L. Sheard

Following a trial decision, the parties delivered written costs submissions.

The applicant asserted that the respondent's offers to settle were withdrawn prior to trial and were not received until they were appended to the costs submissions.

The court directed the respondent to serve and file proof of service of any offers to settle relied upon, as well as evidence showing whether and when any such offer was withdrawn.

Following a focused hearing where the applicant mother was successful on the issues of school choice and the interim parenting schedule, the court determined the issue of costs.

The mother sought costs on a partial indemnity basis prior to her offer to settle and full indemnity thereafter.

The court found the mother's offer to settle was substantially similar to the final order and awarded her partial indemnity costs prior to the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court also applied the principle that costs for a settlement conference cannot be awarded if the endorsement is silent on costs.

The father was ordered to pay total costs of $34,968.42.

The applicant condominium corporation brought an application to declare the respondent unit owner a vexatious litigant.

Prior to the release of the decision, the applicant moved to adduce fresh evidence consisting of multiple new appeals and motions initiated by the respondent.

The court granted the motion to admit the fresh evidence, applying a relaxed standard since judgment had not yet been released.

Applying the Lang Michener principles, the court found the respondent's conduct met six of the seven characteristics of a vexatious litigant, including initiating multiple proceedings, failing to comply with orders, and suing opposing counsel.

The respondent was declared a vexatious litigant.

The applicant mother sought to permanently relocate to Vienna, Austria with the parties' four-year-old child.

The respondent father opposed the relocation and sought sole custody.

The mother had previously withheld the child in Vienna, resulting in a Hague Convention order for the child's return.

The court applied the Gordon v. Goertz framework and found that relocation was not in the child's best interests, as it would severely disrupt the child's relationship with the father.

The court granted sole custody to the father with a 50/50 shared parenting schedule, finding the mother had repeatedly used the child as leverage and restricted the father's access.

The court also imputed minimum wage income to the mother for the purposes of calculating child and spousal support, and ordered spousal support to terminate in January 2019.

Following a family law trial regarding the applicant's proposed relocation with the child to Austria, the applicant's counsel wrote to the court advising that the respondent would be relocating to Switzerland for employment.

The applicant requested the opportunity to make additional written submissions before the trial decision was rendered.

The respondent opposed this request.

The court declined to consider the post-trial correspondence, stating that the forthcoming decision would be based solely on the sworn evidence received at trial.

Following findings of guilt, the Crown sought to have the accused convicted under s. 151(a) of the Criminal Code, which carries a mandatory minimum punishment of one year imprisonment.

The court had to determine whether a previous declaration by another Superior Court judge, which found the mandatory minimum unconstitutional and of no force or effect, was binding.

The court held that the previous declaration was binding on the Crown and that the mandatory minimum ceased to exist.

Consequently, sentencing would proceed using applicable principles in the absence of a mandatory minimum.

In a supplementary decision regarding costs of a Hague Convention application, the court clarified the timing for the payment of costs.

The mother argued that the costs should be payable at the end of the litigation to allow for a potential set-off.

The father argued that pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure, costs of an interlocutory order are payable within 30 days.

The court agreed with the father, finding that the Family Law Rules do not adequately cover the timing of interlocutory costs payments, and applied Rule 57.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The mother was ordered to pay the previously fixed costs of $13,267.84 within 30 days of the original costs decision, with interest.

The plaintiff's motion for leave to appeal was previously dismissed with costs.

The defendant sought partial indemnity costs of $4,424.70 plus disbursements and HST.

The plaintiff argued each party should bear their own costs or, alternatively, costs should be fixed between $3,500 and $4,500.

Applying the principles from Boucher, the court fixed the defendant's costs at $4,915.23 inclusive of disbursements and HST, payable by the plaintiff in any event of the cause.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of contract regarding the sale of a used digital printer.

The defendant stopped making instalment payments, alleging the printer was defective and unfit for its purpose.

The court found the agreement was a sale, not a lease, and that there was insufficient evidence of a fundamental breach by the plaintiff.

However, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim because it was statute-barred, as the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the defendant's default more than two years before issuing the statement of claim.

The respondent father was largely successful on a motion to change to terminate child support for two adult daughters.

He sought costs of $9,628.79 on a full indemnity basis.

The applicant mother opposed, arguing the father's conduct was unreasonable and noting the financial impact on the remaining minor child.

The court applied Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, found the father's conduct did not amount to bad faith, and awarded him costs of $8,608.04 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

Following a motion to change regarding a child's school enrollment and a cross-motion to vary custody, both parties sought costs.

The court found that the applicant father was more successful overall, as the respondent mother's cross-motion to vary joint custody was an unreasonable and overly aggressive response.

The court considered the parties' offers to settle and the time spent by counsel, ultimately awarding the applicant father fixed costs of $12,299.19.

The applicant, a party under disability following a severe motor vehicle accident, brought an application to approve a $900,000 settlement for statutory accident benefits.

The court approved the global settlement amount and the inclusion of a 30-year guarantee period for the structured settlement portion, finding it in the applicant's best interests.

However, the court declined to approve the proposed solicitor-client account of $154,439.77, reducing the approved fees and disbursements to $90,826.86 due to concerns over the retainer agreements and the lack of risk assumed by counsel.

The court ordered further materials to address the allocation of the additional funds resulting from the fee reduction.

Counsel for the defendant Paterson Group Inc. requested that its costs of the Damages Trial be reserved to be determined at the time of the Liability Trial.

The co-defendant Tega Homes Developments Inc., against whom the costs claim would be made due to a cross-claim, consented to the request.

The court granted the request and ordered that the determination of Paterson's costs of the Damages Trial be reserved to the Liability Trial.

The applicant wife brought a motion for authorization to list and sell the jointly owned matrimonial home without the respondent husband's consent.

The parties had previously agreed the husband would purchase the wife's interest, but he repeatedly failed to obtain financing and close the transaction, causing the wife financial hardship.

The court dismissed the husband's cross-motion to delay the sale and granted the wife's motion, allowing the husband a final 14-day extension to close, failing which the wife was granted sole authority to list and sell the property.

The applicant mother sought costs following her successful motion for judgment enforcing a settlement agreement on custody and access, and for retroactive spousal and child support.

The respondent father argued his offer to settle was better than the result achieved.

The court found the applicant was the successful party, as the respondent's offer did not include retroactive spousal support and he had unreasonably refused to honour the negotiated settlement agreement.

The court awarded the applicant her claimed partial indemnity costs of $4,607.30, finding them reasonable and proportional.

The mother secretly removed the children from Lebanon to Ontario without the father's consent.

The father commenced proceedings in Lebanon and brought a motion in Ontario asking the court to decline jurisdiction under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court found that the children's habitual residence remained in Lebanon, as their removal without consent did not alter it.

The court declined jurisdiction over custody and access but refused to enforce the Lebanese order returning the children because the mother had not received reasonable notice of that proceeding.

The applicant moved for judgment based on a settlement agreement regarding custody and access, as well as interim spousal and child support.

The respondent argued the settlement was not binding because it did not comply with Rule 18 of the Family Law Rules.

The court found that while the correspondence did not meet the strict requirements of Rule 18, it constituted a binding agreement under general contract principles.

The court ordered final custody and access based on the agreement, awarded interim compensatory spousal support retroactive to the date the application was issued, and determined the parties' incomes for support calculations.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to answer questions refused at discovery and to produce the legal file of his former lawyers.

The action was commenced more than two years after the motor vehicle accident, raising a limitation period defence.

The defendants argued the plaintiff waived privilege over the file by referencing his former lawyers' advice in a letter to his insurer, and that the file was relevant to the discoverability of his claim.

The court found that while the entire file need not be produced, the plaintiff must disclose information from the file regarding advice on obtaining medical opinions and steps taken to manage the file, as this was relevant to testing his due diligence.

An application was brought by family members seeking appointment as guardians of property and personal care for an elderly individual alleged to be incapable due to dementia and declining living conditions.

Medical evidence from the long‑time family physician and a geriatric assessment confirmed significant cognitive impairment and inability to manage finances, medications, and personal care.

The court found the respondent incapable under the Substitute Decisions Act and determined that guardianship was necessary for both property and personal care.

The applicants were appointed joint guardians, the respondent’s prior powers of attorney were terminated, and authority was granted to enlist police assistance if necessary to secure the respondent’s safety and relocation.

Security for the guardianship was waived initially unless assets exceeded a specified threshold.

The applicant father brought a motion to vary a prior order by declaring that an adult daughter with disabilities was no longer a “child of the marriage” under the Divorce Act and by terminating the parties’ obligation to maintain life insurance for her benefit.

The evidence showed that the adult child had lived independently since 2003, maintained full-time employment with benefits, managed her own finances and accumulated substantial savings.

The court held that despite ongoing disabilities and some parental assistance, the adult child had successfully withdrawn from parental charge.

This constituted a material change in circumstances under s. 17 of the Divorce Act and s. 14 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court declared that the adult child was no longer a child of the marriage and vacated the life insurance obligation securing support.