Lucille Shaw

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff, a lawyer, sued the defendants (a former client's new lawyer, his firm, and the former client) for various torts including defamation, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process, arising from complaints made to the Law Society of Ontario (LSO) regarding his professional conduct and capacity.

The court found that the complaints and related statements made in quasi-judicial proceedings before the LSO were protected by absolute privilege, which is a complete defence to all claims, even if made with malice.

The Statement of Claim was struck without leave to amend, and costs were awarded to the defendants.

The respondent husband brought a motion for the partition and sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home.

The applicant wife opposed the sale, arguing it was in the children's best interests to remain in the home.

The court found no compelling reason or competing Family Law Act interest to defeat the husband's prima facie right to sale under the Partition Act.

The court ordered the home to be listed for sale at the end of the children's school year and adjourned the issues of income and support to a further motion, while ordering the husband to maintain the status quo carrying costs in the interim.

The plaintiff, a suspended lawyer, brought an action against the vendor's lawyer and real estate agent after they filed complaints with the Law Society of Ontario regarding his attempt to purchase a property.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the motion, finding that the doctrine of absolute privilege provides a complete defence to all claims arising from complaints made to a quasi-judicial regulatory body.

The statement of claim was struck without leave to amend, and costs were awarded to the defendants.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application and the granting of the respondent's counter-application, the court determined costs.

The applicant argued that proposed Minutes of Settlement sent to the respondent constituted a Rule 49 offer.

The court found that the email attaching the Minutes explicitly stated counsel did not have instructions, and therefore it was not a valid Rule 49 offer.

The successful respondent was awarded costs of $10,509.75 on a partial indemnity basis.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following a party where the complainant consumed a significant amount of alcohol.

The complainant alleged she woke up to a sharp pain and briefly saw the accused at her feet before passing out again.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to her extreme intoxication, the dark room, and the brief duration of her observation.

The court also found her credibility compromised by prior inconsistent statements regarding text messages about a threesome and her account of her hospital visit.

The accused was acquitted as the Crown failed to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The offender, a youthful first-time offender, was convicted by a jury of assault causing bodily harm following an unprovoked group attack at a transit station.

The Crown sought 6 to 9 months of incarceration, while the defence sought a suspended sentence.

The court emphasized the principle of restraint and the strong prospects for the offender's rehabilitation, noting his lack of a criminal record, supportive family, and full-time employment.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with two years of probation, along with DNA and weapons prohibition orders.

The applicant moved to strike the respondent's non-parenting pleadings due to his failure to provide complete financial disclosure and comply with a previous court order.

The court found that while the respondent had not fully complied with the disclosure order, his conduct was not exceptional and egregious enough to warrant striking his pleadings, given the significant disclosure already provided.

The court ordered the respondent to produce specific outstanding bank and business records by a set date, or provide a sworn affidavit detailing his efforts to obtain them.

The applicant was awarded costs of $10,000.

The applicant property owner sought an order declaring an Occupancy Agreement and Option to Purchase Agreement null and void, and a Writ of Possession.

The respondent occupant had entered into a rent-to-own arrangement and attempted to exercise the option to purchase.

The applicant argued the respondent failed to strictly comply with the notice and deposit requirements of the option.

The court found the agreements constituted a bilateral contract, meaning strict compliance was not required and substantial performance was sufficient.

The court held the respondent substantially complied with the ambiguous terms of the agreement and dismissed the application.

The plaintiff's poultry processing plant was destroyed by fire and was significantly underinsured because the original insurance application understated the building's size.

The plaintiff sued her insurance broker and the insurer.

The insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against it, arguing it owed no duty of care to inform the insured or the broker of the size discrepancy it discovered during a subsequent property inspection.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that conflicting evidence regarding the purpose of the inspection and the parties' reliance required a full trial to determine whether a novel duty of care existed under the Anns/Cooper framework.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) right to a trial within a reasonable time due to delays caused by a co-accused.

The total net delay was 28 months and 26 days, below the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate that he took meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings, specifically by not applying for severance of the charges despite knowing of the co-accused's delays and the Crown's position against severance.

The court also found that the case did not take markedly longer than it reasonably should have, considering the complexity of a multi-accused trial and the Crown's reasonable decision to pursue a joint trial due to the young victim's trauma.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The applicant sought a declaration that the respondent held her 50% interest in a condominium in trust for him, based on resulting and/or constructive trust principles, and an order vesting 100% beneficial ownership in him.

The respondent filed a counter-application seeking an order for the listing and sale of the property under the Partition Act.

The court found no resulting trust, as the respondent contributed significantly to the property's acquisition cost, negating a gratuitous transfer.

No constructive trust was established, as the applicant's payment of carrying costs was offset by his family's occupation of the property, providing a juristic reason for any enrichment.

The applicant's claims were denied, and the respondent's counter-application for the sale of the property was granted, with net proceeds to be divided equally.

The individual defendants, Kastriot Ademaj and Leo Burnaccioni, brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to dismiss the claim against them personally, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff, Thomas Haggan, brought a cross-motion under Rule 26 to amend his statement of claim to include claims against the individual defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The court granted the defendants' motion, finding no factual basis to pierce the corporate veil or establish personal liability for the officers acting within their corporate capacity.

The court denied the plaintiff's request to amend the statement of claim, as the proposed amendments lacked sufficient factual underpinning to disclose a reasonable cause of action against the individual defendants.

This family law trial addressed custody and access for two children, property equalization, retroactive s. 7 expenses, and spousal support.

The applicant sought sole custody and spousal support, while the respondent sought joint custody.

The court granted the applicant sole custody, finding that the high-conflict environment and the parties' inability to communicate made joint custody unworkable.

The respondent was ordered to pay an equalization payment, occupation rent, and child support, but the applicant's claim for spousal support was denied due to a lack of economic disadvantage from the marriage or its breakdown.

The trial concerned the payment method for a $50,000 equalization payment owed by the applicant to the respondent, following a partial settlement of other issues.

The applicant proposed a set-off against future child support, citing hardship for a lump sum payment.

The respondent sought a lump sum payment to fund a home downpayment.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction to order a set-off against future child support, citing Lutz v. Lutz.

While acknowledging the applicant's hardship, the court ordered a partial lump sum of $20,000 by June 1, 2019, with the remaining $30,000 to be paid in monthly installments of $500, secured by a charge on the applicant's properties.

No costs were awarded.

The plaintiff car dealership sought summary judgment against the defendants for breach of a vehicle purchase agreement.

The defendant, Mr. Cater, failed to secure financing for a vehicle but retained possession of it for nearly a year.

The plaintiff sought the purchase price and daily usage fees.

The defendants counterclaimed for harassment.

The court granted summary judgment in part, finding the agreement binding and awarding the plaintiff daily usage fees against Mr. Cater.

The claim for the full purchase price was dismissed as it was not explicitly provided for in the contract's default clause after repossession.

The action against Ms. Parker was dismissed as she was not a party to the agreement.

The defendants' counterclaim was dismissed due to a lack of evidence.

The appellant contractor appealed the dismissal of its claim for an unpaid final invoice for renovation work.

The Deputy Judge had dismissed both the contractor's claim for payment and the homeowners' counterclaim for deficiencies, finding insufficient evidence for both.

On appeal, the Superior Court found that the Deputy Judge erred in law by requiring supporting receipts for the invoice when the invoice itself, coupled with the appellant's credible testimony and the respondents' admission of receipt, was sufficient evidence.

The court also noted the respondents' failure to properly plead or cross-examine on the invoice's quantum.

The appeal was granted, and judgment was substituted for the appellant, deducting only the cost of disputed heaters.

The respondents' unappealed claim for deficiencies was not reconsidered.

The appellant contractor appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim for an unpaid final invoice of $14,104.17 for home renovations.

The trial judge had found insufficient evidence to prove the claim because the supporting receipts were not filed, despite finding the contractor credible.

The Divisional Court held this was an error of law, as the invoice itself was sufficient evidence and the respondents failed to lead evidence challenging the specific amounts.

The court substituted its own decision, granting judgment for the appellant in the amount of $13,804.17, deducting only a disputed charge for used heaters.

The parties separated after an 11-year marriage with four children.

The applicant sought sole custody, spousal support, and occupation rent, while the respondent sought joint custody and primary residence.

The case involved high conflict, with the applicant making numerous unfounded reports of child abuse to the police and CAS.

The court relied on an OCL assessment, finding that the applicant was traumatized by the respondent's controlling behaviour during the marriage.

The court awarded sole custody to the applicant, finding joint custody unworkable due to the power imbalance and conflict.

The applicant was found entitled to compensatory spousal support and occupation rent for the period the respondent lived in the jointly owned matrimonial home.

This decision addresses the voluntariness of statements made by two accused, J.D. and D.B., to police in a human trafficking case.

The Crown sought to admit statements from both.

J.D. argued his statement was involuntary due to fear from a forceful arrest, while D.B. argued hers was involuntary due to the absence of a primary caution.

The court found J.D.'s statement voluntary, concluding that the force used during his arrest was not excessive, he was properly cautioned, and he maintained an operating mind.

However, D.B.'s statement was deemed involuntary because she was never given a primary caution, was not fully informed of all charges when she spoke to counsel, and her understanding of the recording's purpose was flawed, raising reasonable doubt about her awareness of the stakes.

In a criminal trial involving charges of procuring and exercising control for sexual services, the Crown sought to ask a witness in examination-in-chief about prior inconsistent statements and the reasons for them, anticipating the witness would cite fear of the accused.

The defence objected, arguing this constituted self-serving oath-helping.

The court, preferring the approach in R. v. Durrant over R. v. Pinkus, ruled that the Crown could introduce the fact of prior inconsistent statements during examination-in-chief to avoid appearing to shield the witness.

However, the explanation for these statements, particularly the witness's fear, was to be reserved for re-examination, contingent on the defence cross-examining the witness on the statements.