Courtney Boyd

The applicant, Berardi Construction, sought to rescind an order to comply issued by the County of Norfolk requiring a building permit for a retaining wall.

The court found that the retaining wall was not a "building" for the purposes of the Building Code Act and that no building permit was required.

The order to comply was rescinded, and the issue of damages was directed to proceed to trial.

The applicant sought an order declaring the enforcement of a second mortgage statute-barred and directing its discharge from title due to the expiry of the limitation period.

The respondent argued that an oral agreement extended the limitation period, relying on promissory estoppel and part performance.

The court found no credible evidence of an oral agreement, determined that promissory estoppel did not apply as there was no unambiguous promise or detrimental reliance, and concluded that the doctrine of part performance was inapplicable.

Consequently, the court declared the mortgage statute-barred and ordered its discharge.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision, arguing that his responsibilities had changed following the hiring of a new senior employee, which he contended amounted to a constructive dismissal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's argument directly contradicted the trial judge's factual findings.

The trial judge had expressly found that the appellant maintained his role as general manager, that there was no change in the company's hierarchy, and no evidence of a change in his remuneration or bonus package.

The appellate court concluded that the trial judge made no legal error and that her well-supported factual findings were fatal to the appellant's position.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a decision of the Local Planning and Appeal Tribunal that approved an official plan amendment and a zoning by-law amendment permitting the expansion of a casino.

The moving parties argued the Tribunal erred in law by allowing a 'rolling hold' under s. 36 of the Planning Act and by denying procedural fairness when it imposed time limits on evidence after the hearing had commenced.

The Divisional Court found reason to doubt the reasonableness of the Tribunal's interpretation of s. 36 and found the procedural fairness issue merited attention.

Leave to appeal was granted on both issues.

The applicant municipality sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision approving a zoning by-law passed by a neighbouring municipality to permit a major tourist destination, including a casino.

The applicant raised eight questions of law, arguing the OMB misinterpreted the Planning Act, regulations, and official plans regarding municipal council decisions, complete applications, holding provisions, and public works.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the OMB's interpretations were reasonable and within its specialized planning expertise.

This is a ruling on the admissibility of documentary evidence in a criminal trial involving allegations of fraud at a Salvation Army distribution facility.

The Crown sought to admit thousands of documents obtained through internal audits and police investigations, including business records from the Salvation Army's Railside facility, emails, manifests, driver logs, invoices, and tax receipts.

The defendants challenged the admissibility of these documents on various grounds.

The court conducted a comprehensive voir dire to determine which documents could be admitted as business records under the Canadian Evidence Act, common law exceptions, or the principled approach to hearsay.