Georgia Tanner

The self-represented appellant requested an adjournment of the appeal hearing and indicated an expectation that the hearing would proceed by Zoom.

The Divisional Court granted the adjournment, directing that the rescheduled hearing proceed by Zoom and be peremptory to the appellant.

Costs of the day were reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

A land developer appealed the dismissal of his civil action against the City of Toronto as an abuse of process.

The developer had sought site plan approval and variance applications for a property development, all of which were denied through administrative processes including the Committee of Adjustment and the Toronto Local Appeal Body.

Rather than pursuing judicial review, the developer sued the City alleging impropriety and misconduct, seeking damages and costs.

The motion judge dismissed the action as a collateral attack on administrative decisions and refused leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no reviewable error and no basis to interfere with the discretionary decision to refuse amendment.

The appellant sought an extension of time to appeal a Fire Marshal Review decision regarding an inspection order for his property.

The appellant filed his original appeal past the 15-day deadline and subsequently filed a motion for an extension of time 12 days past the 30-day statutory limit for such motions.

The Fire Safety Commission dismissed the motion, finding the appellant failed to establish apparent grounds for the appeal or reasonable grounds for the delay, noting his explanations regarding feasibility studies and legal implications lacked detail and his intentions regarding the property had changed.

The moving party sought a panel review under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act of a single judge's decision denying an extension of time to apply for judicial review of a City Council zoning decision.

The moving party attempted to introduce new affidavit evidence, which the panel rejected as improper and available at the original hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the motion judge's discretionary decision to deny the extension due to unexplained delay and prejudice.

The applicant landlord, Java Investments Limited, applied for a declaration that its commercial lease with the tenant, Tkaronto Trees, was lawfully terminated, and sought to set aside a municipal barring order closing the premises due to unlicensed cannabis sales.

The tenant argued it had an indigenous sovereign right to operate the dispensary and was not subject to provincial cannabis laws.

The court held that provincial laws applied to the premises and implied terms into the lease requiring compliance with provincial law and prohibiting the tenant from exposing the landlord to prosecution.

Because the tenant breached these implied terms, the court declared the lease validly terminated, denied relief from forfeiture, set aside the barring order, and granted a permanent injunction and eviction order.

The applicant, a community organization, sought judicial review of an Ontario Land Tribunal decision dismissing their request to reconsider a zoning by-law amendment.

The amendment permitted a housing development for people leaving homelessness on a property already containing seniors' housing.

The applicant argued the development should be restricted to seniors leaving homelessness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decision reasonable and consistent with the Provincial Planning Statement, as restricting zoning by age would violate equality rights.

The Court also found no procedural unfairness despite inappropriate submissions by the respondent's counsel, though it denied costs to the successful respondent as a result.

The plaintiff, a land developer, brought an action against the City of Toronto seeking costs and damages after his application for site plan approval was denied and upheld by the Committee of Adjustments (COA) and the Toronto Land Appeal Board (TLAB).

The City brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's claim.

The court granted the motion, dismissing the action as an abuse of process, constituting a collateral attack on prior administrative decisions.

The court also found the plaintiff lacked legal capacity to bring the claim, as the property was owned by a corporation, and denied leave to amend the claim.

The defendant City of Toronto brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's slip and fall action for delay under Rule 24.01(1)(b) and (c).

The plaintiff conceded the delay was inordinate but argued it was excusable due to lawyer inadvertence and a lawyer winding down their practice.

The court found the delay excusable, noting the plaintiff's consistent intent to proceed and that no delay was her fault.

The court also found no actual prejudice to the City, despite some employees having retired, as there was no evidence they could not be located or provide evidence.

The motion to dismiss was dismissed, and the action was ordered to be set down for trial by October 1, 2025, with no costs awarded.

The moving party, a neighbourhood association, sought an extension of time to file an application for judicial review of a city council decision accepting a settlement proposal regarding a zoning by-law amendment and heritage designation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the initial delay in filing was explained, the delay in serving the motion caused significant prejudice to the developer who had relied on the settlement and subsequent Ontario Land Tribunal decision.

Furthermore, the court found no apparent grounds for relief, as the application was essentially a collateral attack on the unappealed tribunal decision.

A case conference was held to schedule a motion to extend the time for an application for judicial review regarding a development settlement.

The applicant sought procedural orders, including that the respondent pay for the cross-examination of its witness or that the examination be deferred to the hearing, and that the respondent deliver its factum early.

The court dismissed these requests, ordering that cross-examinations and factum delivery proceed in the ordinary course under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court also noted the corporate applicant requires leave to be represented by its member, who is a lawyer.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Toronto City Council regarding the amount of property taxes to be cancelled for the 2020 taxation year due to renovations that prevented normal use of the property.

The City had cancelled $191.90 based on a notional dwelling value of $32,000.

The Assessment Review Board rejected both the appellant's construction cost approach and the City's notional value approach.

Instead, the Board adopted the City's alternative approach of deducting the assessed value of comparable vacant land from the total property assessment, resulting in a dwelling value of $178,000.

The Board ordered the cancellation of $1,067.47 in property taxes for the 2020 taxation year.

The appellant, a general contractor, appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that the City of Toronto pay a construction holdback of $174,381.14.

The parties had previously entered into a global settlement of five lawsuits for $1,287,500, signing a release for all outstanding claims.

The appellant argued the holdback funds were impressed with a trust under the Construction Lien Act and separate from the settlement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the unambiguous terms of the settlement and release covered all claims, including the holdbacks, and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant, a retail appliance store, sought a declaration that it was permitted to remain open for in-person shopping during the COVID-19 grey lockdown stage in Toronto and Peel.

The applicant argued it qualified as an essential business under O. Reg 82/20, either as a 'hardware store' or as part of the construction supply chain.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the legislature intended the term 'hardware store' to be given its conventional, everyday meaning, which does not include a store exclusively selling home appliances.

The court rejected the applicant's attempt to stretch the plain language of the regulation.

The applicant, a home appliance retailer, sought an interim injunction to allow its showrooms to remain open despite being ordered to close under Covid-19 public health regulations.

The applicant argued it qualified as an essential 'hardware store' and would suffer irreparable financial harm if closed during the busy December retail season.

The court dismissed the request for interim relief, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried and potential irreparable harm, the balance of convenience favoured the respondents.

The court held that the public interest in enforcing public health measures to prevent the spread of Covid-19 outweighed the applicant's private economic interests at this preliminary stage.

Following the dismissal of an application regarding the removal of an illegally installed third-party rooftop sign, the successful respondent sought costs.

The applicant argued for no costs or a modest award, claiming the case involved issues of public importance.

The court rejected this argument, finding the legal issues straightforward and not novel.

The court awarded the respondent costs of $20,613.60, finding the amount reasonable for the hard-fought litigation.

The applicant sought to set aside a Notice of Violation issued by the City requiring the removal of a rooftop billboard sign.

The applicant argued the sign was a legal non-conforming use because a permit had been issued in 1959.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the original sign was replaced between 1978 and 1983 without a permit, and further substantial alterations were made in 2013 without a permit.

As the sign was never lawfully erected under the applicable by-laws, it did not qualify as a legal non-conforming use, and the City was not estopped from enforcing its sign by-law.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its action against the City of Toronto for damages arising from delayed and confusing billing for solid waste management services.

The appellant argued the City owed a common law duty of care to provide accurate and timely statements of account, and that had it known of the fees, it would have hired a private contractor.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no sufficient proximity between the City and the appellant to establish a common law duty of care beyond the City's statutory duty to inform the public.

A self-represented plaintiff sought leave to appeal from a Divisional Court order quashing her appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The original claim against the defendants sought damages totaling $350,000 but failed to articulate any recognizable cause of action.

The Superior Court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court quashed the subsequent appeal on jurisdictional grounds due to the monetary amounts involved exceeding its jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and imposed restrictions on future motions by the plaintiff without prior written leave from a panel.

The complainant sought a vacant unit property tax rebate for the 2011, 2012, and 2013 taxation years.

The applications were filed after the statutory deadline of the last day of February of the year following the vacancy.

The City rejected the applications as late.

The complainant appealed to the Assessment Review Board, seeking equitable relief.

The Board dismissed the appeals, finding that the statutory deadlines in the City of Toronto Act are mandatory and the Board lacks jurisdiction or discretion to extend them or grant equitable relief.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file an application for the reduction, cancellation, or refund of property taxes for the 2014 taxation year due to sickness or extreme poverty under s. 323(1)(e) of the City of Toronto Act, 2006.

The City of Toronto objected, arguing the Board lacked jurisdiction to extend the statutory deadline set out in s. 323(3).

The Assessment Review Board agreed with the City, finding that it has neither the authority nor the jurisdiction to extend a time limit prescribed by legislation.

The request for an extension of time was dismissed.