L. Sheard

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike their own jury notice in a civil action for damages arising from sexual assault.

The trial had been adjourned due to the suspension of civil jury trials during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted the motion, finding that the inevitable delay in rescheduling a jury trial would cause actual prejudice and emotional harm to the plaintiff, and that justice would be better served by allowing the matter to proceed promptly by judge alone.

The plaintiff's claims arising from a motor vehicle accident were settled, leaving a liability dispute between the defendant vehicle owner and the plaintiff's insurer.

The owner's boyfriend took her vehicle without express permission and was involved in a collision.

The court found the owner's evidence lacking in credibility, noting her failure to report the vehicle stolen and her delay in contacting police.

The court held that the owner failed to rebut the presumption under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act that the driver had her implied consent to possess the vehicle, rendering her vicariously liable.

The moving party (defendant) sought summary judgment dismissing the responding party's (plaintiff's) action for a 50% interest in a residential property, or alternatively, an order for partition and sale.

The parties are sisters.

The moving party is the sole registered owner, but the responding party resides in the property and claims a beneficial interest based on an alleged written agreement.

The court found the alleged agreement to be invalid and likely forged, relying on expert handwriting evidence and factual inconsistencies.

However, the court concluded a trial was necessary to determine if the responding party had any monetary claim to the property's proceeds based on her financial contributions.

The court ordered the property sold, with 50% of the net proceeds paid to the moving party and the remaining 50% paid into court pending trial.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs had previously commenced an action in 2011 based on the same core facts, which was dismissed as abandoned.

The plaintiffs argued the limitation period was postponed due to fraudulent concealment, claiming they only discovered confirming evidence in 2013.

The court found the 2011 claim provided irrefutable evidence that the plaintiffs had discovered their claim by July 2011.

The court rejected the fraudulent concealment argument, granted summary judgment, and dismissed the action.

The court determined the costs of an appeal and related motions in a family law matter.

The respondent/appellant was successful on the appeal and sought costs of over $42,000.

The applicant/respondent in appeal argued she should not pay costs due to financial disparity and the impact on their child.

The court found the applicant's litigation conduct unreasonable but held the respondent's claimed costs were disproportionate to the amount at stake.

Applying principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the court fixed costs at $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment against the defendants on a guarantee given as part of a settlement agreement.

The corporate debtor defaulted on the settlement payment schedule, prompting the plaintiff to enforce the guarantee against the defendants.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial, and ordered the defendants to pay the principal sum of $90,000.

The court also applied section 4 of the Interest Act to limit the interest rate to 5% per annum, as the guarantee did not express an equivalent yearly rate.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendant's civil jury notice, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic would cause a delay of 12 to 18 months if the matter proceeded before a jury.

The defendant opposed the motion, advocating for a 'wait and see' approach.

The court granted the motion, finding that the delay caused by the pandemic outweighed the defendant's right to a jury trial, and that justice would be better served by allowing the 10-year-old action to proceed more expeditiously before a judge alone.

The defendant municipality brought a motion under Rule 30.10 for the production of non-party records from the plaintiff's former employer.

The defendant alleged after-acquired cause for the plaintiff's termination, claiming he used confidential information during his recruitment.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing the defendant failed to meet the test for production.

The court granted the motion, finding the records were relevant to the pleadings and it would be unfair to require the defendant to proceed to discovery or trial without them.

The appellant father appealed a costs order made following a summary judgment motion that dismissed the respondent mother's claims for retroactive and ongoing extraordinary child expenses.

The mother sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal regarding her financial inability to pay costs.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding it incomplete and not determinative.

On the merits of the appeal, the court found the motion judge erred in concluding there was divided success and in failing to apply the presumptive costs consequences of rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules given the father's better offers to settle.

The appeal was allowed and costs of the summary judgment motion were fixed at $16,126.29 in favour of the father.

In an ongoing estate litigation matter, the court determined costs for several preliminary steps, including the determination of an estate asset, production of solicitor files, an abandoned consolidation motion, and case management conferences.

The court awarded costs to the applicant and other beneficiaries, payable largely by the former estate trustees personally due to their improper conduct and conflicts of interest, with some portions payable by the estate.

The plaintiff moved for leave to register a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against a property she previously owned, alleging it was fraudulently transferred by the second mortgagee to a newly incorporated company under a power of sale.

The court found multiple 'badges of fraud', including a sale below market value, lack of public marketing, and a prior relationship between the parties.

Concluding there was a triable issue regarding the plaintiff's interest in the land, the court granted the CPL and awarded partial indemnity costs to the plaintiff.

The applicant and respondent were equal shareholders in two corporations.

Following the sale of corporate assets, a dispute arose over the distribution of the remaining holdback funds.

The respondent sought to enforce an alleged 2016 agreement for compensation for past services, but acknowledged he had not commenced a formal claim within the two-year limitation period.

The court held that the respondent could not use his responding affidavit on the application to advance a claim that was statute-barred.

The court ordered the holdback funds to be divided without regard to the respondent's claim for compensation.

The self-represented applicant brought a motion, with the respondent's consent, to remove a family law judgment from online access and to redact identifying information, citing cultural stigma regarding divorce and potential negative impacts on her family.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test and finding no evidence of serious debilitating physical or emotional harm that would justify an exception to the open court principle.

Hydro One brought a motion for an interim and interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendants from interfering with the completion of the Niagara Reinforcement Project (NRP).

The defendants, asserting indigenous rights and jurisdiction, had blocked access to the construction site.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test, finding a strong prima facie case of trespass, irreparable harm due to potential financial losses and safety risks, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction.

The court also held that as a private entity, Hydro One owed no duty to consult.

The injunction was granted.

The plaintiffs sought leave to add Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin as a defendant in a motor vehicle accident tort claim more than five years after the accident.

Viking opposed the motion, arguing the claim was statute-barred.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to exercise due diligence to ascertain Viking's potential liability within the limitation period, despite having access to information indicating Viking insured the plaintiff's husband's vehicle.

The motion to add Viking as a party was dismissed pursuant to section 21(1) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff moved for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendants from blocking access to a laneway on lands owned by the plaintiff.

The defendants cross-moved for an injunction preventing the plaintiff from using the lands, claiming they had acquired title by adverse possession.

The court found the defendants failed to establish a strong prima facie case of adverse possession, as they could not show the true owner was excluded for the requisite 10-year period prior to the lands being converted to Land Titles.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, ordering the defendants to remove gravel blocking the laneway, and dismissed the defendants' cross-motion.

Following an 11-day family law trial where the respondent father was entirely successful in preventing the applicant mother from relocating to Austria with their child, the respondent sought costs of $105,677.

The court considered the parties' offers to settle, the applicant's bad faith conduct including false allegations of abuse, and the principles of proportionality.

The court fixed the respondent's costs at $75,000.

Furthermore, the court held it had jurisdiction to set off the costs award against the respondent's spousal support obligations, ordering a set-off against any arrears and $1,500 per month from ongoing spousal support.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that three children were in need of protection and an order placing them in the care and custody of the mother, subject to a six-month supervision order.

The mother consented to the order.

The father opposed the motion, arguing against the protection finding and the condition that his access be supervised at the Society's discretion.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, noting overwhelming evidence of the father's controlling behaviour, parental conflict, and interference with medical care for the medically fragile children.

The court granted the summary judgment, finding the children in need of protection and ordering them to remain with the mother under supervision, with the father's access to be supervised at the Society's discretion.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, and sexual assault against his intimate partner.

The charges arose from events where the accused struck the complainant in the face, pushed her out of a moving van and directed the driver to drive away while she was partially underneath it, and later forced her to have sex while she was recovering from her injuries.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, rejecting the defence's theory of self-defence and accidental injury.

The accused was found guilty on all three charges.

The plaintiff, a 15-year employee, sought to return to work following a long-term disability leave.

The employer, relying on an incomplete summary of a Functional Abilities Evaluation provided by the disability insurer, concluded it could not accommodate the plaintiff's physical restrictions and refused his return.

The court found the employer failed to meet its procedural duty to accommodate under the Human Rights Code by not making sufficient inquiries or communicating clearly with the plaintiff.

The plaintiff was awarded damages for lost income for the 10-month period he awaited a position, plus $5,000 in punitive damages for the employer's failure to communicate.