfully apply Gladue principles despite the appellant's Aboriginal heritage.

The Court of Appeal rejected all grounds, found the credibility analysis fair, held the self-defence argument had in substance been addressed, and concluded the sentencing judge properly considered s. 718.2(e), the Gladue report, and relevant sentencing authorities.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of multiple historic sexual offences against his niece and sentenced to a total of five years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued that the Kienapple principle should apply to stay one count, which the Crown conceded.

He also appealed his sentence, requesting that the five-year total be apportioned into consecutive sentences of less than two years each to preserve his right to appeal a deportation order under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that courts cannot impose inadequate or artificial sentences to circumvent Parliament's will on immigration matters, and that a sentence of less than two years for prolonged sexual assault of a child would be patently inadequate.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for offences involving cocaine and a firearm found in a vehicle.

He argued the trial judge erred in upholding a police search of a black bag and in instructing the jury on constructive possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the police had reasonable grounds to open the bag for officer safety and the jury charge was appropriate given the firearm was in plain view.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence fell within the appropriate range.

The respondent backed his vehicle into a parked car in a supermarket parking lot and drove away.

He was charged with failing to report an accident under s. 199(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The lower courts dismissed the charge, relying on obiter dicta from a previous Court of Appeal decision suggesting the entire Act applied only to 'highways'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the obiter was incorrect and that the reporting requirement in s. 199 applies generally, even if the accident occurs on private property that does not fall within the statutory definition of a highway.

The appellant appealed his criminal conviction, arguing the trial judge improperly relied on demeanour, reversed the burden of proof, and misapprehended evidence regarding a dropped wallet and lack of injuries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not improperly rely on demeanour or reverse the burden of proof, and that any misapprehension of evidence was not material.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that quashed his acquittal.

The trial judge had rejected the applicant's defence of non-insane automatism because he failed to lead expert evidence as required by R. v. Stone.

Furthermore, there was no evidence that the applicant was tricked into consuming alcohol.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding no issue of sufficient merit or importance.

The appellant appealed from convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, misapprehended evidence regarding online communications, and failed to properly consider inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the reasons adequate under the Dinardo standard, no misapprehension of evidence, and no error in the trial judge's treatment of inconsistencies.

The sentence was also upheld as fit.

The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death, impaired driving causing death, driving while disqualified, and breach of an undertaking.

He engaged in extremely dangerous driving while highly intoxicated, resulting in a crash that killed a passenger.

After the crash, he attempted to fabricate a story and left the passenger to die.

The trial judge imposed a global sentence of 12 years' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing it was outside the established range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the sentence was the highest ever approved for such offences, it was not demonstrably unfit given the egregious nature of the appellant's conduct before and after the crash.

The appellant pleaded guilty to five counts, including sexual assault of a minor and attempting to procure a person to become a prostitute, and was sentenced to five years and two months in prison based on a joint submission.

On appeal, he argued that the agreed statement of facts did not support the convictions and that the sentence was beyond the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's guilty pleas were informed and unequivocal, and that the sentence was within the appropriate range for the offences.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to correct an allegation of recent fabrication made by the Crown in closing, and that the Crown's cross-examination improperly invited the jury to draw an adverse inference from the appellant's failure to call a witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Crown's closing and cross-examination were proper, and noting the trial judge gave the standard instruction that the accused had no obligation to call evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was within a reasonable range and not tainted by legal error.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in applying the Truth in Sentencing Act to preclude 2:1 credit and in requiring a causal connection between his Aboriginal background and the offence during the Gladue analysis.

The Crown conceded these errors.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the sentencing judge would have given 2:1 credit for pre-trial custody but for the statutory error.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant's pre-trial custody credit was increased by 17 months.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's order staying proceedings against the respondent for impaired driving charges due to an alleged breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The delay primarily stemmed from the defence's successful motion to quash the initial information on the scheduled trial date, which required the Crown to relay the charges.

The Court of Appeal found that the delay resulting from the defence's tactical decision to bring the motion to quash should be attributed to the defence or considered neutral.

Consequently, the overall delay did not violate s. 11(b).

The stay was set aside and the matter remitted for trial.

Crown sentence appeal in a child sexual abuse case involving repeated sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and invitation to sexual touching by an adult in a position of trust over a dependent teenage complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge set the sentencing range too low and reaffirmed that prolonged sexual abuse of a child, including penetration, by a trusted adult will ordinarily attract a penitentiary term of at least five or six years.

Given the grooming, repeated intercourse, threats, dependency, profound breach of trust, and absence of remorse, the three-year sentence was manifestly unfit.

The sentence was increased to seven years and the unauthorized lifetime non-communication order was replaced with a custodial-period order under the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

Following a request for an early Board hearing, counsel advised that the appeal would not be pursued.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellants were convicted of aggravated assault following a jury trial.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in dismissing a motion for a stay based on unreasonable delay, allowing the preliminary hearing testimony of a key witness who was out of the country to be read in under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code, and providing incomplete written instructions to the jury during deliberations.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the delay analysis but held the trial judge erred in admitting the preliminary hearing evidence without considering technological alternatives like videoconferencing.

The Court also found the trial judge's written jury instructions were unbalanced and compromised trial fairness.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The parties agreed that the Review Board's decision had no current effect or consequence for the appellant, as it was effectively erased by a subsequent decision of Trotter J. The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal.