Leslie M. McIntosh

The applicant sought judicial review of an Adjudicator's order requiring the disclosure of six records under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The applicant argued the records were exempt under s. 13(1) as they contained advice or recommendations of a public servant.

The Divisional Court upheld the Adjudicator's decision to release Records I to V, finding it reasonable that they did not contain a recommended course of action.

However, the court overturned the decision regarding Record VI, finding that the proposed redactions clearly contained advice and recommendations and were therefore exempt from disclosure.

The appellants, providers of on-site sewage treatment systems, sued the Building Materials Evaluation Commission, its members, and the Crown for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages for misfeasance in public office.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim.

The Divisional Court struck the claim, finding the Commission was not a suable entity and the pleading lacked sufficient particulars of malice against the individual members.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the Commission lacks the legal capacity to be sued and that the bald allegations of bad faith and malice against the subcommittee members did not disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The Ministry of Correctional Services brought an application for judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal order requiring the production of settlement documentation.

The respondent employee sought the documents to prove the Ministry failed to implement previously ordered remedies for workplace racial discrimination.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the adjudicator correctly ordered production because the documents were relevant and necessary to address a compelling interest of justice, falling within an exception to settlement privilege.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister of Health's approvals regarding the privatization of hospital facilities.

A non-party, THICC, asserted that certain documents in the Minister's record were confidential.

A Master heard a motion regarding the content of the record and ruled the documents should be publicly filed.

THICC appealed, arguing the Master lacked jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court held that while a Master does not have jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory motion in a judicial review application, a judge may refer an interlocutory issue to a Master acting as a referee.

The Court found that the case management judge had directed such a reference and that the Master made no reversible error in applying the Sierra Club test to deny the sealing order.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Minister of Finance appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario which held that the definition of 'hedging' in the Mining Tax Act was restricted to contracts settled by physical delivery of gold from an Ontario mine.

The respondent, a mining company, had realized significant gains from financial hedging transactions that did not result in physical delivery, and excluded these gains from its profit computation based on the Minister's former administrative practice.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the statutory definition of 'hedging' extends to transactions that do not result in physical delivery.

The Court applied the modern approach to statutory interpretation, finding that the narrower interpretation would render parts of the statutory definition redundant.

The Children's Lawyer for Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision that dismissed its application for judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order.

The Commissioner had ordered the disclosure of certain records requested by a former client of the Children's Lawyer.

On judicial review, the Commissioner defended her decision on a new ground, arguing the Children's Lawyer was not acting as Crown counsel.

The Children's Lawyer challenged the Commissioner's standing to raise this new argument.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court properly exercised its discretion under the Judicial Review Procedure Act to grant the Commissioner full standing to ensure a fully informed adjudication.

The Minister of Health responded to two freedom of information requests by refusing to confirm or deny the existence of responsive records, relying on s. 21(5) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner held that the Minister must establish both that disclosure of the records would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy, and that disclosure of the mere existence of the records would itself convey information constituting an unjustified invasion of privacy.

The Divisional Court quashed the Commissioner's decision.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the standard of review was reasonableness and that the Commissioner's interpretation of s. 21(5) was reasonable.

The appeal was allowed and the application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services refusing to consent to the abolition of the municipal police force unless the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) agreed to binding arbitration regarding the hiring of a specific officer.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, finding that the Commission's jurisdiction under section 40(3) of the Police Services Act is limited to ordering arbitration between a police board and a member regarding severance pay.

The Commission had no statutory authority to order the OPP to submit to arbitration regarding an officer's suitability for employment.

The condition was set aside and the Commission was directed to consent to the termination.

The Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care sought judicial review of a decision by the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner.

The Commissioner had ordered the Ministry to confirm or deny the existence of records relating to a settlement with an individual, interpreting s. 21(5) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act as requiring a two-part test.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, finding that the Commissioner's interpretation was unreasonable and clearly wrong, as the plain language of s. 21(5) does not require the institution to prove that disclosing the mere existence of the record would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.

Liberty Mutual appealed an arbitration order requiring it to pay a special award under s. 282(10) of the Insurance Act for unreasonably withholding or delaying the payment of statutory accident benefits.

The Arbitrator had ordered a special award expressed as a percentage of the benefits owing.

On appeal, the Director of Arbitrations held that the percentage approach was inappropriate and that special awards must be expressed as a specific lump sum amount.

The Director also found the order was too vague to be enforceable.

Liberty Mutual's argument that the use of full-time government employees as arbitrators raised a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias was dismissed.

The appeal was allowed in part, the special award paragraph was rescinded, and the Director remained seized to determine the appropriate lump sum amount.

The Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services held a hearing into the conduct of the members of the Wallaceburg Police Services Board.

The Board had laid off three members of the police service (two cadets and one civilian communicator) to meet budget cuts, without obtaining the Commission's consent under section 40 of the Police Services Act.

The Commission found that the layoffs constituted a reduction in the size of the force, requiring consent, and that the Board's reliance on the probationary termination provisions in section 44 was improper.

The Commission concluded that the Board members' actions constituted misconduct and a failure to perform their duties in a satisfactory manner.

The four current members of the Board were removed from their positions.

Two female cocktail waitresses filed complaints alleging sex discrimination after they were required to wear a new uniform that they considered sexist and revealing.

The complainants refused to wear the uniform and subsequently lost their employment.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the complaints, finding that the uniform was consistent with commonly accepted social norms, was not unduly revealing, and that the waitresses were permitted to adapt it by wearing leotards and pinning the leg slits.

The Board concluded that the uniform requirement did not constitute discrimination on the basis of sex.

The complainant, a permanent resident of Canada born in India, was refused employment as a security guard by the respondent because he was not a Canadian citizen or British subject.

The Board of Inquiry found that the relationship between the respondent and its members was one of employment, bringing it within the scope of the Human Rights Code.

The Board held that discrimination based on citizenship constitutes discrimination based on nationality.

Furthermore, the respondent did not qualify for the exemption for exclusively fraternal or social organizations, and citizenship was not a bona fide occupational qualification.

The respondent was ordered to reconsider the complainant's application and pay $1,500 in damages for lost wages and hurt feelings.

The applicant brought an application under section 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act seeking a declaration that it is under the direction and control of the Crown in Right of Ontario and that they are related employers.

The Crown challenged the Board's jurisdiction, arguing that the Labour Relations Act does not bind the Crown pursuant to section 11 of the Interpretation Act.

The Board agreed, finding that the Labour Relations Act is not binding on the Crown.

The Board concluded it had no jurisdiction to find the Crown to be a related employer or bound by a collective agreement, and terminated the proceedings.