John S. McInnes

The Court addressed whether Crown-requested police background checks of prospective jurors were permissible and what disclosure duties followed from that practice.

It held that limited criminal-record checks to assess juror eligibility are permissible, and that relevant information obtained for jury selection must be disclosed to the defence.

Applying the appellate non-disclosure framework, the Court found no reasonable possibility that disclosure failures changed jury composition.

The Court also held the impugned conduct did not meet the threshold for miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeals from conviction were dismissed.

The appellant challenged fraud convictions on the basis of improper jury vetting by prosecution offices and police database checks of prospective jurors.

The court held that while disclosure obligations were breached and some vetting conduct was improper, a new trial requires a reasonable possibility that proper disclosure would have produced a differently constituted jury.

On the record, that threshold was not met.

The court also held that the conduct did not amount to a miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court held that broad jury vetting consultations with police should not occur, that relevant jury-selection information from police must be disclosed, and that despite non-disclosure in this case there was no reasonable possibility the jury would have been differently constituted, no unfair trial, and no miscarriage of justice.