Margaret Leighton

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal decision finding it discriminated against a black employee by requiring him to attend anger management counselling after a workplace dispute.

The employer argued the Tribunal breached procedural fairness by relying on a prior decision about anti-black racism without notice, and that the discrimination finding was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Tribunal could take notice of accepted social facts about racism without breaching procedural fairness.

The majority further held that the Tribunal's inference of racial stereotyping was rationally supported by the evidence, given the employer's rare and highly discretionary use of anger management referrals.

The Divisional Court heard three applications for judicial review of decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The Tribunal had found that a Toronto police officer discriminated against a Black mail carrier on the basis of race when he stopped and questioned him in an affluent neighbourhood.

The Tribunal also found the Toronto Police Services Board jointly and severally liable for the officer's conduct and awarded $10,000 in damages.

The officers and the Board sought judicial review of the liability and remedy decisions, while the complainant sought increased damages and systemic remedies.

The majority of the Divisional Court dismissed all three applications, finding that the Tribunal's conclusion that race was a factor in the stop was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The Court also upheld the finding that the Board was liable as the officer's employer under the Human Rights Code.

A dissenting judge would have set aside the liability decision, finding the Tribunal's analysis fundamentally flawed.

The applicants sought judicial review of an interlocutory order made by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario in a complaint that had been ongoing since 2003.

The Divisional Court quashed the application, declining to depart from the general rule against hearing judicial reviews of interlocutory orders, despite the troubling history and delay.

The applicant police officers sought judicial review of two interlocutory decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario ordering the production of records concerning prior complaints against them.

The Divisional Court quashed the application for prematurity, finding no exceptional or extraordinary circumstances to justify fragmenting the administrative proceedings before the Tribunal.

The applicant, Honda of Canada, Manufacturing, sought a stay of a Human Rights Tribunal proceeding pending the disposition of its application for judicial review.

Honda argued that the respondent failed to comply with disclosure rules, denying it procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, applying the RJR MacDonald test.

The court found that Honda had not exhausted its remedies before the Tribunal, failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured allowing the Tribunal proceeding to run its course.

The responding party sought leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision regarding a human rights complaint against a housing co-operative and a federal crown corporation.

In support of her leave application, she filed affidavits to demonstrate the public importance of the legal issues.

The moving party brought a motion to strike the affidavits.

The Court of Appeal held that while affidavit evidence on public importance cannot be filed as of right, the court may grant leave to file such evidence if it is factual and relevant.

The court struck out specific paragraphs containing legal opinions but allowed the remainder of the affidavits to be filed.

The applicant, a federal Crown corporation, sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Board of Inquiry adding it as a respondent to a human rights complaint.

The complainant alleged that the rent calculation formula for social assistance recipients in her co-operative housing, mandated by the applicant's funding agreement, was discriminatory.

The Divisional Court quashed the Board's order, holding that the applicant's imposition of funding conditions was a valid exercise of the federal spending power under s. 91(1A) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, finding that provincial human rights legislation must be read down so as not to impair the essential powers of a federal agency carrying out its core functions.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding a board of inquiry's pre-hearing disclosure order.

The board had ordered the complainant, who alleged discrimination based on a physical handicap, to produce various medical, workers' compensation, and pension files, as well as a list of all other treating medical practitioners.

The Court of Appeal held that the board had the authority to order the complainant to provide an affidavit of documents for the specified files, allowing for claims of privilege and irrelevance to be adjudicated.

However, the Court found that the board exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering the complainant to provide a list of all other treating doctors and their treatments without any relevance screening, as this unjustifiably infringed her privacy rights.

The appeal was allowed in part to set aside that specific paragraph of the board's order.

The applicant County sought judicial review of a Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal decision which found that private-home day care providers were employees of the County for the purposes of the Pay Equity Act.

The Tribunal had applied the common law 'total relationship' and 'organization/integration' tests to conclude the providers were employees.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the Tribunal's decision, finding it to be patently unreasonable.

The majority held that the Tribunal ignored or irrationally discounted evidence demonstrating that the providers were independent contractors, such as their contracts, tax filings, and level of independence.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission brought an application for judicial review of an interim decision made by the Board of Inquiry regarding the production of records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no exceptional or extraordinary circumstances to justify fragmenting the ongoing hearing before the Board.

The Court held that the Board's decision was a reasonable exercise of its discretion at a preliminary stage, particularly in applying the balancing test from A.M. v. Ryan and considering the confidentiality undertaking in place.

Costs of $3,500 were awarded to the respondent employer against the Commission.

The appeal concerned whether a Board of Inquiry lost jurisdiction over an employment discrimination complaint after the Commission ceased participating following referral.

The court held that the complainant retained independent party status under the Human Rights Code, that the Commission's role changed upon referral, and that the Board of Inquiry was an autonomous tribunal required to conduct the hearing.

The phrase granting the Commission carriage of the complaint was interpreted as procedural rather than substantive.

The Divisional Court's contrary ruling was set aside and the matter was remitted for further hearing.

The applicant school board sought a stay of a Board of Inquiry hearing regarding a human rights complaint, pending an application for judicial review.

The school board argued that the Board of Inquiry lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the remedy phase of the hearing because the Human Rights Commission had settled with the school board and withdrawn from the proceedings.

Applying recent jurisprudence, the Divisional Court found there was a serious issue to be tried regarding jurisdiction and that proceeding would cause irreparable harm.

The stay was granted.

The Ministry of Community and Social Services requested a hearing to review an order naming it as the employer for pay equity purposes of employees at the Kingston-Frontenac Children's Aid Society.

The Tribunal examined the relationship between the Ministry and the CAS, focusing on financial control, responsibility for compensation practices, and determination of services provided.

The Tribunal found that the Ministry exercises fundamental control over the CAS's finances, services, and compensation practices, despite the CAS having routine control over day-to-day operations.

Consequently, the Tribunal concluded that the Ministry is the employer for the purposes of the Pay Equity Act and directed the Ministry and the union to negotiate a pay equity plan.

The applicant union applied under section 41 of the Labour Relations Act for a direction to settle a first collective agreement by arbitration.

The parties had engaged in extensive bargaining over many months, culminating in a strike.

A major point of impasse was the employer's insistence on a discretionary 'pay for performance' wage system, which the union rejected in favour of a wage grid.

The Board found that the collective bargaining process had been unsuccessful and that the parties were in a 'logjam' from which they were unlikely to extricate themselves.

Without attributing fault, the Board exercised its discretion under section 41(2)(d) to direct the settlement of a first collective agreement by arbitration.

The Globe and Mail decided to contract out its Ontario highway delivery runs and lay off its drivers to save costs.

The union alleged that the contracting out to independent carriers constituted a sale of a business or that the entities were related employers under the Labour Relations Act.

The union also alleged unfair labour practices when the Globe refused to award delivery contracts to four laid-off employees after the union indicated it might assert they remained employees.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board dismissed the applications, finding no sale of a business or related employer relationship, as the Globe merely transferred a like function to independent contractors.

The Board declined to grant remedial relief for the alleged unfair labour practices, noting the Globe's actions were a response to the union's late assertion of rights that would have undermined the legitimate business decision to contract out.

The union filed an unfair labour practice complaint alleging the employer breached its duty to bargain in good faith under section 15 of the Labour Relations Act by refusing to disclose the individual salaries of bargaining unit employees during collective bargaining.

The employer argued the information was confidential and that the union had waived its right to the information through past bargaining practices.

The Board held that a trade union is entitled to the wage rates of employees in the bargaining unit it represents, as this information is necessary to fulfill its role as exclusive bargaining agent.

The Board found the employer breached section 15 and directed it to provide the requested salary information.