Le Dain

The respondent moved to dismiss the appellant's appeal in the Court of Appeal for failure to file a factum within the fixed delay.

A judge of the Court of Appeal granted the motion pursuant to art. 505 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the exercise of the judge's discretion was not reasonable given the circumstances.

The appellant was granted a peremptory delay of ten days to serve and file his factum.

The appellant was convicted of gross indecency, found to be a dangerous offender, and sentenced to indeterminate detention prior to the enactment of the Charter.

Subsequently, gross indecency was removed from the definition of 'serious personal injury offence' in the Criminal Code.

The appellant sought habeas corpus and Charter relief, arguing his continued detention was unlawful because his offence no longer qualified for indeterminate detention.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the change in the law did not alter his status as a dangerous offender and his continued detention did not violate the Charter.

The appellant appealed the temporary assignment of a co-worker to a newly created but unclassified supervisory position, arguing it was an appointment not based on merit under the Public Service Employment Act.

The Federal Court of Appeal had ruled that without a clear intent to create a position and make an appointment, no appointment occurred.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the objective facts, not the Department's intent, determine if an appointment occurred.

The Court found that the prolonged temporary assignment to new functions constituted an appointment to a position, triggering the merit principle and the right of appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that set aside his acquittal on a charge of dangerous driving and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the Court of Appeal did not err in rejecting the trial judge's finding that the accused drove as he did 'probably out of necessity'.

The appellant lawyer was convicted of contempt of court by a Provincial Court judge for conduct that occurred before a different judge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction, holding that a Provincial Court judge has no jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding for contempt committed before another judge.

The appellant appealed as of right from a judgment of the Yukon Court of Appeal that allowed a Crown appeal from his acquittal on a charge of breaking and entering.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law in the application of s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms based on subsequent jurisprudence.

The matter was returned for retrial.

The accused was charged with impaired driving.

After being informed of his right to counsel, he called his wife to contact a lawyer.

Immediately after the call, police demanded a breath sample, which he provided.

The trial judge convicted the accused, finding no Charter violation.

The District Court allowed the appeal, finding a violation.

The Court of Appeal restored the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the accused's right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was violated by the police's failure to afford him a reasonable opportunity to contact a lawyer, the breathalyzer evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The police's hastiness was provoked by the accused's actively obstructive and stalling behaviour, meaning the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant pleaded guilty to several offences including breaking and entering and using a weapon in a sexual assault.

Following the guilty pleas, the Crown applied to have the appellant declared a dangerous offender under Part XXI of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found the appellant to be a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the dangerous offender provisions violated sections 7, 9, 11, and 12 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the provisions do not violate the principles of fundamental justice, do not constitute arbitrary detention or cruel and unusual punishment, and that the offender is not entitled to a jury determination of dangerousness.

The respondents were charged with conspiracy to commit robbery.

At trial, they sought to introduce the results of a polygraph examination to support their credibility and deny participation in the conspiracy.

The trial judge refused to admit the evidence, and they were convicted.

The Court of Appeal allowed their appeal and ordered the trial reopened to consider the polygraph evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that polygraph evidence is inadmissible in criminal proceedings because it offends the rules against oath-helping, past consistent statements, and character evidence, and because assessing credibility is the exclusive province of the trier of fact.

The respondent entered the home of a 15-year-old girl uninvited, grabbed her breasts, and made suggestive comments.

He was convicted of sexual assault at trial, but the Court of Appeal substituted a conviction for common assault, holding that sexual assault required contact with genitalia.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the sexual assault conviction.

The Court held that sexual assault is an offence of general intent and is determined by an objective test of whether the sexual or carnal context of the assault is visible to a reasonable observer, considering all circumstances including the part of the body touched, words, and gestures.

The appellant, who had successfully appealed his impaired driving conviction to the Supreme Court of Canada based on a Charter breach, sought a rehearing to amend the judgment to award him costs on a solicitor and client basis.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the broad discretion to award costs under the Criminal Code should not be fettered by a general rule that successful accused appellants or those establishing Charter infringements are automatically entitled to costs.

The Court found no oppressive conduct by the Crown to justify such an award.

This was a motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The moving party sought leave against Saskatchewan et al.

The court dismissed the motion without reasons.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada from a decision of the Saskatchewan courts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged Quebec Labour Court proceedings arising from penal complaints under the Labour Code after a hearing date was reset in Montréal without prior notice while the parties attended at the originally scheduled courthouse in Val d'Or.

The Supreme Court held that setting the date and place of trial was not a purely administrative act and that the Chief Judge's decision and the hearing conducted in the parties' absence breached the audi alteram partem rule.

The Court further held that where nothing is done at the time and place fixed for trial, the tribunal loses jurisdiction over the information.

The appeal was allowed, the Court of Appeal judgment was quashed, and the Superior Court judgment authorizing evocation was restored.

The Telfords and Canadian Stanley exchanged parcels of land, each giving the other a mortgage.

Canadian Stanley assigned its mortgage from the Telfords to the Holts without notifying the Telfords.

When the Holts sued the Telfords for the mortgage debt, the Telfords sought to set-off the amount Canadian Stanley owed them on the reciprocal mortgage.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while legal set-off was unavailable due to the assignment destroying mutuality, equitable set-off applied because the two mortgages arose from the same closely interrelated land exchange transaction.

The Court allowed the appeal and permitted the set-off.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the deaths of his two adopted sons, who were found dead on a burning mattress in his town house.

The evidence against the appellant was entirely circumstantial, establishing that the boys were dead before the fire started and that the appellant had exclusive opportunity to commit the crime.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable under s. 613(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal correctly applied the test of whether the verdict is one that a properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered.

The Court also found that the Crown's failure to call the appellant's wife as a witness did not render the verdict unreasonable, as there was no evidence she possessed any knowledge of the events.

The appellant was charged with arson after a fire destroyed his clothing store.

At the close of the Crown's case, which rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, the trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal, finding the evidence gave rise only to suspicion.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge usurped the function of the jury by weighing the evidence.

Applying the Shephard test, the Court found there was admissible circumstantial evidence relating to motive, opportunity, and contradictions in the appellant's statement that, if believed by a properly instructed jury, could justify a conviction.

Following the death of their mother, two children refused to live with their father and repeatedly ran away to live with their aunt and uncle.

The aunt and uncle sought custody of the children.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while there was no serious cause to deprive the father of his parental authority under art. 654 C.C.Q., the paramount consideration under art. 30 C.C.L.C. is the child's interest.

The Court awarded custody to the aunt and uncle, finding that returning the children to their father would compromise their development, but preserved the father's parental authority and granted him visiting rights.

The appellant challenged a condition attached to its provincial entertainment licence that prohibited nude entertainment, arguing it infringed on the federal criminal law power over public nudity.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provincial legislation was intra vires as a valid regulatory scheme relating to property and civil rights and matters of a local nature.

The Court applied the double aspect doctrine, finding no direct conflict between the provincial licensing conditions and the Criminal Code provisions, allowing both to operate concurrently.