Le Dain

The appellant challenged a condition attached to its provincial entertainment licence that prohibited nude entertainment, arguing it infringed on the federal criminal law power over public nudity.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provincial legislation was intra vires as a valid regulatory scheme relating to property and civil rights and matters of a local nature.

The Court applied the double aspect doctrine, finding no direct conflict between the provincial licensing conditions and the Criminal Code provisions, allowing both to operate concurrently.

The respondent ship-owner sued the appellant insurer for general average contribution following a fire at sea.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the ship-owner had not exercised due diligence to make the ship seaworthy.

The Federal Court of Appeal reversed this decision, substituting its own findings of fact based on documentary evidence and rejecting the expert testimony relied upon by the trial judge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judgment, holding that the Court of Appeal erred in interfering with the trial judge's findings of fact and rejecting expert testimony without having heard the witnesses.

The appellant challenged the seven-year mandatory minimum sentence for importing narcotics after pleading guilty to importing cocaine.

The Court held that s. 12 of the Charter protects against punishments that are grossly disproportionate, and that the mandatory minimum in s. 5(2) of the Narcotic Control Act was unconstitutional because it would inevitably capture reasonably foreseeable cases involving much less serious conduct and require cruel and unusual punishment.

The Court rejected reliance on prosecutorial discretion to save the provision and held that the infringement was not justified under s. 1 because the means chosen impaired the right more than necessary.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted for reconsideration of sentence.

The appellant, a civilian, was stopped by military police on a public highway just outside a military base after being observed speeding on the base.

The officers noted signs of impairment and issued a breathalyzer demand, which the appellant refused.

He was acquitted at trial on the basis that military police were not 'peace officers' under the Criminal Code with respect to civilians.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while military police do not have general peace officer status over civilians under s. 2(f)(i), they do qualify as peace officers under s. 2(f)(ii) when enforcing laws on a military base pursuant to the Defence Establishment Trespass Regulations.

The officers retained this authority when stopping the appellant immediately outside the base.

The respondent was arrested for armed robbery and informed of his right to counsel.

He stated he would not say anything until he saw his lawyer.

Despite this, police officers continued to question him without offering him the use of an available telephone, eliciting an inculpatory statement.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police violated the respondent's rights under section 10(b) of the Charter by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel and by not ceasing questioning.

The Court concluded that the admission of the self-incriminatory evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute under section 24(2) and dismissed the Crown's appeal, upholding the order for a new trial.

The appellants were acquitted at trial on a directed verdict of robbery and using a firearm.

The Ontario Court of Appeal quashed the acquittal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in ruling confessions inadmissible based on language comprehension, which goes to weight rather than admissibility.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, substantially agreeing with the reasons of the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed a conviction for unlawful circulation of an obscene video cassette and possession of obscene video cassettes for the purpose of circulation.

The Supreme Court held that the principles set out in Towne Cinema governed the case and that, under those principles, the appeal failed.

The conviction entered by the Manitoba Court of Appeal was affirmed.

Minority shareholders and debenture stockholders challenged the sale of surplus railway lands under nineteenth-century perpetual railway leases and a related agreement transferring lands to a subsidiary of the majority shareholder.

The Court held that the lessee had acquired, under the lease and statutory framework, the power to sell surplus lands, that the debenture stock constituted an incumbrance for purposes of the 1891 statute, and that reinvestment of sale proceeds in the railway satisfied the statutory scheme.

The Court further held that approved rail line abandonments did not breach the lease, the shareholder meeting approving the later transaction was validly called, and the majority shareholder lawfully held and voted shares.

The lessor was not entitled in law or equity to recover its reversionary interest in lands sold.

Appeals were dismissed and the respondent’s cross-appeals were allowed in part.

The Canadian Human Rights Commission and Action Travail des Femmes appealed a Federal Court of Appeal decision that set aside a portion of a Human Rights Tribunal order.

The Tribunal had found that the employer engaged in systemic discrimination against women in blue-collar jobs and ordered an employment equity program, including a requirement that the employer hire one woman for every four non-traditional jobs until women constituted 13% of that workforce.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal had jurisdiction under s. 41(2)(a) of the Canadian Human Rights Act to order an employment equity program to prevent future systemic discrimination.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction to the Supreme Court of Canada based on a dissent in the Manitoba Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court quashed the appeal, finding that the dissent in the lower court was not on a question of law, and therefore no appeal as of right existed.

The appellants were convicted of rape and indecent assault after engaging in sexual acts with a prostitute.

At trial, they argued that the complainant consented or, alternatively, that they held an honest but mistaken belief in her consent.

The trial judge left the defence of mistake of fact to the jury but instructed them that the belief must be supported by reasonable grounds.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the defence was properly left to the jury due to an 'air of reality' in the evidence, the trial judge erred in law by requiring reasonable grounds for the honest belief.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The parties divorced in 1969 and entered into a maintenance agreement where the wife accepted a lump sum in full satisfaction of future claims.

The agreement was incorporated into a court order.

Years later, the wife's health deteriorated, she depleted her funds, and went on welfare, while the husband became wealthy.

She applied to vary the maintenance order under s. 11(2) of the Divorce Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that where parties have freely negotiated a valid settlement agreement, it should be respected.

The court may only intervene to vary the order if there is a radical change in circumstances that flows from an economic pattern of dependency engendered by the marriage.

Since the wife's hardship was not causally connected to the marriage, the application to vary was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an order granting a new trial after a sexual assault conviction.

The court held that an instruction on honest but mistaken belief in consent is not mandatory in every sexual assault case; it is only required where there is sufficient evidence giving that issue an air of reality under s. 244(4) of the Criminal Code.

On the record, the accused's theory of consent or mistaken belief lacked an evidentiary foundation.

The court also held that evidence from the complainant's roommate about a prior sexual proposition was admissible because its probative value outweighed its minimal prejudicial effect, and in any event any error would have been cured by the proviso.

The appellants sought compensation for injurious affection after the respondent Minister acquired adjoining land and constructed a public highway.

No part of the appellants' land was taken, but they claimed damages for loss of prospect and privacy.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that to recover under the Expropriations Act, the damage must be actionable at common law.

The Court found that the loss of amenities, such as prospect and privacy, does not constitute an actionable nuisance, and the Minister's use of the land for a highway was not unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving after a blood sample was taken without his consent while he was in an incoherent and delirious state following an accident.

The Crown conceded that the taking of the blood sample violated the appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure under section 8 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the violation was serious, wilful, and deliberate, effectively conscripting the appellant against himself.

The Court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute under section 24(2) of the Charter, allowed the appeal, and restored the acquittal.

The appellant sought spousal maintenance in the divorce proceeding notwithstanding an antecedent settlement agreement that limited support to one year.

The majority held that the same stringent approach governing variation of support orders applied where a court was asked under s. 11(1) of the Divorce Act to depart from a prior settlement agreement, requiring a radical change in circumstances tied to a marriage-related pattern of economic dependency.

On the facts, there had been no relevant change in circumstances, public assistance alone was insufficient, and concerns arising from custody of a child were properly addressed through child support rather than spousal support.

The appeal was dismissed and the escalator clause inserted by the trial judge could not stand.

The parties entered into a separation agreement, incorporated into their divorce decree, which provided that spousal maintenance would cease if the wife cohabited with another man for more than 90 days.

The wife subsequently cohabited with another man, and the husband ceased payments.

The wife, who eventually required social assistance, applied to vary the decree nisi to reinstate maintenance.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the cohabitation clause was valid and enforceable.

Applying the Pelech test, the Court found no radical change in circumstances related to a pattern of economic dependency generated by the marriage that would justify interfering with the settlement agreement.

The appellant's employee forged signatures on cheques drawn on the appellant's account at the respondent bank.

The bank honoured the cheques and debited the appellant's account.

The appellant sued the bank to recover the funds.

The bank argued the appellant was precluded from setting up the forgeries because it breached a duty to examine its bank statements and maintain adequate internal controls.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that, in the absence of an express verification agreement, a customer does not owe a duty to the bank to examine bank statements with reasonable care and report discrepancies, nor does it owe a duty to maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls.

The appeal was allowed and judgment entered for the appellant.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, fled to Canada after being acquitted of a federal kidnapping charge in the United States.

She faced extradition to Ohio on a state charge of child stealing arising from the same incident.

She argued that extradition would violate her rights against double jeopardy under sections 7 and 11(h) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that section 11(h) does not apply to extradition hearings because the Charter cannot govern foreign criminal proceedings.

While section 7 applies to the Canadian executive's decision to surrender a fugitive, the surrender in this case did not violate the principles of fundamental justice because the federal and state offences contained different elements.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of his ex-wife.

The Crown advanced two theories: that the appellant personally killed the victim, or that he aided and abetted someone else to do so.

The trial judge instructed the jury that they could convict if they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the murder under either theory, without requiring unanimity on which specific theory occurred.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that section 21 of the Criminal Code makes the distinction between a principal and an aider/abettor legally irrelevant, and therefore jury unanimity on the exact mode of participation is not required provided all jurors are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused participated in the crime.