David Burke

The Crown applied for the forfeiture of two vehicles owned by the accused following his convictions for drug trafficking offences.

The court granted the forfeiture of a 2005 Chevrolet Malibu under s. 16(1) of the CDSA, finding on a balance of probabilities that it was used as a venue for a drug transaction and to store drugs.

However, the court dismissed the application regarding a 2017 GMC Sierra pickup truck.

Because the truck was not related to the offences for which the accused was convicted, s. 16(2) required the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was offence-related property.

The circumstantial evidence of short meetings with known drug users fell short of this standard.

The accused was tried on charges of fraud over $5,000 and money laundering arising from his operation of two investment companies.

The Crown alleged the accused ran a Ponzi scheme, soliciting funds from investors under the guise of short-term commercial loans while actually using the money to pay earlier investors, cover operating costs, and enrich himself.

The court found that the accused intentionally deceived investors about the nature, purpose, and security of their investments.

The accused was found guilty on both counts, with the court concluding he orchestrated an overarching fraudulent scheme that deprived investors of over $54 million.

The two accused were convicted of possessing loaded handguns, marijuana, and proceeds of crime.

One accused was also convicted of possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought sentences of 4 to 5.5 years, while the defence sought much lower sentences, citing a Charter breach for delayed bail hearings.

The court weighed the serious aggravating factors of guns and drugs against the mitigating factors of good rehabilitation prospects and the Charter breach.

Both accused were sentenced to two years less a day in custody, followed by probation.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing bodily harm after striking a pedestrian while driving with a blood alcohol concentration approximately twice the legal limit.

The offence caused significant physical and psychological harm to the victim and involved property damage.

The accused had prior convictions for impaired driving and related offences, constituting a third drinking-and-driving offence.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for impaired driving offences causing bodily harm.

Balancing aggravating factors with mitigating factors including a guilty plea, expressions of remorse, employment history, family support, and efforts at alcohol treatment, the court imposed a custodial sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with excess alcohol, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to exclude Intoxilyzer readings under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant contended his s. 8 rights were violated because the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to make the breath demand, as there was no evidence the officer believed the approved screening device (ASD) was in proper working order.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to infer from circumstantial evidence that the officer reasonably believed the ASD was operating properly and provided a reliable result.

The appellant was arrested for impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol, providing breath samples of 200 mg.

He was held in custody for over eight hours before release.

At trial, he sought a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to be free from arbitrary detention was breached.

The trial judge dismissed the application.

On appeal, the Superior Court upheld the decision, finding the officer-in-charge did not rely solely on blood alcohol readings but considered other factors, including the appellant's condition and lack of a known ride.

The court also held that police do not have an absolute duty to inquire about or facilitate transportation for an accused's release.