Robin K. McKechney

The appellant, an occupational therapist, appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding her guilty of professional misconduct, suspending her certificate of registration for four months, and ordering her to pay $26,000 in costs.

The misconduct arose from her failure to successfully complete an ethics course mandated by a previous disciplinary order, as she failed the course due to plagiarism in her final essay.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the appeal, finding that the Committee reasonably concluded she committed professional misconduct and that the penalty and costs awards were within a reasonable range and discretionary bounds.

The appellant, the sole director of a Canadian company that contracted to supply armoured vehicles to the United States government, appealed his committal for extradition to the US on fraud charges and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence that a civil relator action based on the same allegations had been dismissed in the US, arguing this created an issue estoppel and rendered the extradition an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review, holding that the fresh evidence was irrelevant to the extradition hearing judge's limited statutory role and that the Minister reasonably concluded that issue estoppel was a defence to be raised at trial in the requesting state.

The appellant, a personal support worker, pled guilty to assault and criminal harassment.

The Crown and defence agreed on a joint submission for an eight-month conditional sentence and one year's probation.

The sentencing judge rejected the joint submission and imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence followed by a six-month conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal, finding the sentencing judge failed to explain why the joint submission was contrary to the public interest or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The sentence was varied to accord with the joint submission.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in his application of the Grant framework after finding a section 8 Charter breach due to the failure to disclose a confidential informant's criminal record in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The appellant also argued the trial judge misapprehended inconsistencies in the surveillance evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence.

The trial judge reasonably accepted that the officer omitted the record to protect the informant's anonymity, and the surveillance evidence consistently described activities indicative of drug transactions.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault.

At trial, he argued the complainant consented, relying on evidence from the complainant's former common law spouse.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, characterizing the issue as mistaken belief in consent and failing to address the spouse's evidence.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the courts below fundamentally misunderstood the defence advanced and failed to consider critical evidence, rendering the reasons inadequate for appellate review.

The appellant appealed a committal for extradition to the Republic of Korea for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud, and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

The appellant argued the record of the case lacked sufficient basis for committal and contained inconsistencies and translation issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the will-say statements provided sufficient evidence of fraudulent transactions to support committal.

The application for judicial review was also dismissed, as the Minister was not required to seek assurances that the appellant would be tried only on particularized allegations.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following the stabbing death of his former intimate partner.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in the final instructions to the jury, specifically regarding the 'rolled-up' instruction on the intent for murder, the assessment of the appellant's evidence, and the defence of provocation.

The Court of Appeal found that the 'rolled-up' instruction was inadequate because it failed to draw together relevant factors, such as the deceased's provoking words and conduct, and failed to instruct the jury to consider the cumulative effect of this evidence on the appellant's state of mind.

Concluding that the errors in the final instructions were not overcome by the overwhelming nature of the prosecution's proof, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for resisting arrest, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a lawful arrest without addressing whether the police used excessive force.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's actions of pulling his hands and hiding them under his stomach constituted forceful opposition.

The court also held that because the issue of excessive force was not argued at trial as it was on appeal, the trial judge did not err in failing to specifically address it.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, extortion, attempted robbery, and failure to comply with probation.

He argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons and failed to properly assess eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against the convictions, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient and the identification evidence reliable.

However, applying the Kienapple principle, the court stayed the extortion conviction and quashed a duplicate probation breach conviction.