Theodore Sarantis

During a trial for second-degree murder and manslaughter, the Crown sought to introduce twenty-two post-mortem photographs of the deceased through a forensic pathologist.

The defence objected, arguing the photographs were highly prejudicial and of limited probative value.

The court balanced the probative value against the risk of reasoning prejudice, finding the photographs were relevant to the nature of the injuries and corroboration of eyewitnesses.

The court admitted twenty-one of the photographs, directing that three be presented in black and white to minimize any potential prejudice.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, raising grounds of appeal including errors in jury instructions regarding police narrative evidence, eyewitness identification, and prior statements, as well as the trial judge's refusal to quash a search warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions and no basis to interfere with the trial judge's Garofoli analysis regarding the search warrant.

The appellant appealed his conviction for theft.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's receipt being found in the complainant's stolen purse and the complainant's wallet being found near the appellant's residence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the only rational inference was the appellant's guilt.

On a blended voir dire in a robbery prosecution, the court considered the admissibility of post-arrest utterances made while the accused was detained in a police cruiser.

The court held the utterances were voluntary under the confessions rule, finding no oppression, inducement, or improper questioning.

Although the police breached s. 10(b) of the Charter by delaying access to counsel for many hours without sufficient evidentiary justification, the court declined to exclude the utterances under s. 24(2).

Applying the Grant factors, the court found the breach was not flagrant, the impact on protected interests was reduced because the police did not elicit the statements through investigative questioning, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits favoured admission.

On a pre-trial motion in a robbery prosecution, the Crown sought to tender police expert evidence interpreting a single slang word in text messages sent before the alleged offence.

The court held the proposed witness was properly qualified to give expert evidence on urban street language and coded words.

Applying the Mohan admissibility framework and the second-stage balancing described in Abbey and Boswell, the court found the opinion rested on very limited context and carried meagre probative value.

Because the probative value did not outweigh the potential prejudice, the proposed expert evidence was excluded.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon after stabbing an unarmed victim.

He appealed his convictions on several grounds, including allegations of juror coercion and outside influence, the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on self-defence under section 37 of the Criminal Code, and the trial judge's review of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the juror's allegations of coercion were protected by juror secrecy, the alleged outside influence was not capable of influencing the jury, and there was no air of reality to a self-defence claim under section 37.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for offences involving cocaine and a firearm found in a vehicle.

He argued the trial judge erred in upholding a police search of a black bag and in instructing the jury on constructive possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the police had reasonable grounds to open the bag for officer safety and the jury charge was appropriate given the firearm was in plain view.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence fell within the appropriate range.

The Court held that broad jury vetting consultations with police should not occur, that relevant jury-selection information from police must be disclosed, and that despite non-disclosure in this case there was no reasonable possibility the jury would have been differently constituted, no unfair trial, and no miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a sexual offence.

He argued the trial judge erred by relying on the complainant's prior consistent statements, treating his non-cooperation with police as consciousness of guilt, misapplying reasonable doubt regarding his physical limitations, and ignoring exculpatory portions of his statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge did not rely on the prior statements for credibility, properly addressed the physical limitations, and considered the exculpatory statement.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as no error was found in the sentence imposed.